Abstract: This article has two-fold goals: to develop a coherent concept of accommodation and explicate variable shaping the process of accommodation; and to analyse and evaluate the challenges and prospects of India’s accommodation in the emerging international order. It defines accommodation as a ‘state strategy’ and ‘process’. It figures out six determinants viz. the sphere of influence, structural variables, convergence/divergence of national interest, perception and intention towards the international order, political and socio-cultural values, and costs of non- accommodation. Instead of addressing the process of accommodation from accommodation-seekers’ perspective, the article investigates the issue from accommodators’ perspective. Therefore, rather than describing traditional foundations of India’s claim of accommodation, i.e. population, territory, military, and democracy, it illustrates conditions under which the established power accommodate rising powers. By comparing and contrasting India’s interests, principles, and values vis-à-vis the USA and China, it demonstrates how differing strategic calculations, economic and commercial interests and divergence in political socio-cultural norms and values, China is posing or may pose challenges to India’s accommodation. It suggests that India needs to strike a balance between the declining America and rising China. It will have to learn how not to turn China from an adversary to an enemy. A prudent strategy for India will be to balance China, however, in the non-military, i.e. diplomatic, political and economic realms. Nevertheless, the engagement dimension should not be marginalised, actual or even perceived. Full text available here.
Country or Region: China
Choudhury, Avinandan, and P. Moorthy
Abstract: The increasing Chinese naval presence in and around Indian ocean, coupled with the rise of the home-grown Indian Navy and the US naval dominance over the global commons, has brought about a strategic maritime triangle in the Indian Ocean. This article looks into the evolving role, capacity and objectives of the Indian, Chinese and US Navy vis-à-vis their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. The article argues that the ascendency of China’s naval prowess in Indian Ocean will prod India to opt for a tactical naval entente with the USA. Few impediments to the potential formation of a close-knit Indo-US partnership like India’s fear of losing strategic autonomy, its aversion in being an east Asian naval power, US–Pakistan ties and the difference in the Indian and USA’s interpretation of the concept of ‘Freedom of Navigation’ have been discussed. The article contends that an effective Indo-US naval cooperation will depend on how these impediments are taken into considerations within the make-up of their partnership. Full text available here.
Basit, Saira, Stina Torjesen, and S. Neil Macfarlane
Abstract: This article assesses China–Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the period 2014–2018 and asks whether China has exercised distinct pressure on Pakistan to be a more constructive partner for Afghanistan. A central argument is that even as China has failed to alter Pakistan’s policies significantly in the short term it is still continuing to successfully build power and trust in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as with their neighbours to the north and west. This bodes well for China’s exercise of regional leadership in a long-term perspective. Full text available here.
Golobokov, Andrei S
Abstract: The paper evaluates Russia’s increased naval presence in the Asian–Pacific region,
considering the naval interactions with China, India, Vietnam, the Philippines
etc., an important component of Russia’s national strategy and maritime policy
in the region. By strengthening cooperation with the navies of these countries in
different parts of the world, Moscow demonstrates its political preferences and
military capabilities by checking the combat readiness of its own Navy, as well as
modernizing its strategy and tactics, taking into account the modern experience of
combat operations among the other fleets. It then presents a valuable opportunity for
Russia to defend its national interests while remaining a non-aligned and predictable
actor. By analyzing the dynamics, metrics and substance of Russia’s naval activities,
the author tries to clarify the strategic goals of the Russian and other countries’
navies, and also to define some qualitative characteristics, such as the level of
interaction between the Russian Navy and each of its partners, operational tasks of
the exercises, etc. In addition, Russia’s joint maneuvers not only maintain its status
as a great maritime power and raises its international authority but also may serve as
a balancing factor for the U.S. and Chinese navies to improve the security situation
in the Asia–Pacific. Full text available here.
Ding, Yi, and Dingli Shen
Abstract: In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s case of nuclear
proliferation, less attention has been paid to the role of security assurances. This
paper seeks to assess the role of security assurances for the DPRK provided by the
UN, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and to figure out why these
assurances are less effective to bridle its nuclear ambition. It argues that an effective
security assurance for nuclear non-proliferation should meet at least two conditions.
Firstly the security assurance should be credible, which can be realized by being
publicized, legally binding, and infusing with further commitments. Secondly, the
security assurance tailored to the unique features of the target state’s concerns is
more likely to be effective. Using this set of criteria, the only moderately effective
assurance is that provided by the Soviet Union. The general security assurance
of the UN is neither legally binding nor specifically targeted. The alliance with
China exists only on paper as Pyongyang believes Beijing is reluctant to fulfill its
obligation as an ally. The United States is taking a capricious attitude on the DPRK
and none of its security assurances are legalized or address its major concern of
regime survival. These may help explain why security assurances failed to prevent
the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons. Full text available here.
