Post-Hague: The Philippines and Strategic Balance

July 22, 2016

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For Rodrigo Duterte, the new Philippine president, managing the country’s sucessess after winning its case brought against China over South China Sea disputes is an early test of his leadership in foreign policy – a domain that was largely unarticulated during his campaign and still awaits elucidation to the present day. At stake is a broader picture of the Philippines’ strategic posture: while it is certain the Duterte government will provide the Philippines’ a way forward in response to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) ruling issues on July 12, there is also an expectation that this issue will give clarity to Duterte’s strategic outlook in international affairs, specifically with respect to Philippine relations with the United States, China, and the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN). A preliminary examination of the new Philippine president’s approach suggests that his administration will assume a different direction in foreign policy, creating in the process new challenges and opportunities for his presidency.

“Balance” might well be the underpinning for President Duterte’s strategic stance: first, between domestic and international interests, and second, between the United States and China. Duterte is starting off from a domestic-centered national agenda that was central to him winning the election, vowing to fulfill his campaign promise of “peace and order” in the country. In a business forum in Davao City earlier in June this year, he commented how former president Beningo Aquino’s purchase of 12 South Korean FA-50 fighter jets was a waste of money, because they cannot be used to fight an insurgency that he believes is the “problem of the moment.” These pre-Hague pronouncements affirm that internal security is at the forefront of Duterte’s national security strategy despite previous claims by Philippine military officials that they have achieved gains in their anti-insurgency campaign and are ready to shift their focus to territorial defense.

How Duterte will balance his internal security priority with an inherently outward-looking territorial defense policy in light of the country’s Hague victory requires a careful calibration of potentially competitive domestic stakeholder interests. Downplaying the importance of territorial defense at the expense of focusing solely on domestic issues can be a potential source of domestic instability that will ironically undermine his peace and order agenda. Additionally, the Philippines’ legal victory has caused an upsurge in nationalist sentiments, and in this context, he might have to rethink the option of pursuing an ‘easier, quicker’ approach to South China Sea (SCS) disputes, which are generally perceived as weakening the Philippines’ position against China. He can utilize the Tribunal win as an opportune occasion to develop the external dimensions of his national security agenda without compromising on his domestic agenda.

Duterte’s more open stance towards China is a substantial deviation from Aquino’s position, where Sino-Philippine relations stood at a virtual diplomatic freeze. In a similar vein, Duterte’s cool demeanor towards the United States is in direct contrast to the warm ties forged by Aquino during his term. Relations with Washington and Beijing may experience ups and downs, but they are core components of Manila’s ’ foreign policy and will survive change of presidents. The big question now is how these relations will take shape within the context of the PCA ruling and coupled with a new Philippine president. The Duterte Administration’s early behavior towards the United States and China suggests a move toward the center – what some scholars describe as “equi-balancing” – designed to sustain Philippine strategic engagements with the two countries while showing no clear preference for either. If this is indeed the case, Duterte’s equi-balancing strategy carries several implications. First, the ‘reopening’ of Sino-Philippine ties will likely introduce new elements to that will lend credence to the Philippines’ balancing strategy. The realization of the joint exploration and utilization of resources in the disputed areas with China, stronger economic ties, and membership into Chinese-backed institutions are potential dimensions to this bilateral relationship.

Second, Philippine-U.S. relations in the Duterte era may not be as robust as during the Aquino presidency, but the diplomatic, economic, and military presence of the United States in the Philippines’ strategic environment will continue to be extensive. During the past six years, Aquino and President Barack Obama worked toward developing a closer bilateral relationship, driven in no small measure by SCS disputes: the maritime issue left behind for Duterte and Obama’s successors, the execution of high-profile engagements such as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) that awarded nearly 85 percent ($42 million) of this year’s funding to the Philippines, and U.S. assistance for the Philippines’ military modernization and capacity-building. Duterte’s cooler reception to America and the possibility of joint development with the Chinese might create a more challenging environment for the execution of Aquino’s policy legacies such as EDCA and the MSI.

Third, a Philippine balancing stance raises the question of whether Duterte will create a strategic linkage between Philippine-U.S. and Philippine-China relations, or if these two bilateral relationships will be developed as independent policy trajectories. There is need to calculate the risks and gains derived from each of these options. In the final analysis, should the Philippines indeed pursue an equi-balancing strategy, it must be able to assume that doing so will not only successfully manage their post-Hague position in the SCS, it should also be the optimal approach toward the promotion and protection of its national core interests.

The Tribunal win can also mean a win for ASEAN with the Philippines simultaneous playing out three roles as leader, broker, and representative of bloc. As the incoming ASEAN Chair in 2017 – the 50 year anniversary of the organization – the Philippines, a founding member, will be well-positioned to lead in advancing the group’s talks with China to establish a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. The SCS disputes have greatly tested the unity of ASEAN, so with its legal victory over China, the Philippine Chair will find it necessary to broker between ASEAN member states who are not party to SCS disputes and those who are claimants in order to press for ASEAN unity. Finally, not unlike previous ASEAN Chairs, the Philippines can continue to represent ASEAN’s interests vis-à-vis relations with its partners and other international organizations. Leveraging its Hague victory to work for ASEAN can only support the latter’s centrality in Asia’s regional security architecture, enhance regional stability, and uphold the tenets of international order.

By taking China to court and subsequently winning the case, the Philippines created a rare strategic opportunity to defend its national core interests against an emerging power within the rubric of international law. In the process, it gained ‘legal high ground’ in the eyes of the international community. The challenge now for President Duterte is to translate this legal upper hand into ‘strategic high ground’: owning the victory means casting a broad strategic net to institutionalize the Philippines’ gains in all aspects of its national security agenda.

Dr. Virginia B. Watson is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. She can be reached at watsonv@apcss.org.

 

The Policy Brief series is supported by a generous grant from the MacArthur Foundation through the RPI Energy and Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific project.

 

How Lifting the U.S. Arms Embargo on Vietnam Matters

July 1, 2016

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On May 23, 2016, President Barack Obama announced in Hanoi that the United States was completely lifting its 50-year embargo on weapons sales to Vietnam. The move is widely seen as a triumph of geopolitics and economics over ideology. For two decades after the two former enemies restored their diplomatic relations, the arms ban had been used as a leverage to promote human rights in Vietnam. It was now removed without any visible progress in the way Vietnam’s Communist regime dealt with dissidents and the freedoms of their citizens. But it allows the United States to arm Vietnam and benefit from weapons sales as both countries are increasingly alarmed by China’s expansion in the South China Sea and Vietnam is aggressively modernizing its military.

