New Indo-Pacific Dynamics under Biden and Reactions from Rising Powers

Policy Alert #224 | February 25, 2021

Since the inauguration, President Joe Biden has spoken with the leaders of all major rising powers and initiated a new era of multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. According to Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the new administration sees the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which include the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, as “a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific region.” Top diplomats of the Quad met on February 18 and discussed security issues in the Indo-Pacific. During the meeting, the Quad agreed to “strongly” oppose any attempts by China to alter the status quo in the region by force. A day later, President Biden attended his first G7 meeting, after which G7 leaders said they would seek a collective approach to China to counter “non-market oriented” policies and practices.

Meanwhile, several interactions among the resident powers of the Indo-Pacific demonstrated noticeable changes in the diplomatic and security dynamics of the region. Security tensions between China and India eased as the two sides pulled back their troops from the disputed border near the Pangong Tso Lake area on February 21. At the same time, Indian and U.S. armies concluded the Yudh Abhyas bilateral exercise. China was expected to conduct a joint naval exercise with Russia and Iran in the Indian Ocean in mid-February but ended up not participating. Economic tensions between China and India also saw some improvement as India is expected to clear 45 investment deals from China.

In this Policy Alert, we examine the Rising Powers’ reactions to the shifting dynamics of the Indo-Pacific under the Biden administration.

China

On February 18, in response to a question about the U.S. renewing the Quad as a multilateral platform, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that “cooperation between relevant countries will be open, inclusive and win-win, benefit the world and regional peace and stability and act as a force for good, instead of being used to target any specific country.” At a forum held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 22, Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated Beijing’s position on a number of sensitive issues, including Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet while urging “dialogue instead of confrontation and teaming up instead of ganging up.”

Moreover, Wang called for a “resumption of bilateral exchanges in all areas” between the U.S. and China, stating that “the people-to-people exchanges between the two countries should stay immune to the ups and downs in the political dimension of the relations.” In particular, Wang suggested that China hopes that the U.S. should “act as early as possible to lift its restrictions on Chinese educational and cultural groups, media outlets and institutions…remove its obstructions for U.S. subnational governments and social sectors to engage with China and encourage and support the resumption of normal exchange programs between universities, research institutes and of students.”

India

On February 8, President Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held their first phone call, during which the two leaders agreed to continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, including support for freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and a stronger regional architecture through the Quad. Prime Minister Modi also vowed to elevate the bilateral strategic partnership between the two countries.

In an op-ed for the center-right Times of India, Duncan Bartlett, Research Fellow at SOAS China Institute of University of London, proposes that amid the tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the rivalry between the U.S. and China, India should diversify its diplomatic strategy and establish closer relations with Europe: “Germany, Italy and South Korea were not great Trump supporters, and they are also being more circumspect on China… There are many sectors in which India and the EU have scope for closer cooperation, such as technology and healthcare. Even though the EU and India have expressed interest in closer trade ties, there has not been much tangible progress… India should study the Chinese approach. China has convinced the Europeans that their controversial investment deal creates a win-win outcome for both sides.”

Japan

President Biden reaffirmed the United States’ security commitment to Japan during his first phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on January 27. In addition to stepping up security cooperation with Australia and India for a free an open Indo-Pacific, the conversation specifically confirmed that U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan include the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, an island chain claimed by both China and Japan.

Russia

Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Biden had their first phone call on January 26. According to Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, the two sides “confirmed that there are very deep differences but…these differences demand a rather intensive dialogue between the two countries.” More recently, President Putin spoke at the Russian Federal Security Service and warned about ongoing schemes to contain Russia. Without naming any specific country, Putin said that such policy is “aimed at disrupting our development, slowing it down, creating problems along the outer perimeter, triggering domestic instability, undermining the values that unite Russian society, and ultimately to weaken Russia and put it under external control.”

Rising Powers React to the New Era of U.S.-China Relations

Policy Alert #223 | February 12, 2021

Since the inauguration of President Joe Biden, Washington has been talking tough, expecting “extreme competition” between the U.S. and China in the coming years. In a speech at the State Department, President Biden presented his outlook on U.S. foreign policy and stated that the U.S. would “confront China’s economic abuses; counter its aggressive, coercive action; push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property, and global governance.” But Biden’s Press Secretary Jen Psaki’s statement that the Biden team would exercise “strategic patience” toward Beijing left some wondering.