Karmazin, Aleš
Abstract: Creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral
development bank initiated by the People’s Republic of China, has been one of
the key symptoms of Xi Jinping’s ambitious “China Dream” foreign policy. The
previous studies mainly focused on providing a description of AIIB’s creation
or general motives and context through which they explicated the establishment
of the Bank. Building on the literature focused on strategic culture and grand
strategy, I supplement the general motives of AIIB’s creation by characterizing the
style and process of AIIB’s materialization. I argue that the style (procedure) of
AIIB’s implementation largely resembles the previous Dengian model of strategic
procedure which Deng himself described with the Chinese saying “crossing
the river by touching the stones” which evinces flexibility and “step-by-step”
characteristics in its procedure. This helps to illustrate that China’s engagement
with the international order can be adaptive to a significant degree and China
does not necessarily follow a pre-planned vision of how to take over international
(institutional) order. While China’s foreign policy in some areas is often regarded
as being assertive and rigidly defending its positions, AIIB is a different case to a
high extent. Moreover, analyzing the creation of AIIB indicates ambiguity of Xi’s
foreign policy regarding general aims it wants to achieve and identities on which it
should be based. Full text available here.
Huang, Mike Chia-Yu
Abstract: In June 2018, the Chinese government initiated a new round of reforms to reshuffle
the leadership of the China Coast Guard (CCG) so as to better administer the
country’s blue territory. In contrast to the 2013 structural reform of the Chinese
government which created the CCG and made it part of the State Oceanic
Administration, a sub-ministerial organ of the Chinese State Council, the 2018
reform placed the agency under direct command of the Communist Party’s Central
Military Commission. This paper argues that the CCG today has been a formidable
maritime giant and acquired a fair ability to coordinate its patrol operations with
other agencies in recent years. In particular, the maritime law enforcement force
has been made more militarized given its close association with the Chinese
Navy. Nonetheless, despite the notable performance the CCG has made, it still
faces problems of unclear legal status and weak airborne surveillance capabilities,
keeping its institutional reform far from full completion. Moreover, a more
powerful coast guard force can on the one hand facilitate Beijing’s aim to become
a great maritime power but on the other hand lead to more security challenges as a
harsher maritime contest between China and its strategic competitors is likely to be
witnessed in the near future. Full text available here.
Ye, Quan
Abstract: As an extremely delicate and sensitive matter, it is unrealistic to expect the eventual resolution of maritime delimitation disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) in the immediate future. To manage the disputes and utilize the disputed maritime area, the claimants in this region have made continued efforts to conclude provisional arrangements. Due to the lack of consensus on the precise disputed zones and the low political will to make concessions, the existing arrangements have several drawbacks. To break the stalemate, a set of approaches are indispensable. A reasonable first step might be to develop provisional arrangements in less disputed maritime areas, especially those areas involving only two states. For areas with multiple claims or where the claimants have low political will to cooperate, it is advisable to start with developing arrangements on issues with common interests and easy to implement. For higher sensitive issues, track two connections might be employed at first, so as to pave the way for future official cooperation. Full text available here.
Blank, Stephen
Abstract: In light of a second Kim–Trump summit this article reviews the posture of
Russia and China and suggests that not only do they have an alliance but that it
also includes to some degree North Korea. Moscow and Beijing have endorsed
Pyongyang’s negotiating posture and much evidence suggests a Russo–Chinese
alliance, albeit an informal one. Such an alliance possesses immense implications
for the ongoing efforts to find a negotiated path out of the Korean nuclearization
crisis and for regional security in general. But in the meantime the advent of such
an alliance imparts a quality of regional bipolarity to the Northeast Asian security
agenda that could obstruct further progress towards peace. Full text available here.
Lee, Kihyun
Abstract: China’s North Korea policy is a combination of China’s strategic goal toward
regional order including U.S.–China relations and tactical management over North
Korea’s crisis action. Since the post–Cold War era, China has preferred the status
quo as its regional strategy, which leads them to operate tactical management
over North Korea risk. North Korea risk consists of uncertainty, which means
uncontrollability of North Korea, and instability, which means the possibility of
collapse of the North Korean regime. These risks often play as a crisis of China’s
status quo strategy, so China is inclined to implement its North Korea Policy
to control these crises. The basis of China’ North Korea policy is engagement,
considering that China has to protect North Korea’s conventional and geopolitical
values. However, the engagement comes in different forms according to the
characteristics of the crisis. The one is coercive engagement, which appears when
North Korea’s uncertainty prevails over instability. The other one is inclusive
engagement, which occurs when North Korea’s instability is stronger than
uncertainty. This hypothesis can be applied to past and current situations. With this
point of view, it is possible to predict the future of China’s North Korea policy. Full text available here.
Zhu, Qin, and Xiuyu Fang
Abstract: Tensions flared for a time after North Korea’s fifth and sixth nuclear tests as well as
THAAD’s entry into South Korea. This paper extends the view that the root cause
of these issues is the lack of regional public goods (RPGs) on the Korean Peninsula,
and its insufficiency results from three major conflicts in the politico–economic
situation of the Peninsula. In order to resolve the issues and maintain lasting peace,
three specific aspects, i.e., in diplomacy, security and economy, are to be addressed
in carrying out the long-term mission of supplying RPGs to the Peninsula. For
effective operation and comprehensive management of the RPGs provision, an
integration platform with powerful commitments is called for, i.e., “Association of
Trans-Korean Peninsula Nations” (ATKPN) co-established by China, the United
States, and the two Koreas. Apart from the dilemma commonly identified in the
delivery of RPGs, the ATKPN also faces dilemmas specifically from the Northeast
Asian order. To overcome the ATKPN’s obstacles, concerted efforts are needed to
promote the institutionalization of Sino–U.S. “new type of great power relations,”
to transform the function of the alliance system, and to cultivate the awareness of
“common external threats.” Full text available here.