Against this background, questions arise as to how the lifting of the embargo will affect Vietnam’s arms purchases and human rights situations. Will Vietnam soon buy U.S. weapons in a large scale? Does the unconditional termination of the embargo encourage Hanoi to further suppress human rights? Contrary to some expectations, the arms ban’s end will not be a windfall for U.S. arms producers, nor will it be a boost for Vietnam’s repressive regime. However, it will have long-term impacts on the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship and bolster Obama’s application of soft power to the region.

The Vietnamese Military After the Arms Embargo

Several factors influence Vietnam’s decision-making in procurement of foreign arms, but two major factors are suitability to Vietnam’s needs and price. As a small country facing a giant neighbor, Vietnam has adopted a strategy of asymmetric deterrence vis-à-vis China. What Hanoi is to buy must fit in this strategy and be well suited to the geography of Vietnam’s defense. In this respect, American weapons are not particularly better than Russian or other non-U.S. equipment. When price comes into consideration, U.S. weapons can hardly compete with their Russian counterparts, unless they are from the Pentagon’s excess defense articles (EDA) program. Vietnam is reportedly seeking to buy F-16 fighter aircraft from this program, which in 2011 gave Indonesia 24 refurbished F-16s and associated equipment, parts, training, and logistic support for an estimated cost of $750 million. By comparison, Vietnam’s contract for 12 Su-MK2 fighter aircraft from Russia in 2013 cost $450 million.

Ideological concerns as well as bureaucratic culture and interests also play a significant role in Vietnam’s arms purchases. Conservatives who dominate the Vietnamese military still do not trust the software that guides U.S. hardware. They also do not want to see U.S. personnel staying for weeks or months inside Vietnamese bases, even if only to provide technical support. As Vietnam’s bureaucratic culture is closer to Russia’s and farther from America’s, it is much easier for Vietnamese officials to negotiate with Russian partners, while interaction between Vietnamese and U.S. military officials is fraught with misunderstanding. This disposition is further reinforced by rent-seeking, which has become pervasive in Vietnam’s government. Another bias against American weapons is the difficulty to integrate them into Vietnam’s operational and logistic systems, which are geared to support Soviet and Russian weapons.

Nevertheless, Vietnam wants to diversify the sources of its weapons. It does not want to put all its eggs in one basket, especially when Russia is cozying up with China and has recently veered closer to Beijing’s position, and farther from Vietnam’s, in the South China Sea dispute. America’s ending of its arms embargo against Vietnam does not only open the U.S. market to Vietnamese procurement; it also allows Vietnam to access other Western sources which were previously out of Vietnam’s reach due to Washington’s opposition. A case in point is Vietnam’s failed attempt to purchase Mirage-2000 combat aircraft from France in the 1990s. Now that the ban has been removed, Japan is emerging as a potential supplier. Vietnam is reportedly asking to buy retired P-3C anti-submarine aircraft from Japan. While the P-3C is a derivative of the American P-3 Orion, it is more attractive to the Vietnamese because it is far cheaper than the U.S. plane and training with the Japanese is easier ideologically.

When these factors are combined, they suggest Vietnam will buy U.S. weapons on a gradual basis. The lifting of the U.S. arms ban has given Vietnam more options in the global market, and the new options include not only American but also other Western suppliers. Arms producers from U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, France, Germany, Britain, and Israel are also potential beneficiaries of the U.S. decision.

Strategic Rationale for Lifting Arms Embargo

At a more strategic level, America’s move has redefined the U.S.-Vietnam relationship. As President Obama tweeted after he lifted the embargo, “Today, Vietnam and the United States are partners.”

In Vietnam’s internal debate, the arms ban had served as a clear evidence of Washington’s hostility to Hanoi. Even after the two countries declared in 2013 that they were “comprehensive partners,” by citing the U.S. sanctions, conservatives continued to be able to convince many in Vietnam’s ruling elite that America was still an adversary. As the arms ban was removed without explicit preconditions, Vietnam’s conservatives would find difficulty denying it was a gesture of goodwill. In other words, the unconditional termination of the embargo has soft power effects. It strengthens the position of Vietnam’s modernizers, who prefer close ties with America and the West, and wins many moderates, who stand between the modernizers and the conservatives, to the pro-U.S. camp.

The removal of the arms ban will elevate U.S.-Vietnam relations to a higher plateau and boost bilateral cooperation in all sectors. It makes possible that Vietnam and the United States will become strategic partners. It also paves the way for the two countries to join forces and redress the regional equilibrium, which is a prerequisite for lasting peace and prosperity in the region. More immediately, the arms ban lifting is likely to be followed by the decision to grant the U.S. military wider access to Vietnamese facilities on the South China Sea coast.

 

The lifting of the arms ban will also help improve human rights situation in Vietnam. This won’t work at one stroke but it will work indirectly and in the long term. As Obama was in Vietnam to demonstrate America’s friendship, the regime’s secret police continued to harass and prevented several Vietnamese from meeting him, despite the fact they were invited by the U.S. president. However, by changing Vietnam’s perception of America and Hanoi’s political landscape, Obama’s decision, in combination with the hosting of Vietnam’s Communist Party boss Nguyen Phu Trong in the White House last year and other costly signals of U.S. friendship, will only make the Hanoi leadership more amenable liberal ideas.

Conclusion

The effects of the arms ban lifting are more strategic than operational, and they bear fruit in the long term rather than the short term. While its motives may be more geopolitical than ideological, its will have far-reaching consequences not only for geopolitics but also for the ideological nature of Vietnam’s ruling regime. Among its long-term effects there will be the improvement of human rights in Vietnam.

By Dr. Alexander Vuving, Professor, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The views in this article are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or the Asia-Pacific Center.

 

The Policy Brief series is supported by a generous grant from the MacArthur Foundation through the RPI Energy and Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific project.

 

Tensions in Japan-China Relations over the East China Sea Could Exacerbate in Coming Years

August 18, 2015

For long, Japan-China relations have largely been acrimonious due to historical and territorial factors. Despite strong economic ‘bonhomie’, the two countries have failed to resolve these disputes amicably. The situation could deteriorate further in coming months following the release of Japan’s latest Defense White Paper expressing strong concern over China’s ‘coercive’ maritime advances in the East and South China Seas. The White Paper expresses strong opposition to the ongoing construction of new gas fields by the Chinese near the median line between China and Japan in the East China Sea region. These constructions have raised strong economic and security concerns within Japan. On the other hand, China has taken few steps to assuage Japanese concerns while maintaining a critical stance on Japan’s White Paper.  Such developments could widen the gulf between the two countries further.

