Clarke, Michael

Abstract
This essay presents two interconnected arguments in this context. First, it suggests that BRI is clearly motivated by Beijing’s desire to resolve long-term domestic, economic, and geopolitical challenges. Domestically, BRI is guided by China’s ongoing state-building agenda in its traditional frontier regions (such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan). Economically, BRI flows from the quest of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to ensure the ongoing economic growth on which its legitimacy depends by finding new outlets for Chinese capital and exports. Geopolitically, BRI with its focus on developing trans-Eurasian connectivity centered on China, speaks to Beijing’s desire to construct a viable strategic and economic alternative to the current international order. Second, BRI constitutes a grand strategy that integrates these factors in pursuit of Beijing’s decades-long goal of returning to great-power status without provoking overt counterreactions from its neighbors and the United States. As such, BRI did not spring fully formed from the mind of Xi but builds on the corpus of foreign and security policy concepts bequeathed by his successors. Most significantly, BRI represents an overturning of Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim of “biding time and building capabilities.” Xi’s vision, embodied in BRI, posits China’s continued economic development and stability as an engine of regional and global stability.
PDF (must purchase access)