Ciorciari, John D., and Jessica Chen Weiss

Abstract
The past summer was a tempestuous one for Sino-Vietnamese relations. In May and June 2011, Vietnam accused China of deliberately cutting the cables of oil exploration vessels in the western Spratly Islands, calling the second incident a “premeditated and carefully calculated” attack. China responded by accusing Vietnam of “gravely violating” its sovereignty by conducting “invasive activities.”1 Both sides flexed their muscles by holding naval exercises in the disputed area, and Chinese state-owned media warned Vietnam of possible military “counterstrikes.” In July, Vietnam reported that Chinese forces beat a Vietnamese fishing captain and drove his ship out of disputed waters.3 In Hanoi and Ho Chih Minh City, protesters vented anger at China in a series of rare public demonstrations. Tensions arguably reached their most dangerous level since the two former Cold War adversaries normalized relations in 1991.
Both China and Vietnam have sought to mobilize diplomatic support abroad and manage rising nationalism at home. Vietnam has been more successful at courting international support, but in broadcasting its grievances it has aroused nationalist forces at home and abroad that could jeopardize a negotiated solution. China is also constrained,criticized for its “assertive” behavior abroad while facing domestic demands to take a harder line. Both states recently agreed to return to the negotiating table, but they remain far apart on questions of territorial sovereignty, and the dispute continues to feed into powerful currents of nationalism and popular frustration in both countries. These domestic forces exacerbate the difficult task of forging a peaceful resolution to the complex multiparty dispute in the South China Sea.
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