Continue reading “Tensions in Japan-China Relations over the East China Sea Could Exacerbate in Coming Years”

Tensions in Japan-China Relations over the East China Sea Could Exacerbate in Coming Years

August 18, 2015

For long, Japan-China relations have largely been acrimonious due to historical and territorial factors. Despite strong economic ‘bonhomie’, the two countries have failed to resolve these disputes amicably. The situation could deteriorate further in coming months following the release of Japan’s latest Defense White Paper expressing strong concern over China’s ‘coercive’ maritime advances in the East and South China Seas. The White Paper expresses strong opposition to the ongoing construction of new gas fields by the Chinese near the median line between China and Japan in the East China Sea region. These constructions have raised strong economic and security concerns within Japan. On the other hand, China has taken few steps to assuage Japanese concerns while maintaining a critical stance on Japan’s White Paper.  Such developments could widen the gulf between the two countries further.

On July 21, the Japanese Cabinet approved the defense white paper for 2015. The paper titled “The Defense of Japan 2015” notes that intrusions by Chinese vessels in disputed waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea have become routine operation. The report also claims that in both the East China and South China Sea, China continues to “show an uncompromising stance toward realizing its unilateral claims.” Moreover, it terms China’s continued activities in those two regions as “high-handed” to alter the status quo by force.

On July 22, the Japanese government released photos and maps revealing China’s construction of offshore structures related to gas fields in the East China Sea. In addition to the photos, the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s website also features a map depicting the locations of those structures along with the photos. The Japanese government has reportedly confirmed sixteen such structures so far. Of those, twelve have been discovered since June 2013. At present all these platforms are reportedly equipped with heliports and large cranes.

On July 22, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga expressed the Japanese government’s displeasure over the construction of these offshore structures. Japan views the construction as a unilateral move by China that constitutes a clear violation of the 2008 agreement between Japan and China on joint gas field development in said region. In that agreement, both countries agreed to “cooperate, without prejudice to their legal positions, during the transitional period pending agreement on the delimitation” of the sea boundary.

With regards to the oil fields in the East China Sea, economic and security factors have heightened Japanese tension. On the economic front, some experts point out that while China‘s offshore structures are on the Chinese side of the median line, it could eventually connect them with the oil deposits on the Japanese side beneath waters. In such case, China would be able to siphon off gas from the Japanese side. If China continues to construct the oil-related structures in the East China Sea unabated, it could certainly have an adverse impact on the Japanese economy in the long run.

On the security front, some observers argue that if Sino-Japanese tensions escalate, Beijing could convert the offshore structures in the East China Sea to military facilities. This could pose a serious security threat to Japan. It should be noted that even though China unilaterally established an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in November 2013, the radars installed in mainland China are reportedly not yet fully effective in covering the entire region. To deal with that loophole, China might choose to utilize the offshore structures as military bases by equipping them with air defense radar systems and heliports for reconnaissance helicopters.

So far China does not seem to have taken any step in mitigating Japan’s growing concerns over the ongoing construction in the East China Sea. China’s stance is to some extent understandable given that so far, China’s construction remains on its side of the median line between Japan and China. However, China has responded critically to Japan’s latest Defense White Paper, arguing that the paper is “artificially creating tensions” and “stirring up fears about China’s military threats.”

In the short run, the ongoing developments in the East China Sea might not have serious repercussions on Japan-China relations. However, the scenario may change dramatically once Japan’s new security bills come into force in September this year. Those bills aim at enabling Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense in a limited manner. They will also expand the role of the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) by enabling the latter i) to provide rear area logistical support to friendly countries, and ii) to respond to ‘grey zone’ infringements of Japanese territorial waters as well as airspace short of an armed attack. On July 28, during deliberation on the said bills, Prime Minister Abe signaled that the enactment of the new security laws would pave the way for the Japanese government in enhancing the SDF’s capability to deal with Chinese vessels’ intrusions near the Senkaku islands. In that case, the possibility of armed confrontation between the militaries and coast guards of the two countries could no longer be denied. Moreover, the two countries’ growing energy needs could eventually compel them to resolve their ongoing dispute over energy resources of East China Sea through use of force. Under the circumstances, tensions in Japan-China relations could exacerbate in the coming years.

 

Dr. Pranamita Baruah is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University, Washington DC.

This Policy Brief is part of a series in a project at the Rising Powers Initiative exploring the linkages between energy security and maritime strategies in the Indo-Pacific. RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation for research on maritime security that contributed to this report.

Cautious Optimism from Asia’s Energy Security Debates

May 6, 2016

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Meeting the energy demands of a growing economy is one of the primary challenges in the 21st century. This endeavor has led many states in Asia to consider whether to satisfy their energy needs through competitive “resource nationalism” or to instead rely on market-based approaches and better energy efficiency. These debates have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy in the region and took center stage at a roundtable on Energy Security Worldviews hosted by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. Three experts who participated in a major Sigur Center research project presented their findings that there are relatively optimist prospects for energy security in Asia, thus posing a challenge to prevailing assumptions and fears.

This research project studied how three foreign policy “schools of thought” contended for influence in the domestic energy security debates of several countries in Asia. The nationalist school argues that energy vulnerability demands greater national autonomy, mercantilist policies, and aggressive military strategies to realize these goals. Globalists, on the other hand, emphasize liberal market approaches and international regimes as solutions for the region’s energy demands. A third group, realists, focuses on geo-strategic international cost-benefit calculations.

In Japan, South Korea, and to a degree in China, coalitions of pragmatic realists and liberal globalists have thus far steered domestic energy debates away from the nationalist camp. This Policy Brief explores energy debates in Asia, the factors underlying them, and the future outlook for energy security and U.S. foreign policy in the region.

The Resilience of Japan’s Globalist-Realist Coalition in the Face of Disaster

As an island nation with limited energy resources at home, Japan is keenly aware of its significant energy security challenge. The March 2011 accident at the nuclear reactor in Fukushima exacerbated an already stressed energy market in Japan and stalled the country’s ambitious nuclear energy plans. Given a tense security environment with China’s growing naval power looming nearby, instability in the Middle East threatening Japan’s major source of fossil fuels, and the bourgeoning energy demands of others in the region, one might expect Japan to drift toward more nationalist, mercantilist, and competitive energy and maritime strategies.

However, Mike Mochizuki, an associate professor at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, argued that there are a number of important reasons why Japan has adopted a more realist-globalist attitude to meet its own energy needs:

  • Due to slower than expected economic growth, Japan’s energy demand has risen at a more leisurely pace than predicted several years ago. Furthermore, a decline in Japan’s population size, an expanded role for renewable in Japan’s energy portfolio, and improvements in energy efficiency have diminished Japan’s initially dire energy crunch.
  • The recent drop in global oil prices helped to offset the impact of the Fukushima disaster on Japan’s nuclear energy plans.
  • Despite instability in the Middle East, Tokyo has been fortunate enough to still find enough energy suppliers willing and capable of selling to Japan, including planned imports of U.S. shale oil.
  • Guaranteed access to sea-lanes remains vital for Japan’s energy supply, but Tokyo continues to rely on its alliance with the United States to safeguard freedom of navigation.