In response to the new rhetoric from Washington, China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi, Director of the Office of Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, told Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that the U.S. should “rectify its mistakes made over a period of time and work with China to uphold the spirit of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation, focus on cooperation and manage differences” while also stressing that “the two sides should respect each other’s core interests and choices of political system and development path, and manage their domestic affairs well.” Following Yang’s narrative, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai highlighted the need for bilateral cooperation between China and the U.S. “vis-à-vis the emerging or the existing global challenges, like climate change” during a CNN interview.

The meaning of Washington’s “patience” may have been on display newly adopted strategic patience is most notable when President Biden waited until February 10 – after having talked to all major world leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi – to make the first phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the eve of Chinese Lunar New Year. During the call, Biden confronted Xi over all major issue areas between the two countries, including trade and economic practices, democratic crackdown in Hong Kong, human rights abuse in Xinjiang, assertiveness toward Taiwan, and the preservation of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The first month of diplomacy under President Biden has already signaled a new era of U.S. policy toward China. In this Policy Alert, we will examine how the Rising Powers are responding to the prospects of U.S.-China relations under the new U.S. administration.

China

An editorial from state-owned nationalist tabloid Global Times tries to put the delayed phone call between Biden and Xi in a more positive light:

In an op-ed for South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, Wang Xiangwei, former Editor-in-Chief of South China Morning Post, proposes that Washington and Beijing could begin mending bilateral relations by taking small steps in reversing the tit-for-tat policies of the Trump era:

In an op-ed for Global Times, Yuan Zheng, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow of the Institute of American Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, expects enduring competition between the two countries and suggests that Beijing should take the initiative in shaping U.S.-China relations:

Japan

An editorial from the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun sees China’s recent heightening of military pressure toward Taiwan as a signal aimed at warning the Biden administration not to interfere in the Taiwan issue:

An editorial from the center-right The Japan Times argues that China’s assertiveness in defending its own interests explains the Biden administration’s reluctance to respond to China’s call for a cooperative bilateral relationship:

In an op-ed for the left-leaning Mainichi Shimbun, Bill Emmott, former Editor-in-Chief of The Economist, foresees that U.S. foreign policy in Asia under the Biden administration is likely to resemble Japan’s existing China policy:

India

An editorial from the pro -BJP government The Pioneer suggests that President Biden’s tough posture during the recent phone call with President Xi is a sign of Washington aiming to reestablish the U.S. as a global leader:

In an op-ed for the liberal Hindustan Times, Harsh Pant, a Professor at King’s College London and the Director of Studies at Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, questions the strategic clarity of Biden’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific amid the urgency of countering China’s rising regional dominance:

In an op-ed for center-right Times of India, Bharat Karnad, Emeritus Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, sees the strategic competition between the Washington and Beijing as a driver for more Indo-U.S. cooperation, but expresses skepticism on whether New Delhi is capable of taking full advantage the opportunities:

China and India Compete in Vaccine Diplomacy

Policy Alert #222 | January 29, 2021

As COVID-19 cases surpass 100 million globally, the successful distribution of vaccines is the only solution that allows the world to truly recover from the pandemic. According to a vaccine database managed by Duke University, governments around the world have purchased more than 7 billion vaccine doses as of January 2021, among which 4.2 billion were bought by high-income countries. Even though they only represent about 16% of global population, high-income countries are holding 60% of all COVID vaccines. Most of these countries are holding more vaccines than their populations, while some have enough to cover their populations several times over. For instance, Canada has purchased enough vaccine doses to cover more than five times their population, whereas the UK ranks second by holding enough for three times their population. In contrast, most middle and low-income countries lack the capability to develop vaccines themselves and are scrambling to secure the remaining vaccine supply. This global inequality of vaccine distribution thus offers an opportunity for China and India – two of the handful of countries that are capable of exporting COVID vaccines – to enhance their soft power and geopolitical influence through the provision of vaccines for countries in need.

In this Policy Alert, we examine the ongoing Sino-Indian competition in vaccine diplomacy and compare the success of their global distribution efforts.

