Shin, Jongho

Abstract: This study analyzes the reflection of the “great power identity” of China during the Xi Jinping administration in its policy on the Korean Peninsula. The Xi leadership has emphasized the “core interests” of China founded on the great power identity, and has projected more assertive peripheral diplomacy to expand its influence in East Asia. China will not dare to challenge the US dominant international order, but will seek to receive treatments relative to “the rise of China.” On the basis of this recognition, the Chinese leadership regards the Korean Peninsula not simply as a security environment in which the status quo should be maintained, but as a venue on which it wields its expanding leverage. That is, China, as a rising great power, has no choice but to stress its relationship with both South and North Korea to prepare for the strategic competition with the dominating power, the United States, and undermine US regional influence in East Asia. Because of this point, China has shown inconsistent behaviors in its Korean Peninsula policy: It not only strongly denounces the nuclearization of North Korea, but also opposes economic sanctions that could inflict severe damage on the North Korean regime. While China values South Korea’s strategic values, it is taking a firm stand on foreign and security issues such as the THAAD deployment. Based on its great power identity, China recognizes the Korean Peninsula as a substructural part of its relations with the United States. However, South Korea should lead in solving the Korean Peninsula problem and North Korean denuclearization by preemptively suggesting a long‐term vision on issues regarding the Korean Peninsula

Ra, Jong-yil

Abstract: [Note: This a speech the author presented at the Northeast Asia Cooperation Forum hosted by the East Asia Research Center, School of International Relations, Renmin University of China, that was printed in the Journal of East Asian Affairs.] There are in general at least two aspects in any security regime among nations: One is a hard one, such as military strategic balance, diplomatic relations including treaties, organizations, and so on. There is another aspect which may comprise what may be called soft ones. Culture governs relations among people, attitude toward one another, implicit assurances about expected behaviour of the other side, and is a common value whether of implicit or explicit kind, shared identity, sense of attachment or belonging, etc. This latter aspect of the security regime in the context of Northeast Asia which I propose to address together with all who are present today, one of the reasons for doing so ebing the former aspect of the subject has been covered rather well and the latter relatively little.

Cheng, David

Abstract: China’s current approach towards the Korean peninsula, especially in the security dimension, is the product of a combination of long-standing Chinese historical concerns and Xi Jinping’s calculations of China’s political and security interests. Of particular importance, from the Chinese perspective, is the need for South Korea to accede to Chinese concerns, even if that requires subordinating South Korean interests to Chinese ones. China therefore sees the Korean peninsula mostly with reference to its own needs, and only marginally in terms of what are the interests and needs of either North or South Korea.

Klinger, Bruce

Abstract: Fears at the beginning of 2018 of imminent military hostilities on the Korean Peninsula were replaced by hopes of a diplomatic resolution to the long-standing North Korean nuclear problem. At first, North Korea appeared to have reversed its long-standing resistance to abandoning its nuclear arsenal. After meeting with Kim Jong-un, a senior South Korean delegation announced Pyongyang had “clearly expressed its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” But a careful reading of Pyongyang’s offer showed it came with heavy strings attached and consistent with enduring regime objectives. North Korean statements reflected traditional regime demands for conditionally and reciprocity. All previous attempts at diplomatic resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue have failed, so there is good reason to be skeptical and wary. Given the lengthy record of diplomatic failures in curbing the North Korean nuclear program, it is prudent to be cautious is trusting reports that the regime is now willing to abandon its nuclear arsenal. That is not to say the U.S. should not try again, but engagement should be based on a thorough knowledge of past efforts. Even during negotiations, the North will continue to augment and refine its missile and nuclear capabilities. So, Washington and its allies must keep their eyes open, their shields up, and their swords sharp.

Seyrafi, Sassan, and Amir-Hossein Ranjbarian

Abstract: The so-called Iran nuclear agreement, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive plan of Action, is an agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Germany and the EU to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. Praised as an historic diplomatic achievement that resolved a decade-long crisis, the 2015 agreement is distinctive in its comprehensive provisions and innovative solutions to various legal and technical issues. However, US President Donald Trump’s controversial decision to withdraw the US from the agreement in May 2018 has put its future in peril. This paper attempts to analyze the legal aspects of the US’ decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement with special reference to the currently on-going US-North Korea deal for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the course of this study, special attention is given to the lessons learned from the Iran nuclear agreement.