Yet, Mochizuki conceded there are roadblocks Japan must overcome to avoid a surge of nationalist views. Japanese power companies resist efforts to expand the country’s renewable energy sources at the expense of nuclear power. Lower gas prices may also reduce the incentive for Tokyo to shift further toward renewables. While pronuclear energy groups in Japan have seen their influence diminish in recent years, the country is still likely to see 15 to 20 percent of its energy needs met by nuclear power once a number of the nuclear plants come back online – though this figure is significantly lower than ambitious pre-Fukushima targets (50 percent by 2030) or preFukushima operating capacities (30 to 40 percent). Nevertheless, Mochizuki believed Japan should feel quite comfortable with its energy future.

The Rise of South Korean Globalists

Like Japan, South Korea is unable to rely on its truncated supply of energy resources at home. Scott Snyder, a senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, sensed that South Korean leaders have been closely observing and adapting Japanese energy policies. Steady access to energy is a prime component of South Korea’s decades-long goal to transform itself into a modern state and a rising power in the region. However, South Korea’s unique security environment vis-à-vis North Korea and Seoul’s plans to become a major nuclear power exporter have presented distinct challenges for the country’s energy strategies.

Snyder observed a clear shift within South Korea from one dominated by nationalists in the 1970s flirting with the idea of an indigenous nuclear arsenal and energy self-sufficiency to today’s globalist-realist security strategy and globalist market-oriented energy policies. As evidence of this shift, he offered several points:

  • Rather than insisting on a robust “nuclear sovereignty” in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapon tests, Seoul has largely relied on U.S. security guarantees – including the possible reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea – to allay its security concerns.
  • To demonstrate its willingness to become a responsible stakeholder in the nuclear energy field and a renewed focus on becoming a major nuclear exporter, South Korea moved to join a number of international regimes such as the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
  • South Korean energy decisions are increasingly less state-led and more market driven with significant input from private industry.

South Korea will likely be able to meet its energy needs through a combination of nuclear power and continued imports from the Middle East. The country’s globalist worldview seems to have survived a critical test as a delicate compromise was reached in late April following almost five years of sensitive negotiations on a revised framework for future civilian nuclear cooperation between Washington and Seoul. Snyder had warned that nationalist outrage was possible if South Korean leaders saw the deal as unfairly denying them freedom in how to handle U.S.-origin nuclear fuel. In the absence of a satisfactory agreement, globalists who want South Korea to be as competitive as possible in the global nuclear export market (e.g. to be able to offer fuel enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and waste depository options) may have joined this coalition as well.

China’s Pragmatic Realists

While leaders in Japan and South Korea may obsess over energy security, Robert Sutter, a professor of practice of international affairs at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, was surprised to find that China takes a more relaxed and pragmatic approach to the topic. There are certainly nationalists seeking to control global energy supply chains and suspect the United States of trying to cut off markets and sea-lane access to China. There are also globalists who implore leaders to focus on domestic energy efficiency, count on the global energy market, and trust U.S. benevolence and the international community to keep sea-lanes open. Sutter characterized the majority of Chinese decision-makers, however, as pragmatic realists who examine issues on a case-by-case basis rather than exclusively rely on either of the other schools of thought.

Energy debates in China are important to be sure, but considerably less dramatic and more “ho-hum” compared to the rest of the neighborhood. There are several reasons for this disparity:

  • China has a vast supply of energy resources at home, mostly in the form of coal. Nuclear energy will remain part of China’s energy portfolio, but it will unlikely grow beyond its relatively small share today with debate focused mainly on safety concerns and the pace of development.
  • China’s slow moving bureaucracy has coped with energy security issues for decades without fundamental change.
  • Even as it closely monitors the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy, China’s political leadership is not overly concerned with losing access to sea-lanes necessary for the transit of its energy supplies.

As a result, China’s pragmatic realists adopt energy policies on a case-by-case basis. On pipeline development and securing oil contracts, nationalist viewpoints may emerge on top. On energy efficiency investments, further integration with global energy market, and cooperation on sealane access, globalists may win out. Even as anti-U.S. rhetoric heats up, Sutter determined that China’s energy policies and related maritime strategies remain largely unchanged. In other words, realists hedge their bets with policies from other schools of thought depending on the specific issue under discussion.

Future Outlook: The Role of the Public and Warning Signs

There are two final trends worth noting while looking ahead to the future of energy security in Asia. First, the role of civil engagement in energy debates is evolving. Mochizuki believed that the voices engaged within Japan’s energy debate have become more diversified with civil society concerned with nuclear safety and energy supplies. This is echoed in South Korea with public protests on safety and waste depository siting, the insistence on local referendums to decide nuclear matters, and uproar after controversies involving improper nuclear operators and suppliers. While China’s decisionmaking remains centralized, its pragmatic realists will not entirely ignore cost and safety concerns raised by its citizens and industries.

Second, the roundtable’s scholars were watching for potential developments that could disrupt today’s optimist outlook. While Mochizuki doubted that another oil shock or Middle East crisis would dislodge Japan from its realist-globalist coalition, he underlined that the U.S. commitment to protect sea-lane access and maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance is absolutely essential to prevent a surge of nationalist views. Likewise for South Korea, the guarantee that America would be there for support in a potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula remains key. For the time being, the successful conclusion of the U.S.-South Korea civilian nuclear cooperation talks should reassure Seoul. According to Sutter, nationalists in China will closely monitor U.S. naval deployments in the region for possible threats to Beijing’s ability to rely on sealane transit for its energy security. As these debates progress, it is clear that energy security remains a top challenge for Asia and U.S. foreign policy in the region.

By Timothy Westmyer, Research and Program Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, GWU

 

This Policy Brief  was supported by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. RPI also acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation for research on maritime security that contributed to this report.

Putin Goes Nationalist

April 9, 2015

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Nationalism has recently become more salient in Russian foreign policy debates, especially after the annexation of Crimea last year. How does this resurgence of nationalism affect Russia’s foreign policy and its relationship with the United States and Europe? Should we expect to see a more assertive Russia in the coming years?

There are three broad schools of thought in Russian foreign policy discourse: 1) liberal westernizers; 2) great power balancers; and 3) Russian nationalists. President Vladimir Putin came into power as a great power balancer who at times tacked toward the liberal westernizer camp and at times toward the Russian nationalist camp. But with his decision to annex Crimea one year ago and later in the spring and summer of 2014 to directly support an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, Putin has firmly placed himself in the camp of Russian nationalists, in fact, quite a chauvinistic strain of Russian nationalism at that.