Han, Sukhee
Abstract: Despite 25 years of unprecedentedly friendly ties between South Korea and China, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) disputes and China’s ensuing sanctions against South Korea have forced the bilateral relationship into an unprecedented standoff. Given South Korea’s growing dependence on China in economic and North Korean affairs, commentators always assumed that the South Korean government would “manage” this relationship. China has maintained a close relationship to keep South Korea within its orbit, restraining Seoul from further efforts to strengthen the U.S.–South Korean alliance. However, the Park Geun-hye government’s decision to respond to North Korea’s incessant provocations by deploying the THAAD system in South Korea caused China to implement economic retaliation. The ensuing paralysis of bilateral relations has lasted for over a year. A key problem for the future of the bilateral relationship is the fact that both countries have lost trust in each other. China views South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD as a betrayal of its support, while South Korea objects to China’s relentless economic bullying. Consequently, post–THAAD South Korea–China relations are likely to reflect South Korea’s efforts to reduce its dependency on China and to manage its development in a more balanced way. Full text available here.
Zhang, Weiqi, and Dmitry Zinoviev
Abstract: How does the North Korean government view China? This study examines North Korea’s foreign policy on China by analyzing the strategic options of North Korean leaders and applying sentiment analysis to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reports about China. It is found that North Korea’s generally positive attitude toward China contains nuanced types of sentiments and that North Korean leaders have managed the expression of these sentiments in the media to achieve political goals at domestic and international levels. Our findings also suggest that, first, China may not be the key to the solution of the Korean nuclear issue. Second, Kim Jong Un was not a weak leader from the beginning of his rule. Rather he had acquired a substantial amount of authority before Kim Jong Il passed away. Based on our findings, an analysis of the future development of the North Korea–China relationship is also provided. Full text available here.
Khan, Muhammad Khurshid
Abstract: It is always a risky affair, especially for a weak state to strike the right balance while dealing with two great powers having serious conflicting interests in a particular region. For a country like Pakistan which remains dependent on foreign aid, running an independent foreign policy seems quite difficult. While Pakistan’s relations with China continued to remain smooth throughout history, its relations with the United States has been more of a roller coaster than a smooth ride but still both could never be too apart from each other because of various compelling reasons. Currently, China and Pakistan are extensively engaged in promoting their mutual economic and strategic interests that go against the U.S. interests. Therefore, in the case of a possible conflict between the United States and China, Pakistan might be trapped in a catch-22 because it cannot afford to infuriate the United States beyond certain limits. In such a trap, staying neutral might be even riskier. Slow and steady change in the status of Gilgit–Baltistan beyond a certain level for promotion of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would also be a serious trap. Pakistan could afford to lose economic benefits of the CPEC but it cannot afford to give up its claim over Kashmir which remains the “lifeline” for its survival. Pakistani Generals fighting on exterior fronts must therefore, make smart moves to ensure that at no stage should Islamabad be compelled to put all its eggs in one basket. Full text available here.
Lee, Chang-Wee
Abstract: China has a long coastline of approximately 18,000 kilometers and hence an extensive continental shelf as well as an EEZ. Its coastline is said to be the tenth longest coastline in the world. The total sea area in the China Seas is about 4.7 million square kilometers. Despite these advantageous circumstances in geography, China failed to become a maritime power like Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK. So it remained a land power for a long time except when Zheng He, the great seafarer in Chinese history, led the greatest ocean-going fleets of the world of that time, sailing to the Pacific and Indian Oceans during the years of 1405–1433. As a result, China suffered foreign invasions several times from the sea, being defeated in the Opium War as well as at the Sino–Japanese War in the nineteenth century.
It is only natural that China has opposed the traditional freedom of the seas claimed by the maritime powers since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. When China took part in all the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) sessions, its policy and position on the major issues were almost identical with those of the developing countries: creeping jurisdiction policy. With regard to the breadth of the territorial sea, China supported and complied with the 12 nautical mile territorial sea. It has established straight baselines since it proclaimed territorial sea in 1958. Also it argued that several disputed islands were its territories by the 1958 declaration as well as by the 1992 law on the territorial sea. China’s policy on the law of the sea, however, might change dramatically in accordance with the general trends of the law of the sea. China ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) in 1996, 14 years after signing it. Thus China has committed itself to developing its domestic laws and regulations on maritime affairs in accordance with the 1982 LOSC and to meet the demands and changed circumstances in the use of oceans. Given the foregoing, this paper attempts to provide China’s policy on the territorial sea in the context of its change in the law of the sea. To be more specific, it examines relevant issues on the breadth of the territorial sea, baselines as well as innocent passage of warships in terms of U.S.–China relations, with special emphasis on the comparison with Korea’s relevant policy on the law of the sea.