Gray, Kevin, and Jong-Woon Lee

Abstract: While Beijing has repeatedly signed up to multilateral sanctions against North Korea, it is widely regarded as having failed to enforce them. Indeed, China’s deepening economic engagement with the country has led observers to debate the causes of this seemingly duplicitous approach. Constructivist and realist approaches have relied on state-centric frameworks that serve to reduce Sino-North Korean relations to the high politics of Beijing-Pyongyang diplomacy in the context of broader geopolitical dynamics. This article argues that such approaches pay insufficient attention to the profound rescaling of the Chinese state in recent years and the implications this process has for bilateral relations. This article sheds light on how Sino-North Korean relations are being driven by actors at multiple scales and by a multitude of objectives as a result of decentralisation and marketisation alongside increasing geographical unevenness within China and new challenges to continued capital accumulation. North Korea has come to play an increasingly important role in efforts to facilitate economic recovery in the northeastern border regions through serving as spatial fix for Chinese manufacturing capital. These new cross-border flows of capital and labour suggest an emerging pattern of Sino-North Korean relations that is by no means static but in considerable flux.

Lee, Junghoon

Abstract: Multilateral approaches such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the Four-Party and Six-Party Talks, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (established by the USA, Japan, and South Korea to solve North Korea’s issues and to build a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula) have achieved few accomplishments since the Cold War. Exceptions include the avoidance of deadly clashes during ongoing multilateral talks at the time of serious situations including the nuclear crisis in 1994 and the Bush administration’s attempt to strike on North Korea with nuclear weapons. The USA has hesitated to conduct kind military relationships with North Korea because they seem to strongly recognize the high risk associated with physical conflict. Additionally, the USA and its allies have experienced North Korea’s ability with nuclear weapons. Many which have attempted to target the USA during the later years of the Clinton and Bush administrations. Dealing with North Korea contributes to the knowledge of those involved in the Six-Party Talks regarding how to work with the USA and others. Are multilateral approaches still efficient under this situation? Even with a number of several types of proposals such as China’s recent dual-track approach or double suspension approach—also backed by Russia—there seems to be no certain attempt to collaborate on building a peaceful regime. This paper will examine why multilateral approaches to building a peaceful regime post Cold War on the Korean Peninsula have forwarded little to a contextual perspective of the changing regional circumstances.

Kwon, Edward

Abstract: This paper examines how South Korea might be able to deter the growing threat from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. North Korea’s six nuclear weapons experiments with various types of missile test fires using solid fuel and new technology pose a security threat to South Korea and the USA. The credibility of the North’s WMD capability and the military balance of two Koreas are critically analyzed. South Korea’s superior conventional weapons system, supported by U.S. strategic weapons and intelligence systems, could fend off North Korean nuclear weapons and missile attacks. However, it is imperative that the U.S.-ROK alliance continues to develop a stringent nuclear deterrence strategy and deploy a series of countermeasures, including preemptive strikes and a multilayered missile defense system, such as Kill Chain, KAMD, and THAAD, all to guard against a potential nuclear weapon attack from North Korea.

Michishita, Narushige

Abstract: On June 12, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK or North Korea) leader Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, met in Singapore for the first time. The two men signed a joint declaration and pledged to work toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and improving bilateral relations. These developments raise several questions. What impact will this summit meeting between the two leaders have on regional security? What sorts of opportunities and risks will that impact produce for Japan? How should Japan deal with this fluid regional situation?

Cho, Pyungse, and Jae-Cheon Lim

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of North Korea’s foreign policymaking to show why denuclearization efforts continue to fail to curb, let alone end, its nuclear weapons program. Two determinants, namely South Korea’s existential threat and North Korea’s juche ideology, are explored to conclude that “nuclear North Korea” is a natural and non-negotiable manifestation of its foreign policymaking.