The question one year later remains why Vladimir Putin took this dramatic and dangerous step. It appears he did so to more firmly consolidate domestic political support for his leadership. Over the course of more than twelve years of his two terms of de jure leadership as President and one term of de facto leadership as Prime Minister, Mr. Putin’s high popularity ratings were principally buttressed by robust economic growth and a sense of growing prosperity among the Russian people.

However, when he returned to the Presidency in May 2012, Russia’s economic performance began to plummet. In 2013, growth stagnated to a meager 1.3%, and on the eve of the military occupation of Crimea at the end of February, growth was close to zero, the ruble was losing value, and capital flight was at an all-time high rate.

Putin faced a serious dilemma of a deeply stagnant economy despite the fact that oil prices remained at over $100/barrel. This situation hearkens back to that of the Soviet Union more than thirty years ago in the early 1980s, when despite massive amounts of petro-dollars flooding the Soviet economy, overall Soviet economic growth was stagnant and close to zero. The reason then, like the reason now, is deep structural inefficiencies in the economy coupled with endemic corruption. The answer then, like the answer now, would be deep structural reforms coupled with an anti-corruption campaign. But soon after his re-election as President in 2012, it came as little surprise that Putin, like his Soviet predecessors, would avoid taking those measures and hope for the best.

But if economic growth and prosperity were no longer going to be the foundation for Putin’s popular support, what would be? It is clear now that Putin would appeal to Russian nationalism. There were signs of this from 2012-2013 as Putin began to increasingly talk about Russian civilization as different from that of Europe and the West. He cleverly manipulated the Pussy Riot case and embraced homophobia as indicators that Russia rejected certain decadent Western values. Always coupled with this rhetoric was talk about Russia’s status as a global great power with a special role that appealed to more messianic aspects of Russian nationalism. Much more emphasis was placed on the “Russian World” and Moscow’s responsibility to defend the rights of ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and even loosely defined “compatriots” abroad. This all added up to what can be referred to as the “larger Russia project.” The emergent Eurasian Economic Union was a key institutional piece of this project.

Turning to Ukraine, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s flight from Kiev after the collapse of the February 21 agreement marked the total failure of Putin’s Ukrainian policy and a major blow for his aspirations to expand the newly-formed Eurasian Economic Union. Putin’s response was to seize Crimea and cast its annexation in virtually religious terms of returning Russia’s birth-place, its holy land back to its rightful owner. And in doing so, Putin’s political instincts, as they so often have been over his now 15- year tenure in power, were right on target as his popularity ratings immediately jumped about 25 points putting him into the high 80s, where they have remained as the war in Eastern Ukraine expanded with not-so-covert support from Moscow.

Russian nationalism is usually historically defined in antiWestern terms, and so it is the case again. In fact, Putin casts the Ukrainian conflict not as Russians vs. Ukrainians, but rather as “true” Ukrainians versus misguided Ukrainians who have fallen under the evil spell of the United States. He dismisses Europeans supporting anti-Russian sanctions simply as lackeys of Washington. In effect, what this conflict boils down to in Putin’s narrative for the Russian people is that he and Russia are defending Ukraine against the United States. Once again, as in the Cold War, the United States is being branded by the Kremlin as the enemy. Similar to the early days of the Cold War, there is a very tight relationship between Russian foreign and domestic policy. Now with Russia’s economy tanking, Putin’s foreign policy IS his domestic policy. Some contemporary strains of Russian nationalism are coupled with a domestic political economy that is state-directed, and in times of war can become a mobilization economy like the Soviet economy was for decades.

It is, however, doubtful that Putin’s system is sustainable for decades, especially now that we appear to be in a relatively lower oil price environment for some time to come. But it remains concerning that Putin’s system while it lasts can be far more dangerous and unpredictable than the Soviet Union, which avoided using nationalism as its rallying principle.

By Andrew C. Kuchins, Director and Senior Fellow of Russia and Eurasia Program, the Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

This Policy Brief takes off from a Rising Powers Initiative conference on “Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: A Resurgence of Nationalism?” held November 18, 2014 at GWU. The conference reconvened authors to update their findings in the book Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia (Oxford University Press, 2012). For additional discussion on Russia, see the chapter by Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor Zevelev, “Russia’s Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy” in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia.

Return of Defensive Realists in Tehran

February 18, 2015

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Nationalism has greatly shaped debates in Iran on what role the country should assume in the Middle East and in the world. How have these debates evolved under President Hassan Rouhani’s administration over the past two years? How do they differ from the debates that occurred during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency? These questions were addressed by Farideh Farhi, Affiliate Graduate of Faculty, University of Hawaii at Manoa at a Rising Powers Initiative conference on “Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: A Resurgence of Nationalism?” held this winter at GWU. The conference reconvened authors to update their findings in the book Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Undercurrents in Iranian Politics

The 1979 revolution weighs heavily in influencing Iran’s foreign policy debates and nationalism. Regardless of leadership change, several undercurrents remain constant in Iranian politics. The first undercurrent is the fear of external manipulation of domestic cleavages to undermine the theocratic regime. Though Iran was never colonized, it has been subject to external powers’ intervention in internal affairs. The second undercurrent shaping Iranian politics, particularly post-revolution, is Iran’s sense of loneliness and isolation. Despite its regional power status, Iran does not possess strategic allies. This is important particularly in the Middle East, where every country is very clear on where it stands. This loneliness has led to a sense of insecurity for Iran in a region where conflict is rife. Efforts by superpowers to contain Iran constitute another undercurrent in Iran. While Iran has attempted to engage in the global economy as an oil exporter, the United States and other Western powers have prevented Iran from integrating into the global economy and partake in the institutions governing it, largely due to fear of Iran’s rise as an aspiring power in the region and its nuclear power status. These factors contribute to and shape Iranian nationalism which in turn shapes Iranian foreign policy debates.

2013 Elections: Return of the Defensive Realists

With regard to Iran’s current foreign policy debates, the 2013 elections served as a pivotal moment; it marked the comeback of the defensive realist camp, that had been at the helm of Iran’s foreign policy and security prior to Ahmadinejad’s 2009 election. While President Rouhani ultimately was seen as a candidate of moderation and reform, almost all of the presidential candidates would have brought Iran toward the center, a sign that people were ready to move on from the polarizing politics that occurred after the 2009 elections and harsh crackdown that followed. Rouhani promised pushbacks against a securitized environment and economic improvements. He also explicitly linked Iran’s economic issues with its foreign policy, discussing Iran’s nuclear centrifuges as both an economic and foreign policy issue in an unprecedentedly frank manner.

