Kamath, P.G

Abstract: The question that arises is – can the countries of North East Asia cooperate and bring stability in the region? For any meaningful cooperation in North East Asia, two factors stand out that would always cast their shadow on the geo-political relations among the countries of the region. First, is the historical baggage carried by Japan for her ruthless invasions in the first half of the twentieth century. The Russo-Japanese War broke the might of a European power by an Asian power and subjected Russia to a humiliating treaty at Portsmouth. It resulted in Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula and the resulting oppression and use of Koreans as ‘comfort women’ for the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War. Then was the Sino-Japanese war; the rape and sack of Nanking and the atrocities that were committed on its people by the Japanese Imperial Army, was indeed a sad chapter, as yet unforgotten in the minds of the Chinese. All this has caused xenophobia among the Chinese and Koreans towards Japan. It may take another generation to heal the wounds and soothe the minds for positive relations to be built. Full text available here

Kelly, Robert E

Abstract: The years 2017–2019 have been remarkable in the long stand-off with North Korea,
as much for the drama of war-threats and then summits, as for the durability of the
North Korean status quo. Indeed, given all the sturm-und-drang of both hawkish
and then dovish approaches to North Korea since 2017, the greatest surprise is how
little both alternatives have accomplished ‘on the ground.’ This essay investigates
surprise—why is the North Korean status quo so persistent? Specifically, why
have the hawkish and dovish deviations from the status quo since 2017 so failed
to change much? Several hypotheses derived from levels of analysis theory in
international relations are suggested. In brief, a leader level analysis would focus
particularly on Trump’s personality—his swings of interest, his personalistic
bargaining style, his sloth, his chaotic staffing. A domestic analysis would identify
the divisions within both the United States and South Korea over policy toward
the North. And a structural answer would posit the value of nuclear deterrence
as the cause particularly of Trump’s failure to budge Pyongyang. Because North
Korean intentions, particularly Kim’s psychological preferences, are only poorly
discernible, assigning causal weight to each hypothesis is quite difficult so long as
the North’s opacity persists. Hence this essay focuses on concept and hypothesis
development while nonetheless laying out what evidence there is. Full text available here

Sohn, Hanbyeol

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to assess the strategic environment of the Republic
of Korea (ROK) and to examine what strategies the ROK will develop ahead of
the 2020 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear arms control policy-making is very
complex for the ROK because of its specific security dilemma. And the role and
strategy of the ROK in international regimes are increasingly important for the
ROK’s security and status in the world. Thus, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons and its review process including the Review Conference and
Preparatory Committee are particularly essential to the ROK. In 2020 when the
10th Review Conference will be held, the ROK should present an appropriate
strategy. For this, this article first outlines the establishment and development of the
NPT and its review process from 1995 to 2015, after the Cold War and the North
Korean nuclear issue was raised. And it describes the ROK’s role played in the
NPT on the basis of its three pillars and suggests what strategies Korea must retain:
Nuclear disarmament and security assurances from Russia and China; Coercing the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to rejoin the NPT; Continuing the
momentum of the Nuclear Security Summit; and Setting and leading a new agenda.
This study concludes with a forecast that the year 2020 will be a major turning point
for Korea. Full text available here.

Zhu, Qin, and Xiuyu Fang

Abstract: Tensions flared for a time after North Korea’s fifth and sixth nuclear tests as well as
THAAD’s entry into South Korea. This paper extends the view that the root cause
of these issues is the lack of regional public goods (RPGs) on the Korean Peninsula,
and its insufficiency results from three major conflicts in the politico–economic
situation of the Peninsula. In order to resolve the issues and maintain lasting peace,
three specific aspects, i.e., in diplomacy, security and economy, are to be addressed
in carrying out the long-term mission of supplying RPGs to the Peninsula. For
effective operation and comprehensive management of the RPGs provision, an
integration platform with powerful commitments is called for, i.e., “Association of
Trans-Korean Peninsula Nations” (ATKPN) co-established by China, the United
States, and the two Koreas. Apart from the dilemma commonly identified in the
delivery of RPGs, the ATKPN also faces dilemmas specifically from the Northeast
Asian order. To overcome the ATKPN’s obstacles, concerted efforts are needed to
promote the institutionalization of Sino–U.S. “new type of great power relations,”
to transform the function of the alliance system, and to cultivate the awareness of
“common external threats.” Full text available here.