China as Global Pharmaceutical Supplier, India as Global Vaccine Producer

China is the world’s largest pharmaceutical supplier, whereas India is the largest vaccine producer. It is no surprise that both countries – especially China, who has been criticized for its lack of transparency during the initial COVID outbreak – see the pandemic as an opportunity to extend their soft power and geopolitical influence. In China, there are three COVID vaccines that have been developed and ready to be exported. The first vaccine comes from private company Sinovac. At the higher end, testing in Turkey shows that the Sinovac vaccine is 91.25% effective, whereas at the lower end, a report from Brazil reveals an efficacy rate of 50.5%. The second Chinese vaccine is developed by state-owned Sinopharm, which is yielding an efficacy rate of 79%. The Chinese government plans to distribute free shots of Sinopharm vaccines for all of its citizens. Finally, the vaccine from privately-owned CanSino has also reached its final stage of testing, but the efficacy rate has yet to be published.

India has two vaccines that are ready for distribution. The first is Covishield, which is licensed from Oxford University and AstraZeneca and produced by the Serum Institute of India, the largest vaccine manufacturer in the world. The original Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine has an efficacy rate between 60% and 90%, while the testing of the Indian model shows an efficacy rate of 70.42%. The second Indian vaccine is Covaxin, which is indigenously developed by Bharat Biotech in collaboration with the Indian Council of Medical Research and the National Institute of Virology. Covaxin is still undergoing its late stage trials and the efficacy rate is yet to be published.

The headline efficacy rates of vaccines – especially China’s Sinovac – have received a lot of media attention and require careful consideration. The official result from Sinovac’s Brazilian testing is 78%, but one report revealed that the headline rate drops to 50.4% when “very mild” infections are included in the calculation. It remains unclear how the “very mild” cases are defined, while it is also unclear if Sinovac’s 91.24% result in Turkey follows the same standard, and whether the efficacy rates of other existing vaccines include “very mild” cases. As the result, direct comparison of headline efficacy rates can be challenging, especially when Chinese data lacks transparency.

Trends in Distribution of Chinese and Indian Vaccines: China Selling, India Donating

Unlike the Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines, which have adopted a new RNA technology and require extremely low temperatures for storage, Chinese and Indian vaccines utilize the traditional viral vector method, which is apparently less effective, but the lower cost of production and distribution makes it the best option for middle and low-income countries around the world. The following Chinese and Indian vaccine distribution data are extracted from a database run by Duke University and supplemented by media sources.

As of January 28, 2021, China has donated vaccines and/or entered agreements of vaccine purchases with the following countries:

Sinovac
Country             Doses              Donation or Sale
Azerbaijan        4 million         Sale
Brazil                100 million     Sale
Chile                 60 million       Sale
Indonesia        125 million      Sale
Malaysia          14 million        Sale
Mexico             Unknown        Sale
Philippines     25 million        Sale and 500k Donation
Thailand          2 million         Sale
Turkey             50 million       Sale
Ukraine           1.8 million      Sale

Sinopharm
Country           Doses                Donation or Sale
Morocco          10 million         Sale
Pakistan          1.7 million        Sale and 500k Donation
Peru                 38 million        Sale
Serbia              1 million           Sale
UAE                 3 million          Sale

CanSino
Country          Doses                     Donation or Sale
Indonesia       15 million              Sale
Mexico            10 to 35 million   Sale
Malaysia         10 million             Sale
Pakistan          20 million            Sale

As of January 28, 2021, India has donated vaccines or entered agreements of vaccine purchases with the following countries:

Covishield (Oxford-AstraZeneca):
Country              Doses                   Donation or Sale
Bangladesh        2 million             Donation
Bhutan                150k                     Donation
Brazil                  2 million              Sale
Caribbean          500k                     Donation
Maldives            100k                     Donation
Mauritius          150k                      Donation
Morocco            2 million              Sale
Myanmar          1.5 million           Donation
Nepal                 1 million              Donation
Nicaragua          200k                   Donation
Oman                 100k                    Donation
Pacific Islands  200k                   Donation
Seychelles          50k                     Donation

Competition in Vaccine Diplomacy: An Indian Edge

China first attempted to generate soft power by exporting PPE at the beginning of COVID pandemic, but Beijing’s initial effort blundered due to the inconsistent quality of Chinese-made equipment. As COVID vaccines are readied through expedited development, both China and India seized the opportunity to engage in vaccine diplomacy.