How has Rouhani fared since the elections? In practice, the Rouhani team differs little from the Ahmadenijad administration in terms of their emphasis on nationalism, because in a sense, every post-revolution group in Iran is nationalist. The regime draws strength from a strong post- revolutionary insistence on sovereignty, “national honor,” and a refusal to acquiesce to the demands of “arrogant and meddling powers,” as referred to in Iranian discourse. Rather, the difference in the new administration is mostly tactical- instead of talking about foreign enemies, the new team talks about domestic reconciliation and support as the main source of strength in Iran’s foreign and security policy. This in turn has affected Iran’s views and posture on important issues concerning its regional role and relations with the United States.

Regional Ambitions

In terms of regional ambitions, the Rouhani team -which Farhi terms as defensive realists-differs from the Ahmadenijad team -or offensive realists- in that they do not view the entire Middle East region as an important playground. Rather, the focus is more on what could be considered Iran’s civilizational sphere of influence- the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and Southwest Asia. The rise of ISIS in the past year has led Iran to feel vindicated in terms of the key role it can play in bringing about security, while also forcing outside players that have been engaged in the containment of Iran to understand the important role Iran can play. Nonetheless, neighboring states have observed Iran warily, fearing that Tehran’s hegemonic aspirations would be unleashed if the U.S. abandons its containment policy in the region.

U.S.-Iran Relations

In dealing with the United States, the Rouhani administration has gone aggressively after a nuclear deal, based on the argument that Iran’s regional ambitions cannot be fulfilled without resolving its thorny relationship with Washington. Offensive realists and many other hardliners in Iran have long argued that the United States will never come to terms with the Islamic republic, and therefore, Iran’s prominence in the region has to come through resistance and the establishment of policies that would show America’s weakness in the region. Both offensive and defensive realists agree that the United States is in decline in the Middle East; however, defensive realists argue that despite its relative decline, Washington still has enough power to sanction Iran to the extent that it already has. Thus, defensive realists accept the fact that American influence in the region remains strong and will continue for some time, and argue for “dealing” with the United States in a non-confrontational manner.

Conclusion

Iran’s hardliners remain skeptical that the United States will agree to come to terms with a nuclear Iran. If the talks ultimately succeed however, normalization of relations with Iran will not come about immediately. In the same way that the American Revolution framed foreign policy debates in the United States for many years, the nationalistic undercurrents driving the debate and discourse concerning Iranian foreign policy and worldviews are unlikely to dissipate any time soon. Moreover, the outcomes of Iran’s 2016 elections have the potential to dramatically alter the course of Iran’s foreign policy debates in the same way that the current administration’s regional and global posture constitutes a dramatic departure from the Ahmadenijad years. The only permanent reality in Iran is that contested politics are here to stay, with nationalism at its helm.

By Winnie Nham, Research Manager, Rising Powers Initiative, GWU

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Abe and Modi: Nationalist Leaders versus Nationalist Leadership

December 11, 2014

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The issue of nationalism in Asia has gained attention in recent years as two new nationalist leaders—Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—came into office with aspirations to play a greater role in shaping the regional economic and security order. How does nationalism affect the foreign policies of the world’s third-largest economy and its largest democracy?

This question was addressed by Richard Samuels, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Deepa M. Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and Associate Research Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University (GWU), at a Rising Powers Initiative conference on “Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: A Resurgence of Nationalism?” held on November 18 at GWU. The conference reconvened authors to update their findings in the book Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Nationalist Turn in Japan’s Grand Strategy?

Recently, observers have noted Japan’s increased nationalism in the context of  rising diplomatic tensions in the region due to history issues, including Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in December last year. Despite such a perceived trend, nationalism does not dominate the strategic calculations of Japanese policymakers. The future of Tokyo’s grand strategy will ultimately depend on the relative power of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific and the balance of power among competing foreign policy worldviews in Japan.

Four worldviews exist in Japan’s strategic thinking—bandwagon (economic hedge), integrate (dual hedge), balance (military hedge), and autonomy (self-hedge)—each of which views the country’s relations with the U.S. and China differently. The first worldview, bandwagon, takes seriously the shifting balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, “hugging” China to maintain good economic relationships while somewhat distancing Japan from the U.S. The failure of this approach under the short-lived Yukio Hatoyama administration gave a rise to the second and third worldviews: integrate and balance. Hatoyama’s successor, Naoto Kan, adopted the second approach based on dual hedging: aiming to maintain cordial relations with both superpowers by integrating China into existing regional order while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. The increasingly deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship in recent years, however, shifted the center of gravity to the third worldview, balance, that emphasizes the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance to militarily hedge against China’s rise. This line of strategic thinking dominates Abe’s foreign policy, which positions Japan much closer to the U.S. than China and aims to expand the country’s regional and global security role via the reinterpretation of the Peace Constitution and increased military budget. However assertive, Abe’s strategic thinking still remains distant from the fourth worldview, autonomy, which seeks to achieve Japan’s military self-reliance. This vision, supported by right-wing nationalists such as former Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, advocate for a Japan that can say no to the U.S. and take an independent course of foreign policy by “using the alliance to transcend the alliance.” This worldview, however, has been on the margin in Japanese society, and Abe, despite his reputation as a nationalist, has not embraced it as a centerpiece of his foreign policy.

The future of Japan’s grand strategy therefore will reflect the changing balance of power among the four competing worldviews in the country’s foreign policy debate. It will also depend on the relative power of the U.S. vis-à-vis China. Faced with Beijing’s military expansion and assertiveness, especially in the East China Sea, Tokyo is reassessing the security commitment of Washington, whose defense cuts will likely undermine its military capabilities and power projection in the Asia-Pacific, and whose leadership appears to be increasingly inward-looking under the Obama administration. The U.S. involvement in history issues also play a role, as its criticism against Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine created a sense of dissatisfaction with the ally among Japanese nationalists, who have become more outspoken in the recent foreign policy discourse. It is therefore the interaction of these internal and external dynamics that will shape the contour of Japan’s grand strategy in the coming years.

New Foreign Policy Orientation under Modi?