Kwon, Edward

Abstract: This paper analyzes the background of the nuclear stalemate between Trump and Kim in the Hanoi Summit and investigates various issues involving North Korean denuclearization, including a detailed roadmap and proper compensation for Pyongyang. The paper uses tree cardinal perspectives of analytical tools (the will of the leader, nuclear capability, and nuclear strategy) to critically assess North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and fathom Kim Jong Un’s stance on denuclearization. The United States reaffirms CVID/FFVD principles regarding North Korea’s WMD, while Pyongyang prefers an action-for-action method of denuclearization. Although Pyongyang has announced an end to its nuclear testing and has shut down nuclear facilities, experts question whether Pyongyang really is dismantling its nuclear program. Pyongyang’s hidden nuclear facilities and accumulation of HEU in numerous places, the complicated process of verification, as well as potential traps in the details of the denuclearization agreement pose a big challenge. In light of the current nuclear stalemate, President Moon’s mediating effort to bring Kim Jong Un back to the denuclearization table is imperative. Full text available here

Cha, Victor D.

Abstract: Prudent leaders must always contemplate the unintended consequences of their foreign policy successes, particularly when those secondary consequences create negative externalities. In this article, I look at whether the unintended consequence of the South Korean government’s push for a peace declaration on the Korean peninsula could create the conditions by which the United States, led by an impulsive American president, could withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. I first document the rationale behind the South Korean government’s approach to peace diplomacy with North Korea. I then examine the concept of the peace declaration, which is different from a ratifiable treaty, and the “catch-22” of this declaration as it relates to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Finally, I analyze how a superficial peace declaration will not address core national security concerns of either ally, and how it could create unintended consequences with regard to troop drawdowns. This research features an original and unique dataset that documents Donald Trump’s transactional view of U.S. military commitments to its allies over the past three decades. Full text available here

Chung, Kyung-young

Abstract: This study aims to develop a strategy for building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and to explore a desirable future of the United Nations Command (UNC) in the event that the Korean Peninsula peace treaty is signed. The study draws lessons learned from the inter–Korean dialogues and proposes a peace regime initiative consisting of North Korea denuclearization, transition of wartime operational control, a security regime in Northeast Asia and a peace treaty. There is a controversial debate regarding the dissolution or continuing presence of the UNC after a peace treaty. This article proposes the twenty nations involved to reorganize the UNC to consist of the UN Security Council P+5, the two Koreas, and thirteen nations as member states of the UNC in order to play a supervisory role in a peace treaty through the transformation of the Demilitarized Zone to a peace zone. The article makes a policy recommendation related to the UNC Reorganization Roadmap. The first phase is to consult with the United States on the future of the UNC after a peace treaty in the event of substantial progress of North Korea’s denuclearization. In addition, the ROK–U.S. should discuss and agree to the command relations between the future Combined Forces Command and the UNC in terms of armistice, wartime and contingency plans in the event of the transition of wartime operational control. The second phase is to recuperate the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and consult with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the reorganization of the UNC for the Korean Peninsula peace treaty. The third phase is to reactivate the reorganized UNC in a supervisory role for a peace treaty. Full text available here.

Han, Sukhee

Abstract: Despite 25 years of unprecedentedly friendly ties between South Korea and China, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) disputes and China’s ensuing sanctions against South Korea have forced the bilateral relationship into an unprecedented standoff. Given South Korea’s growing dependence on China in economic and North Korean affairs, commentators always assumed that the South Korean government would “manage” this relationship. China has maintained a close relationship to keep South Korea within its orbit, restraining Seoul from further efforts to strengthen the U.S.–South Korean alliance. However, the Park Geun-hye government’s decision to respond to North Korea’s incessant provocations by deploying the THAAD system in South Korea caused China to implement economic retaliation. The ensuing paralysis of bilateral relations has lasted for over a year. A key problem for the future of the bilateral relationship is the fact that both countries have lost trust in each other. China views South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD as a betrayal of its support, while South Korea objects to China’s relentless economic bullying. Consequently, post–THAAD South Korea–China relations are likely to reflect South Korea’s efforts to reduce its dependency on China and to manage its development in a more balanced way. Full text available here