Comparing vaccine distribution, it is clear that there is a huge difference between the Chinese and Indian approach to vaccine diplomacy. Even though Chinese vaccines have a much wider outreach, they are almost exclusively distributed through purchase agreements instead of donations. Interestingly, the only Chinese donations are to the Philippines and Pakistan, both significantly associated with China’s ongoing disputes in the South China Sea and the Ladakh/Kashmir regions respectively. In contrast, India adopts a different strategy of vaccine diplomacy by first targeting its immediate neighbors, followed by its extended neighborhood and smaller island countries around the world. The main difference between the two countries is that Indian vaccines are almost exclusively distributed through donation – a strategy known as the Vaccine Maitri (Vaccine Friendship).

The most notable competition of vaccine diplomacy between China and India happened in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Bangladesh initially planned to purchase vaccine from China’s Sinovac, but the deal apparently fell apart when the Chinese company asked Dhaka to share the cost of clinical trials. This created an opportunity for India to step in and offer a donation of 2 million doses. Similarly, China promised a batch of donations to Myanmar during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit on January 12, but has yet to fulfill the commitment as India stepped in to donate 1.5 million doses. Moreover, Chinese and Indian media have also traded accusations against each other’s vaccine diplomacy. Chinese media and netizens questioned India’s ability to manufacture high-quality COVID vaccine after a fire broke out at a plant of India’s largest vaccine maker. Meanwhile, Indian media accused China of using the vaccine agreements to put pressure on the Turkish Parliament to ratify a treaty that allows the extradition of Uyghur dissidents.

In the initial round of vaccine distribution, it seems India has gained an edge in vaccine diplomacy through its Vaccine Maitri. Although China has signed purchase agreements with a larger number of countries, Beijing’s ability to fulfill its vaccine commitment is the country’s greatest challenge, especially when outbreaks are surging within China. India has committed to less countries, and its donation of vaccine shipments are gradually being fulfilled. However, as total COVID cases continues to rise while new variants of the virus are spreading around the world, India is also facing tremendous pressure to distribute vaccines within the country. For both China and India, vaccine diplomacy may ultimately be successful only if production is able to exceed the domestic demands of their huge populations.

Rising Powers React to the Storming of U.S. Capitol

Policy Alert #221 | January 19, 2021

After two months of misinformation and failed lawsuits against the result of the 2020 Presidential Election, President Donald Trump’s denial of electoral loss has culminated in the storming of U.S. Capitol by his supporters on the day when Congress was scheduled to certify the outcome of Electoral College. President Trump’s incitement of the riots on January 6, 2021 shocked political leaders around the world and seriously undermined the leadership of the U.S. among liberal democracies. In this Policy Alert, we examine how the Rising Powers react to the appalling storming of the U.S. Capitol.

 

China

During a daily press briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying went to great lengths to try and compare the rampage at the U.S. Capitol to Hong Kong protestors at the Legislative Council in 2019: “[U.S. officials] all condemned [what happened in the Capitol] as ‘a violent incident’ and the people involved as ‘rioters,’ ‘extremists’ and ‘thugs’ who brought ‘disgrace.’ Now compare that with what the Hong Kong violent protesters were called, like ‘a beautiful sight’ you brought up and ‘democratic heroes.’ They said that ‘American people stand with them.’ What’s the reason for such a stark difference in the choice of words? Everyone needs to seriously think about it and do some soul-searching on the reason.”

 

India

In response to the storming of U.S. Capitol, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in a tweet: “Distressed to see news about rioting and violence. Orderly and peaceful transfer of power must continue. The democratic process cannot be allowed to be subverted through unlawful protests.”

 

Japan

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga did not directly comment on the storming of U.S. Capitol but told reporters that he hopes the U.S. “will go from conflict to unity under Biden, the next president.” Similarly, Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato made a reserved comment by saying that “Hopefully the difficult situation faced by U.S. democracy can be overcome, and stability and harmony will be restored as the country moves toward a peaceful, democratic presidential transition.”

 

Russia

Russian deputy U.N. Ambassador Dmitry Polyanskiy compared the Capitol riots to the protests in Ukraine in 2013 while citing the moment when then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland offered food to protesters: “Quite Maidan-style pictures are coming from DC. Some of my friends ask whether someone will distribute crackers to the protesters to echo Victoria Nuland stunt. My guess is that chances are meagre, there is no US Embassy in Washington!”

