Khan, Zulfqar

Abstract
It is argued that, Pakistan’s “full spectrum” nuclear strategy is based upon the concept of proportionate calibration against the perceived threat of a limited strike by the conventionally much superior military forces of India. Pakistan’s strategy is emitting robust signaling vis-à-vis the apparent strikes with the objective to deter the adversary from operationalizing its flawed limited war doctrine. Moreover, its strategic nuclear forces would perform the function of a dynamic reserve asset and as an ultimate deterrent against India. Most significantly, it would convince India of consequences in the case of deliberate escalation of a crisis or plan of a limited military operation. In essence, it also sufficiently reflects Pakistan’s preparation and “willingness to fight.” In the absence of a conflict resolution mechanism, diplomatic dialogue, both countries’ nuclear deterrent capabilities are expected to perpetuate the element of uncertainty especially during crises.
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