Abstract: History suggests that the most probable consequence of the Singapore Summit will be difficult and lengthy negotiation followed by slow and inadequate compliance, quite possibly on both sides.
Country or Region: South Korea
Dhawan, Ranjit Kumar
Abstract: The Narendra Modi government after coming to power in May 2014 initiated the ‘Act East’ policy to further enhance New Delhi’s engagement with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. However, India’s engagement with the two Koreas has not seen any significant improvement under the Modi government. North Korea’s isolationist policies and its involvement with India’s neighbouring countries with regard to the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies have proved detrimental for relations between New Delhi and Pyongyang. Following the United Nations Security Council resolutions India has restricted its trade relations with North Korea since 2017, except for food and medical assistance to this reclusive state. On the other hand, India’s interest in South Korea also appears to have waned as bilateral trade relations have not witnessed any dramatic improvement in recent years. Despite South Korea’s claims of being a ‘middle power’ country, its reluctance to take a stand on several issues that concern India has diminished hopes for further improvement in relations between New Delhi and Seoul. This article seeks to discuss the issues and challenges that hamper the improvement of relations between India and the two Koreas in the context of the Modi government’s ‘Act East’ policy.
Jackson, Van
Abstract: Why might bilateral antagonism prove resilient to incentives for improvement from multilateral cooperation with shared third parties? Prominent theories predict that two actors with a record of cooperation in multilateral contexts would cooperate bilaterally as well; multilateralism is generally thought harder than bilateralism and provides opportunities for exposure and socialization that can facilitate preference convergence. This article presents Japan–South Korea relations as a deviant case for such expectations in the cooperation literature. Rather than think of multilateral cooperative contexts as “bridges” that facilitate closer, positive relations between actors, this case shows that multilateralism can instead be a “buffer” between two actors with negatively valenced ties, mediating bilateral friction sufficient to facilitate functional cooperation while insulating antagonistic national discourses or bilateral policies from pressures for change. In the case of Japan–South Korea relations, a pattern of simultaneous cooperation (with shared third parties) and friction (in bilateral interactions) over the same period illustrates a potential buffering logic of multilateralism; the multiparty context diffuses accountability for cooperative behavior that might otherwise generate domestic audience costs and allows policy elites to frame cooperation in a way that downplays or ignores the other.
Park, Seo-Hyun
Abstract: This article is about rhetorical framing and its effects on foreign policy outcomes – specifically in intra-alliance relations. It argues that leaders’ attempts to change the framing of existing security concepts alter the context – and cost – of alliance cooperation. In particular, I highlight the mechanism of rhetorical entrapment as the causal link between initial rhetorical action and the changed context of alliance cooperation. While previous studies of rhetorical entrapment have focused on individual-level reputational costs – such as moral shaming or political backlash when hypocrisy is exposed – I focus on the socially constructed nature of political rhetoric and the consequences of language use. That is, I explore why leaders are compelled to choose certain security rhetoric in the first place and how social resonance and audience receptivity can present unintended political constraints and hidden costs. In this way, the findings from this article contribute to two separate bodies of work in the field of International Relations that have yet to be examined closely in tandem: the role of foreign policy rhetoric employed by leaders as part of their political legitimation strategies, and the domestic politics of alliance cooperation. Through comparative case studies of Japan and South Korea prior to and during the early stages of the Iraq War, I demonstrate the role of rhetorical entrapment in explaining the politics of alliance cooperation.
Easley, Leif-Eric, and Kyuri Park
Abstract: Middle power identity and interests claimed by South Korean leaders predict a foreign policy of multilateralism, institution building, and contributions to global public goods. South Korea is indeed active in global governance, but its regional diplomacy for much of the Park Geun-hye administration defied middle power expectations. In recent years, Seoul appeared to apply a strategy of isolating and pressuring Tokyo, while behaving like a smaller power showing deference to Beijing. Existing literature offers several explanations for failures to implement middle power diplomacy: historical memory impediments (e.g., Japan), budgetary constraints (e.g., Canada and Australia), stalled regionalization (Brazil and Turkey), and inadequate economic development (India and Indonesia). Finding these explanations insufficient for the South Korean case, this article shows how anti-Japan identity and Korean unification interests at times overwhelmed South Korean middle power identity and interests, respectively. The article offers implications for the growing category of states considered middle powers and concludes with policy recommendations for how Seoul can adjust its mismatched diplomacy to serve as a constructive middle power in Asia.
Sakaki, Alexandra, and Junya Nishino
Abstract: Although historical disputes have periodically upset Japan–South Korea relations for decades, the deterioration of ties after 2011 was unprecedented. Focusing on the string of events that led to the rapid bilateral downturn, this article analyses Japan’s changing strategic thinking on South Korea. It finds that Japanese policy-makers perceive a strong overlap in strategic interests with Seoul on two issues, namely the North Korean threat and the United States’ presence in Asia. However, both structural changes in the region—including China’s rise and shifts in the relative power between Japan and South Korea—and domestic developments are undermining Tokyo–Seoul relations. We identify three fault-lines that have opened up in the relationship and are compounding existing sources of friction: strategic, historical–psychological and economic fault-lines. The strategic fault-line in particular weighs heavily on ties, with Tokyo and Seoul diverging in their approaches to China. Trends in all three fault-lines have combined to foster mutual suspicion about intentions and strategic orientation. Overall, Japanese policy-makers feel that their capability to bring about a reset in relations with Seoul is limited. This creates a predicament for Tokyo, as it recognizes South Korea as a strategically important country, especially in facing North Korea.