How Are Rising Powers Sizing Up Biden Foreign Policy Picks?

Policy Alert #219 | December 18, 2020

Although President Donald Trump has yet to concede the 2020 election, the Electoral College voted on December 14 and confirmed the Biden-Harris victory. Meanwhile, President-Elect Joe Biden has been announcing his picks for key cabinet positions in the upcoming administration, including Secretary of State candidate Anthony Blinken, Secretary of Defense candidate Lloyd Austin, National Security Advisor candidate Jake Sullivan, and U.S. Trade Representative candidate Katherine Tai.

In this Policy Alert, we review how the Rising Powers are reacting to the Biden’s cabinet candidates for the upcoming administration.

China

An editorial from state-owned nationalist tabloid Global Times believes that the key to Biden’s China policy lies in how determined his administration will be in committing to multilateralism and demonstrating the U.S.’s desire to return to international rules broken by the Trump administration:

In an op-ed for South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California, argues that Taiwan’s concern about the Biden administration rethinking U.S.-Taiwan policy in favor of better relations with China is misguided:

A commentary in South China Morning Post foresees that Biden’s USTR candidate Katherine Tai, the chief enforcement lawyer on China trade issues during the Obama administration, is an excellent candidate who is expected to share incumbent USTR Robert Lighthizer’s hawkishness on trade issues against China:

In an op-ed for Global Times, Sun Chenghao, a research fellow with the Institute of America Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, expects that as Biden inherited the key foreign policy advisors from the Obama administration, U.S. foreign policy will maintain the alliance-focused strategy of the Obama years, but the attention will be directed toward the U.S.-China rivalry:

India

A commentary in the liberal Indian Express predicts that with Blinken as Secretary of State, U.S.-India relations will become a high priority and continue to strengthen under the Biden administration:

In an op-ed for The Tribune, Sandeep Dikshit, a former Member of Parliament, suggests that although the bilateral relations are expected to deepen between two countries in the upcoming administration, human rights in India is likely to remain under pressure from the U.S.:

A commentary in The Print sees Anthony Blinken as a strong interlocutor for New Delhi as the Biden administration aims to build on strategic gains made under the Trump administration:

Japan

A commentary in the center-right The Japan Times expects that under the advice of Anthony Blinken and Jake Sullivan, the Biden administration is expected to prioritize U.S. allies in East Asia and help mend bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea:

A commentary in the business-focused Nikkei Asia Report argues that despite having a similar team of diplomats from the Obama years, the Biden administration will be facing a greater challenge in Asia-Pacific because geopolitical landscape in the region has changed drastically:

A commentary in The Japan Times worries that Secretary of Defense candidate Lloyd Austin could be a signal of the U.S. paying less attention in security cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region:

Russia

In an op-ed for government funded RT, George Szamuely, a senior research fellow at Global Policy Institute in London, predicts that by picking Anthony Blinken and Jake Sullivan, the Biden administration will have more global interventions and regime-change operations, resembling the Clinton and Obama years:

A commentary in state-owned Sputnik News criticizes Lloyd Austin’s role as a board member of Raytheon Technology and suggests that Austin’s apparent close ties with the defense contractors means that the U.S. is unlikely to reduce arms sales to its security partners around the world:

A commentary in RT suggests that Russian officials are relieved by Biden’s pick for Secretary of State because Anthony Blinken is seen as the more favorable candidate compared to other possible alternatives, including Susan Rice:

Rising Powers React to the Busiest Diplomatic Season of 2020

Policy Alert #218 | December 1, 2020

Against the rising level of COVID infections around the world, November has been an eventful month for multilateral diplomatic engagements. Leaders and representatives of Rising Powers met virtually at a slew of international summits, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits on November 10 and 30, the East Asia Summit (EAS) on November 14, the signing of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on the sideline of ASEAN Summit on November 15, the Brazil-Russia-India- China-South Africa (BRICS) on November 17, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on November 20, and the G20 Summit on November 21.

In this Policy Alert, we highlight the Rising Powers’ most notable reactions to the outcomes of the busiest diplomatic season this year in November.

China

At the SCO summit on November 10, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated China’s firm opposition to “interference by external forces in the domestic affairs” while also warning against unilateralism and calling for more multilateral cooperation: “The international community now faces a major test with choices to be made between multilateralism and unilateralism, openness and seclusion, cooperation and confrontation.”