Scholars and commentators have discussed the kind of foreign policy Prime Minister Modi will pursue for India, where six different worldviews—realists, globalists, and four variants of nationalists—have the potential of shaping its strategic thinking. Embracing standard nationalism and Hindu nationalism with a strong realist tendency, Modi seeks to establish India as a global player with an emphasis on strategic autonomy in the traditions of Nehruvianism and Hindtuva (paradoxical at first glance). In formulating his foreign policy, however, Modi faces a challenge of managing conflicting demands from competing worldviews. The details of the six worldviews are summarized below:

  • Standard nationalists emerged from post-colonial nationalism following India’s independence from Great Britain in 1947. They aim to establish India as a developed, self-reliant country in the tradition of Nehruvianism while viewing both status and power as  important for the country’s standing.
  • Soft nationalists, inspired by post-colonial nationalism, Nehruvianism, and socialism, eschew any great power ambitions, emphasize self-reliance in the short- and long-term, and prioritize status over power. They became salient after the 1991 economic liberalization.
  • Hard nationalists base their worldview on post-colonial nationalism and offensive realist theory, seeing military power as an end in itself and advocating for India as a global military power. This group gained popularity after the country’s second nuclear test in 1998.
  • Hindu nationalists, drawing inspiration from post-colonial nationalism and Hindutva, seek military power and emphasize a martial spirit and self-reliance in foreign policy debates. They became politically salient after the establishment of Modi’s party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in 1980.
  • Realists view the world through the lens of post-colonial nationalism and defensive realist theory and argue for India to be a global player. Unlike hard nationalists, however, they see military power as means to an end, not as an end in itself, and remain attentive to negative consequences such as the security dilemma. This group emerged after the country’s second nuclear test in 1998.
  • Globalists, becoming prominent after the 1991 economic liberalization, draw on post-colonial nationalism and liberal economic theory and seek global economic power and further regional economic integration.

Traditionally, nationalists and their focus on strategic autonomy dominated Indian foreign policy, as manifested in the Non-Alignment Movement during the cold war. In recent years,  realists and globalists have become more prominent while nationalists have been increasingly on the defensive. Realists and nationalists are now on a more equal footing as their focus on strategic autonomy and no hard alliance transcend the ideological divide. They have also come to share the globalist idea of economic integration; they now see economic growth as a critical vehicle for India to achieve its power ambitions.

This trend is evident in Modi’s foreign policy, which takes a pro-U.S. realist approach in expanding the bilateral free trade and security cooperation while adopting a nationalist stance in protecting sovereignty and strategic autonomy. He sees America as a “first among equals,” maintaining good relations not only with Washington but also other regional players including Beijing. He has also eschewed military means in dealing with China, emphasizing a peaceful and early resolution of the border dispute while signing a Chinese $20 billion infrastructure investment in India during the bilateral summit with President Xi Jinping in September this year.

Meanwhile, Modi faces a difficult task of managing competing pulls of other worldviews, especially over the issues of U.S.-Indian relations and military vs. economic means in foreign policymaking. A pro-U.S. stance faces criticisms from both hard and soft nationalists, who view any dependence on the U.S. as a threat to India’s self-reliance and autonomy. His economic-based diplomacy is met by strong demands for a more militant approach against China and Pakistan from hard nationalists and Hindu nationalists. Therefore, Modi’s foreign policy cannot simply be explained in terms of nationalism. It is rather an amalgamation of competing worldviews ranging from realism to globalism to different strains of nationalism.

By Daisuke Minami, Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science Department, GWU and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, GWU

Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy

November 24, 2014

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In recent years, observers in the Asia and the West have raised concerns about how nationalism will affect the trajectory of China’s rise. While awareness of nationalism’s role in shaping a country’s identity and foreign policy has grown, the phenomenon is by no means a recent occurrence, particularly in China’s case. The historical roots of Chinese nationalism and its manifestations in Chinese foreign policy were examined by David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University (GWU), at a Rising Powers Initiative conference on “Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: A Resurgence of Nationalism?” held on November 18 at GWU. The conference reconvened authors to update their findings in the book Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Historical Roots of Chinese Nationalism

Nationalism and nationalist values in China hearken back to the historical contest of China by Western powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Referred to by Chinese as the “century of shame and humiliation,” the Western partition of China created the notion of an existential threat to Chinese civilization as a result of Western onslaught. China’s self-described “national humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers continued into the 20th century, with nationalism manifesting itself against various external agents at differing points in time. To this day, the historical sense of shame plays an important role in shaping Chinese nationalism.

Student and citizen demonstrations at the 1919 May Fourth Movement marked early demonstrations of official displays of Chinese nationalism. Protesters expressed outrage at the Treaty of Versailles’ outcomes, which granted the Shandong peninsula to Japan and lead to China’s sense of betrayal by the Western Allies. In the 1930s and 1940s, Japan’s invasion of China and the wartime atrocities that followed stimulated an even greater sense of nationalism in China, and Japan was added to the anti-Western strain of nationalist sentiment. Following Mao Zedong’s 1949 proclamation that the “Chinese people have stood up,” the nationalist struggle against anti-imperialism was incorporated as an integral part of the Party’s foundation and legitimacy. During the Cold War, Chinese nationalism regarded the Soviets as the external threat:  Khruschev’s request for long range radio stations to be placed in China was regarded as an infringement of sovereign rights on Chinese land and was an important factor contributing to the Sino-Soviet split. Chinese nationalism during the Cold War was also directed against American “imperialism” up until President Nixon’s 1972 visit to China and the subsequent thaw in Sino-American relations. In all of these instances, Chinese nationalism was directed towards an external threat, a trend that continues to define Chinese nationalism today.

Seven Faces of Chinese Nationalism Today

Seven strains of Chinese nationalism are prevalent at varying times and circumstances in China today. These varying faces of nationalism combine the contradictory emotions of pride, ambition, and confidence, but also retribution, anger, and aggression.

  • Affirmative nationalism draws its roots and influence from the “Chinese Dream” concept articulated by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Affirmative nationalism refers to the realization of the Chinese nation’s “great renewal” affirms China’s sense of greatness and the importance of China historically; 5000 years of Chinese history and 150 years of shame are connected in a self-strengthening effort.
  • Aggrieved nationalism is derived from China’s century of shame and humiliation and frames the West and other external actors as bully to China. Aggrieved nationalism is utilized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which sees itself as champion of China’s revival from its century of shame.
  • Confident nationalism is used to describe China on the world stage. As opposed to an aggrieved, insecure, angry, or assertive China, confident nationalism sees China as taking its appropriate place in the world and regional order. This strain of nationalism regards China as a proud nation without a historical chip in its shoulder and as a major power that others should defer to and respect. Confident nationalism is most widely displayed in Chinese diplomacy.
  • Assertive nationalism is more negative in nature and is often directed against “domestic” actors the Chinese view as splittist. Assertive nationalism has manifested itself in incidents involving actors and incidents Beijing regards as belonging to China, including the South China Sea, Taiwanese independence, and Xinjiang and Tibetan separatism.
  • Aggressive nationalism is related to assertive nationalism but differs in its focus on external actors that pose a threat to China. Most recently, this has been directed at Japan and the United States; historically it has also been directed at the Soviet Union and Vietnam amongst others.
  • Angry nationalism is xenophobic in nature and tends to erupt spontaneously and unpredictably. Angry nationalism reared its head at the 2011 basketball game between the Georgetown Hoyas and the Bayi Rockets, when a sequence of fouls escalated into a full court brawl directed at the Hoyas by Chinese players and spectators. Similar instances targeting Westerners have occurred spontaneously in the streets of China.
  • Soft power nationalism has been an ongoing push since 2008 as China seeks to improve its image around the world and break the discourse monopoly China perceives Western media as possessing over China and other international affairs. The CCPt has dedicated $13-14 billion USD a year towards this charm offensive, promoting various facets of Chinese culture and China’s rich history.