Richey, Mason, Ohn Daewon, Jangho Kim, and Jaejeok Park

Abstract: There is a lacuna in the literature analyzing the mid-term (6-24 months) period after a DPRK contingency that results in the Pyongyang regime’s relatively sudden and unmanaged fall. This article helps fill that gap, particularly with respect to security issues that would challenge Korean unification efforts during such a period. Following an Introduction, Section I first makes the case for a DPRK contingency being the most plausible end to the Pyongyang regime. Assuming the scenarios from Section I, Section II addresses the question of what critical issues a unifying Korea will face over the mid-term, and how dealing with these challenges will condition the type of end-state that a unified Korea will embody. In particular we examine three challenges: (a) mid-term security provision related to potential weapons proliferation, cyber-security, organized criminality, and human security; (b) the foundations of institution-building through measures dealing with issues of transitional justice, disputed land title claims, and generating broad domestic stakeholder buy-in in a unifying Korea; (c) the disposition of Korea’s strategic alignment in a Northeast Asia that will have undergone a major alteration of the regional system. Section III concludes with policy recommendations concerning what efforts should be made now to prepare for the situations described in Sections I and II.

López i Vidal, Ll., and Àngels Pelegrín

Abstract: Debates about how states deal with rising powers have been mainly concentrated on a continuum comprising on balancing and bandwagoning strategies. While theory has principally offered realist and liberal explanations, Japanese behavior vis-à-vis China does not match with them. Japan is not powerful enough to balance against China but remains too strong to bandwagon. Accordingly, Tokyo is pursuing a mixed strategy of both containment and engagement, which may be better described as a hedging strategy against Beijing. This article analyzes which strategies states can adopt when dealing with a rising power and proposes a framework to analyze Japan’s recent policy towards China based on Kuik’s analysis. We argue that Japan’s hedging strategy towards China is consistent with how middle-power states deal with rising power.

Soeya, Yoshihide

Abstract: This essay presents a perspective on Japan’s relations with the two Koreas in relation to resolving the thorny issues posed by North Korea. It will first briefly recap recent developments in North Korea’s posture under Kim Jong-un before examining Japan’s interpretation of those changes and related interactions with South Korea and the United States in response. It will then analyze the evolution of Japan’s approach to relations with the Korean Peninsula and suggest strategic and political options for the future.

Joo, Seung-Ho, and Yune Lee

Abstract: Since 2000, President Vladimir Putin of Russia has persistently pushed for trilateral economic projects involving Moscow, Seoul, and Pyongyang, especially in the fields of energy (oil, gas, and electricity) and transportation (railroad). The Kremlin has long maintained that its proposed trilateral projects would not only be economically beneficial to all but also pave the road to inter-Korean reconciliation and peaceful unification. This article addresses three questions regarding Putin’s trilateral economic projects. What motivates Russia to push for the projects? Would they bring benefits to the three countries? Would they facilitate Korean peace process? The authors argue that Putin’s trilateral economic projects are part of Russia’s quest for power and search for a multipolar world order and should be understood from the theoretical framework of “structural realism.” The research finds that the projects are not feasible due to North Korea’s nuclear crisis and economic uncertainties and may be implemented after the current North Korea’s nuclear crisis is resolved diplomatically, if North Korea’s leadership changes or if inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation is achieved by the progressive government of Moon Jae-In.

Shin, D

Abstract: In recent years, North Korea’s military provocations have been making the headlines. Beyond its harsh actions and remarks, North Korea persistently mentions ‘peace’ through a demand for a ‘peace treaty’. This may sound paradoxical. However, the origin of the North Korean argument for a peace treaty dates back to the Korean War (1950–53). Since then, North Korea has continued to raise the issue of a peace treaty in a consistent manner and the arguments have displayed similar logic and terminology throughout. It is this consistency and similarity that this article examines: through reviewing North Korea’s original texts, this article attempts to undercover North Korea’s perspectives reflected in its argument for a peace treaty.