Lee, Chang-Wee

Abstract: China has a long coastline of approximately 18,000 kilometers and hence an extensive continental shelf as well as an EEZ. Its coastline is said to be the tenth longest coastline in the world. The total sea area in the China Seas is about 4.7 million square kilometers. Despite these advantageous circumstances in geography, China failed to become a maritime power like Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK. So it remained a land power for a long time except when Zheng He, the great seafarer in Chinese history, led the greatest ocean-going fleets of the world of that time, sailing to the Pacific and Indian Oceans during the years of 1405–1433. As a result, China suffered foreign invasions several times from the sea, being defeated in the Opium War as well as at the Sino–Japanese War in the nineteenth century.
It is only natural that China has opposed the traditional freedom of the seas claimed by the maritime powers since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. When China took part in all the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) sessions, its policy and position on the major issues were almost identical with those of the developing countries: creeping jurisdiction policy. With regard to the breadth of the territorial sea, China supported and complied with the 12 nautical mile territorial sea. It has established straight baselines since it proclaimed territorial sea in 1958. Also it argued that several disputed islands were its territories by the 1958 declaration as well as by the 1992 law on the territorial sea. China’s policy on the law of the sea, however, might change dramatically in accordance with the general trends of the law of the sea. China ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) in 1996, 14 years after signing it. Thus China has committed itself to developing its domestic laws and regulations on maritime affairs in accordance with the 1982 LOSC and to meet the demands and changed circumstances in the use of oceans. Given the foregoing, this paper attempts to provide China’s policy on the territorial sea in the context of its change in the law of the sea. To be more specific, it examines relevant issues on the breadth of the territorial sea, baselines as well as innocent passage of warships in terms of U.S.–China relations, with special emphasis on the comparison with Korea’s relevant policy on the law of the sea.

Lee, Choongkoo

Abstract: To North Korea, the denuclearization plan of the Korean Peninsula is the first of its reactions to the American nuclear issue, and a regional ban on nuclear weapons that the country concerned can propose in order to deal with the regional nuclear issue. North Korea had already shown an interest in the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in 1954; however, it began to assert the establishment of a NWFZ in the Korean Peninsula by applying the concept to their security environment in 1976, in which it started its activities as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.
The implementation of North Korea’s denuclearization policy on the Korean Peninsula unfolded in 1986, as North Korea authorized its plan for the denuclearization of the Peninsula as an immediate objective of its diplomatic activities. That is, North Korea pursued the establishment of a denuclearized zone on the Peninsula with the goal of managing its relationship with the Soviet Union and strengthening diplomacy of the Non-Aligned in 1986. Even though North Korea’s traditional claim for denuclearization of the Peninsula no longer served as an immediate task after 1994, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis was resolved, it re-emerged at the policy-level due to the 9.19 Joint Statement in 2005. Such re-authorization as party discourses was influenced by the engagement of the United States and South Korea, and active persuasion by China. It is noted that the denuclearization policy for the Korean Peninsula was re-authorized as party discourses of North Korea even after their declaration of nuclear–state status.
Though this assertion towards denuclearization of the Peninsula remained as party discourses even after the suspension of the Six–Party Talks, it is yet unclear whether their willingness to pursue this policy has once again been reinforced at the higher levels amid the recent situation of the inter–Korean and U.S.–North Korea dialogues. It is inevitable that the diplomatic solution for the North Korean nuclear issue shall begin by reinforcing the denuclearization argument in North Korea. It is time to draw the international community’s coordinated engagement to make North Korea choose denuclearization more clearly. Full text available here

