Dasgupta, C

Summary
Based on declassified documents, the book throws new light on the roles played by Mountbatten and the British service chiefs in the Kashmir war of 1947-48 and explains why India took the Kashmir issue to the UN, why it did not carry the war into Pakistan and why it accepted a ceasefire. Examining archival material that has not been looked at previously and attempting an important reassessment of Mountbatten’s role, the book highlights the fact that India’s first Governor-General was not a mere constitutional figurehead. The book shows that he used — and abused — this authority to ensure that the conflict in Kashmir did not escalate into a full-scale inter-dominion war.
A study of British policy in Kashmir must begin with an examination of the strategic interests of Britain in the subcontinent. The book explains the diplomatic background to the military developments of the time, tracing the evolution of British policy on Kashmir and its orchestration of the moves of western powers in the Security Council. The book provides details from the British archives about the secret understandings between Commanders-in-Chief of the rival armies to contain the conflict. It reveals, for instance, that India’s Commander-in-Chief, General Bucher, had tried as early as March 1948 to negotiate an informal truce with his counterpart in Pakistan, without the knowledge of the Indian government. A revealing study about a controversial incident in India’s military history, this is a timely book, especially in the post-Agra Summit period.