Nationalism and China’s Future

While China’s varying faces of nationalism are contradictory to one another, all are borne from the same set of historical roots and furthered by the CCP’s inculcation of nationalistic propaganda to Chinese society starting at a young age. While nationalism is fostered by the Party, it also has autonomous roots in society, thus contributing to its unpredictable nature and tendency to grow in a way that lies outside the sphere of CCP control. The negative aspects of Chinese nationalism are easily triggered by China’s humiliation narrative and can quickly escalate. This lack of government control poses a challenge for the CCP, who champions nationalism and economic success as the sources of its legitimacy. As China continues to grow, will confident and affirmative nationalism prevail over aggrieved, assertive, aggressive, and angry nationalism? Given the unpredictability of Chinese nationalism, all are likely to be on display in the future, with the latter compromising China’s desire to project a benign image to its neighbors and the world.

By Winnie Nham, Resarch Manager, Rising Powers Initiative, GWU

Can ASEAN Sell Its Nuclear Free Zone to the Nuclear Club?

October 20, 2014

On November 13-14, Myanmar’s President Thein Sein will host the East Asia Summit, the apex of his country’s debut as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar has inherited a daunting agenda, notably the need to move ASEAN toward completion of an economic community and to maintain dialogue with China on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, however slowly. At the beginning of the year, Myanmar had set as one goal for its chairmanship persuading the five permanent members (P-5) of the U.N. Security Council to sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, in which they would promise to uphold the treaty’s principles. This has been a continuing but elusive goal for ASEAN since SEANWFZ went into force in 1997.

At this juncture, there is scant evidence that Myanmar will be able to meet its self-imposed goal this year – none of the P-5 has signed the protocol – but the prospects in the future are by no means dim.

The core of the SEANWFZ Treaty, also known as the Bangkok Treaty, is each member’s agreement that it will not “develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons, station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; or test or use nuclear weapons.” Dumping radioactive waste anywhere in the zone is also prohibited. Geographically, the Zone makes up the territories of the states and their continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). It includes land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, seabeds, and the airspace above these features.

Signatories also pledge to maintain International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards over their nuclear facilities, an increasingly important provision as Southeast Asian countries debate the use of nuclear power in their energy portfolios. SEANWFZ was the fifth geographic area to form a nuclear weapon free zone.

Each SEANWFZ member state can decide individually if it will allow foreign ships or aircraft, including those that are nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed, to visit or transit through their airspace or their territorial waters. This provision is critical if ASEAN is to draw the P-5 powers into the SEANWFZ protocol.

 

Read the rest of the Policy Brief here.

 

By Catharin Dalpino, Contract Course Chair in Southeast Asian Studies, the Foreign Service Institute, and Adjunct Professor at Seton Hall University’s Washington program.

Japan Debates the Right to Collective Self-Defense

October 22, 2013

Japanese political leaders – faced with emerging security concerns ranging from territorial disputes with China to the nascent North Korean nuclear arsenal – are reevaluating how their constitution limits the Japanese military’s ability to project power beyond its self-defense. While Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution “forever renounce[s] war” and “the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes,” Japan’s changing security environment raises several questions. Is Japan heading towards more military activism under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his recently reelected coalition? Will Abe be successful in changing the Japanese Constitution? What are the major forces at play in this domestic debate?

This Policy Brief by Satoru Mori, Visiting Scholar, outlines competing viewpoints debating the future direction of Japan’s Self-Defense Force, its constitution, and Tokyo’s foreign policy toward its neighbors and the United States.

Read the rest of the Policy Brief here.

By Satoru Mori, Professor, Department of Global Politics, Hosei University, Japan

U.S.-Russia Relations Back from the Brink

October 22, 2013

In 2012, the Rising Powers Initiative published an edited volume entitled Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia, edited by Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally. The Worldviews volume identifies the most important domestic schools of thought within each country and connects them to the history and institutional development of each nation. In this Policy Brief, Russia chapter author Andrew Kuchins examines how Russia’s foreign policy has evolved over the past two years from the lens of President Vladimir Putin’s leadership, conflict in the Middle East, and U.S.-Russia relations.

Read the rest of the Policy Brief here (PDF).

By Andrew Kuchins, Senior Fellow and Director, CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program

How the Pakistan Military Learned to Love the Bomb

Pakistan is undergoing a period of unprecedented transition after recent elections marked the first time two civilian governments succeeded each other peacefully. The new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, last held that position when Islamabad tested its first nuclear weapons. While civilian leaders were historically the primary drivers behind the decision to pursue nuclear weapons (something not widely known), the Pakistani military gradually came to value these weapons and eventually dominate the country’s nuclear debate.

Will Pakistan’s emerging civilian government again grapple with control over nuclear decisionmaking? This Policy Brief by Christopher Clary – Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation and a participant in the Rising Powers Initiative’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project – provides an understanding of how control over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal evolved over time and what the future might hold should the civilian government continue to consolidate its power.

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China’s Energy Outlook and the Shale Revolution

August 22, 2013

Faced with surging energy demand and increased public pressure for better environmental protection, the Chinese government is trying to shift its energy policy from coal and oil to gas. Vested interests are slowing reforms, but a pluralization of actors in the energy sector has yet to prove effective as the example of shale gas development reveals.

Read the rest of the Policy Brief here (PDF)

By Julia Coym, Ph.D. Candidate, Free University of Berlin and Visiting Scholar, Sigur Center for Asian Studies

Japan as a Global Power: Contending Views from Japan

June 22, 2013

Japan confronts an ever‐changing security environment abroad and economic turmoil at home as it looks to maintain a role as a global power. Japanese and U.S. experts discussed how Tokyo should respond to these challenges at a recent conference that presented a wide array of domestic views in each country on the future of the U.S.‐Japan security alliance, Japanese history and society, and domestic policy priorities.

This Policy Brief is based on the discussions at the conference on “Japan as a Global Power: Contending Views from Japan,” co‐organized by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations Japan Program, and MIT’s Center for International Studies on June 18, 2013.

The event featured the following Japanese panelists:

  • Tomoko Abe, Member of Parliament
  • Kan Ito, Foreign Policy Analyst
  • Yukio Okamoto, Center for International Studies
  • Kyoji Yanagisawa, International Geopolitics Institute

Read the rest of the Policy Brief here (PDF)

By Timothy Westmyer, Research and Program Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, and Samuel Porter, Research Assistant to Mike Mochizuki