After the signing of RCEP, the world’s largest free trade agreement including 15 participating countries and accounting for about 30% of global GDP, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang praised the agreement as “a monumental achievement in East Asian regional cooperation, but more important, a victory of multilateralism and free trade.” At the APEC summit, President Xi welcomed the signing of RCEP and announced that China “will favorably consider joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).”

India

At the SCO summit on November 10, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the linkage between the challenge of territorial disputes and the prospect of economic cooperation: “[I]t is unfortunate that repeated attempts are being made to unnecessarily bring bilateral issues to the SCO agenda, which violate the SCO Charter and Shanghai Spirit…India believes that to enhance connectivity it is important that we move forward while respecting one another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

At the East Asia Summit, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar commented on the importance of adhering to international law and respecting territorial integrity while condemning “actions and incidents that erode trust” in the South China Sea. A day after the signing of RCEP Jaishankar criticized free trade agreements without making a direct reference to RCEP: “In the name of openness, we have allowed subsidized products and unfair production advantages from abroad to prevail…The effect of past trade agreements has been to deindustrialize some sectors. The consequences of future ones would lock us into global commitments, many of them not to our advantage.”

Japan

At the East Asia Summit, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga expressed concerns about the territorial disputes in the region: “In the East China Sea, activities that violate Japan’s sovereignty continue, and in the South China Sea, there have been actions that increase tensions such as ballistic missile launches and further militarization of the features, and claims that are inconsistent with the UNCLOS.”

At the APEC summit a few days later, Prime Minister Suga restated Japan’s interest in further advancing free trade in the region based on the foundation of RCEP and CPTPP and reiterated the call to establish Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, a Japanese vision to integrate all 21 APEC member economies.

Russia

At the SCO summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted the rising level of security cooperation among SCO member states and hoped that the trend will continue to develop: “[F]oreign policy and military cooperation between the SCO states has intensified significantly…We consider this undertaking to be useful and hope that such extended meetings of natural partners will become regular.” In addition, President Putin also castigated foreign meddling in SCO member states: “Belarusians are entitled to a chance to sort things out calmly and take the necessary steps on their own. The same is true of the recent events in Kyrgyzstan and the political struggle in Moldova.”

 

How Are Rising Powers Responding to Results of the 2020 U.S. Election?

Policy Alert #217 | November 12, 2020

After four days of vote counting, news organizations on Nov 7 declared Democratic candidates Joe Biden and Kamala Harris as the winners of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Although incumbent President Donald Trump refused to concede to Biden and vowed to legally challenge the result of the election, leaders around the world, including French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, have congratulated Biden and Harris on their victory.

Given Biden’s track record as Vice President during the Obama administration, world leaders await drastically different U.S. policies compared to President Trump. What are the expectations of the Rising Powers on the upcoming leadership of Biden and Harris? In this Policy Alert, we examine the Rising Powers’ reactions to the results of the 2020 U.S. Election.

China

Consistent with its pre-election attitude, China has been cautious with official comments in the aftermath of the U.S. election. President Xi Jinping has yet to congratulate Biden on his victory. On Nov 5, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng responded to a U.S. election question at a press conference: “China’s attitude toward the bilateral relations is clear and consistent. Although there are differences between the two countries, they also have extensive common interests and room for cooperation. We hope that the next U.S. government will meet China halfway; uphold the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation; focus on collaboration; manage differences; and push forward bilateral ties along the right track.”

During a regular press conference on Nov 9, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin answered a question on Biden’s victory: “ [W]e noticed that Mr. Biden has declared election victory. We understand the presidential election result will be determined following the U.S. laws and procedures. We always believe China and the United States should strengthen communication and dialogue, manage differences on the basis of mutual respect, expand cooperation based on mutual benefit, and promote the sound and stable development of China-U.S. relations.”

India

Indian leaders responded quickly to Biden’s victory. In a Twitter post, Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Biden soon after the election was called on Nov 7: “Congratulations @JoeBiden on your spectacular victory! As the VP, your contribution to strengthening Indo-US relations was critical and invaluable. I look forward to working closely together once again to take India-US relations to greater heights.” On a separate post, Modi praised Harris: “Heartiest congratulations @KamalaHarris! Your success is pathbreaking, and a matter of immense pride not just for your chittis, but also for all Indian-Americans. I am confident that the vibrant India-US ties will get even stronger with your support and leadership.”