Yang, Xiangfeng
Abstract: In tackling the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, President Donald Trump has invested—especially before the dramatic turn of events since early 2018—a great deal of political capital in President Xi Jinping in the hopes that he might rein in North Korea, China’s traditional ally. However, expecting Beijing to ‘solve’ the problem is unrealistic. Chinese thinking on North Korea—as reflected in policy positions and domestic debates—has been marred by inconsistencies and overcaution and it is now further complicated by the intensifying geopolitical competition with the United States, which also embroils, to a varying degree, South Korea and Taiwan. Beijing has been strenuously walking a fine line between pressing Pyongyang and averting a war, all the while watching its back, particularly with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Beijing’s risk aversion over North Korea and its security competition with the US has led it into a geopolitical conundrum from which there is no clear exit.
Bitzinger, Richard A
Abstract: Asia is a leading consumer of arms, and some of the most modern and most advanced armaments are finding their way into the inventories of Asian militaries. As a result, many Asian-Pacific militaries have experienced a significant, if not unprecedented, build-up over past several years, both in terms of quantity and quality. In addition to this trend, however, Asia has become an increasingly significant producer of armaments. Many nations in the region, if they can, have sought to supplant, or at least supplement, foreign arms suppliers with indigenous producers of needed weapons systems. However, for most Asian-Pacific militaries (the possible exception being China) indigenously produced weapons add only partial value to military capabilities. Consequently, imports of advanced weaponry remain a critical dependency for most of Asian-Pacific nations.
Markowski, Stefan, Satish Chand, and Robert Wylie
Abstract: In this paper, we use new data on military expenditure (milex) compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to investigate the relationship between military spending and economic growth. We focus on selected countries in Indo-Pacific Asia – an economically diverse but increasingly prosperous region with pockets of strategic competition and growing milex. We confirm the robustness of SIPRI’s milex data by corroborating it with defence budget data published by Australia’s Defence Intelligence Organisation (ADIO). We find no conclusive evidence of an arms race in the region. It is the growing economic prosperity that accounts for most of the growth in Indo-Pacific Asia’s milex. But we also find wide variations in the economic burden imposed by milex at the national level and that milex’ high level of aggregation masks important changes in national military capabilities. We argue that such capabilities can increase despite a constant or even declining milex burden and, hence, prejudice the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and, thus, undermine the fragile regional stability. We propose limited disaggregation of milex to highlight national spending on military force structure and preparedness so as to facilitate better understanding of military capability formation.
Morin, Jean-Frédéric, Omar Serrano, Mira Burri, and Sara Bannerman
Abstract: Rising economies face a crucial dilemma when establishing their position on international patent law. Should they translate their increasing economic strength into political power to further developing countries’ interests in lower levels of international patent protection? Or, anticipating a rising domestic interest in stronger international patent protection, should they adopt a position that favours maximal patent protection? Drawing on multiple case studies using a most-similar system design, we argue that rising economies, after having been coerced into adopting more stringent patent standards, tend to display ambivalent positions, trapped in bureaucratic politics and caught between conflicting domestic constituencies. We find that the recent proliferation of international institutions and the expansion of transnational networks have contributed to fragmentation and polarisation in domestic patent politics. As a result, today’s emerging economies experience a more tortuous transformative process than did yesterday’s. This finding is of particular relevance for scholars studying rising powers, as well as for those working on policy diffusion, regulatory regimes, transnational networks and regime complexes.
Ki, Jung Jung, Hyeon Gon Lee, Sei-Hun Yun, Yeong-Kook Oh, and Hyeon K. Park
Abstract
This overview discusses the status of fusion energy development in the Republic of Korea. Korea studies fusion energy through research and development in 2 ways: one by performing the Korea Superconducting Tokamak Advanced Research (KSTAR) for a domestic approach and the other by participating in the international collaboration project ITER. Korea had remarkable progresses not only in KSTAR but also in the ITER project in 2016. In KSTAR, a world record of more than 70 seconds in high‐performance plasma (H‐mode) operation in the superconducting tokamak has been achieved. For the ITER project, toroidal field conductors have been successfully accomplished and the other major equipment such as vacuum vessel sectors, ports, and assembly tooling seem to be reaching an end. This paper deals with current research and development results on both fields of KSTAR study and ITER project progress.
Van Ness, Peter, and Mel Gurtov, eds
Abstract
Learning from Fukushima began as a project to respond in a helpful way to the March 2011 triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown) in north-eastern Japan. It evolved into a collaborative and comprehensive investigation of whether nuclear power was a realistic energy option for East Asia, especially for the 10 member-countries of ASEAN, none of which currently has an operational nuclear power plant. We address all the questions that a country must ask in considering the possibility of nuclear power, including cost of construction, staffing, regulation and liability, decommissioning, disposal of nuclear waste, and the impact on climate change. The authors are physicists, engineers, biologists, a public health physician, and international relations specialists. Each author presents the results of their work.
Arms Control Today, editorial
Preview
The nuclear danger posed by North Korea is not new. But since the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House, a bad situation has become far worse. Now, as Trump readies for a trip to East Asia, the crisis enters a critical phase.
Davenport, Kelsey
Preview
North Korea’s test of a ballistic missile capable of longer ranges poses an immediate challenge to newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who campaigned on an engagement-oriented approach to dealing with Pyongyang. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is showing no sign of making that easy as he continues to defy international demands that he halt nuclear weapons activities and missile testing.
Watts, Robert C., IV
Abstract
China’s purported fears about the introduction of defensive missiles into South Korea are likely insincere or misplaced, leaving concerns about the beneficial effects on U.S. alliances as the probable explanation for its opposition.