Ohm, Tae-am

Abstract: The Republic of Korea, now more than ever, faces more security challenges, strategic dilemmas, and policy tasks. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, after consolidating his power base internally and with his nuclear and ICBM programs completed, has begun negotiations with President Donald Trump of the United States to guarantee his regime security. Although a reconciliatory atmosphere within inter–Korean relations continues cautiously after the PyeongChang Winter Olympics and the Panmunjom Inter–Korean Summit, many issues remain before tensions disappear from the Korean Peninsula. The U.S.–DPRK Summit in Singapore resulted in an overall direction of “efforts” to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. However, Korean people, well aware of North Korean behavior in the past, are in no hurry to predict its resolution. The trade war between the United States and China, being a global power struggle at its core, might become fiercer until it reaches climax. The Trump administration has ended sequestration—a legacy from the Obama administration—and significantly increased its defense budget, while slashing foreign aid and demanding that major allies, such as NATO member states and the ROK, take on a bigger burden of shared defense costs. The United States seeks to cement its superpower status for the future. China is undertaking some countermeasures, i.e., continued defense investments; a second sea trial for its aircraft carrier, which is a part of a wider program to acquire ten aircraft carriers by 2049; building military bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea; strengthening its economic and military partnership with Russia; and dramatically expanding its cyber forces. As the growth of Chinese military power has become a concern for countries in the region, the ROK confronts a particularly notable strategic dilemma. This is because inter–Korean relations, the ROK–U.S. alliance, and ROK–China relations are intricately overlapping in all areas. For the ROK, the security alliance with the United States continues to be a critical security asset. Full text available here.

Li, Jun

Abstract: In 2017, the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula has been marked by ongoing crises.However,the situation is one of conflict without complete break. There is neither dialog nor mitigation in the overall situation,nor is there strong condemnation leading to the military conflict. However, with increasingly fierce competition among countries related to the Korean Peninsula, uncertainty and complexity becomes increasingly obvious. Full text available here.

He, Kai

Abstract: This article proposes a new concept of ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ to describe the puzzling institutional building efforts by non-ASEAN members after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) in the Asia-Pacific. It suggests that different to ‘multilateralism 1.0’ of the 1990s, which was mainly led by ASEAN, this wave of multilateralism has been initiated by other powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, Australia and South Korea, either by forming new institutions or by reinvigorating existing ones. This article advances an institutional balancing argument. It suggests that ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ is a result of institutional balancing among major states under the conditions of high strategic uncertainty and high economic interdependence after the GFC. One unintended consequence may be that it could well lead to a more peaceful transformation of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific if regional security hotspots, such as the Korean crisis and the South China Sea dispute, can be managed appropriately. Full text available here.

Hundt, David, and Sooyoung Kim

Abstract: This article analyses elite opinion in South Korea about China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) in order to better understand how this Asia-Pacific middle power and US ally is approaching the initiative. Through a close analysis of the writing of foreign-policy elites in South Korea, the study finds that OBOR was generally depicted as significant to China’s re-emergence in regional and global affairs, but not as wholly detrimental to South Korean interests. Elites did not speak with one voice, but presented the government with a comparatively sanguine view of OBOR. The debate, we illustrate, created unlikely alliances between left- and right-leaning elites about some aspects of the initiative, but it also revealed tensions among conservative and centrist elites. In seeking to demonstrate their relevance to policymakers, however, elites inadvertently underlined their growing distance from the general public.

Ko, Sangtu

Abstract: The North Korean nuclear problem has remained unsolved for 25 years. A variety of approaches can be used to resolve the problem, ranging from economic incentives to dialogues, sanctions, and military strikes, but sanctions appear to be the most plausible solution as a realistic method. Still, the question remains how to make sanctions against North Korea more effective. This article focuses on a regional approach to international cooperation and suggests that a regional security arrangement should be established in Northeast Asia to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Today, the international order is undergoing change. Globalization is in retreat. Under these circumstances, international problems seem to be solved most effectively through regional cooperation. Northeast Asia has no significant regional cooperation arrangements. A successful regional cooperation requires two elements. First, the South Korean government needs to utilize the North Korean nuclear problem, redefining it as a threat to regional peace; such a shift in threat recognition would elevate the importance of a regional solution. Second, the process of building a regional arrangement needs institutionalization. The existing regional dialogues can hardly help solve the nuclear problem. In this sense, it is necessary to recalibrate the Six‐Party Talks as an institution implementing sanctions as resolutions adopted in the UN Security Council.