Besides Prime Minister Modi, other Indian political leaders also lauded the Biden-Harris victory. Ruling BJP General Secretary Ram Madhav praised the two country’s strong bipartisan bilateral relationship based on principles of democracy, mutual benefits, and global peace, whereas Sonia Gandhi, President of the opposition Congress Party, praised that the victory would work to heal the division among the people and called Harris “a beloved daughter of India.

Japan

In a Twitter post, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga congratulated Biden and Harris on Nov 7: “Warm congratulations to @JoeBiden and @KamalaHarris. I look forward to working with you to further strengthen the Japan-US Alliance and ensure peace, freedom, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.” On the same day, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi also said on Twitter: “Congratulations to @JoeBiden and @KamalaHarris. I look forward to working closely with the new administration to further promote Japan-US relations and to overcome challenges the world faces.”

In addition to sending blessings, Prime Minister Suga held phone talks on Nov 12 with Biden regarding the U.S. commitments to the security alliance with Japan. Speaking to reporters after the call, Suga said the Biden administration made clear that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation would apply to the Senkaku Islands, but the readout from Biden’s transition team confirmed the President-elect’s commitment to the U.S.-Japan security alliance without mentioning the islands by name.

Russia

Similar to China’s caution, Russia has been reluctant to make official comments on the Biden-Harris victory while citing the ongoing legal process. On Nov 9, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: “Obviously, you can see that certain legal procedures are coming there, which were announced by the incumbent president – therefore this situation is different, so we consider it correct to wait for the official announcement.”

In contrast, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who is currently recovering from poisoning in Germany, applauded Biden and Harris on their victory: “Congratulations to @JoeBiden and @KamalaHarris on the victory and to the Americans on defining the new leadership in a free and fair election. This is a privilege which is not available to all countries. Looking forward to the new level of cooperation between Russia and the US.”

What Are the Rising Powers’ Expectations as the 2020 U.S. Election Approaches?

Policy Alert #216 | October 30, 2020

After four years of President Donald Trump’s unconventional foreign policies, the 2020 U.S. Election has become the most anticipated political transition closely followed by all major powers around the world. With COVID infections surging in most countries, the results of the Presidential and Congressional election on November 3 not only lead to significant political impacts globally, but also generate serious consequences on the prospect of post-pandemic recovery.

In this RPI Policy Alert, we examine the Rising Powers’ expectations as the election day is around the corner.

 

China

An editorial from People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, urges the U.S. to stop making an issue out of China during the election:

In an op-ed for Global Times, a nationalist tabloid, Wei Zongyou, professor at the Center for American Studies of Fudan University in Shanghai, argues that regardless of who wins in November, the next administration will continue to be tough on China. Wei also expects that a potential Biden administration will be tough on economic and human rights issues, but more open to climate change cooperation and people exchanges between the two countries:

A commentary article in South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, predicts that Biden’s White House will be more favorable for the Chinese economy for two reasons:

In an op-ed for South China Morning Post, Ian Storey and Malcolm Cook, research fellows at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, foresee that although the hard-line U.S. strategy toward China in Southeast Asia is likely to remain unchanged no matter who wins, U.S. policy execution in the region will be less unpredictable under a potential Biden administration:

 

India

In an op-ed for the left-leaning The Hindu, T.P. Sreenivasan, former Ambassador of India and Governor for India of the IAEA, criticizes President Trump’s unpredictable foreign policies and disengagement from multilateral institutions, which he argues has undermined the post-war international system. Sreenivasan also sees no change in bilateral relationship between India and the U.S. no matter who wins the election:

An editorial from the business-focused Economic Times forecasts further bilateral cooperation between India and the U.S. in security, technology, and public health:

In an op-ed for the liberal Indian Express, Amitabh Mattoo, Professor of Disarmament Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University , argues that the rise of a belligerent China is the main reason why the relationship with the U.S. is the most important of India’s bilateral ties, and that both parties in the U.S. favor engagement with India:

In an op-ed for Indian Express, Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution, points out that U.S. foreign policy under the new administration will have more significant implications for India. Madan emphasizes that U.S. policy toward China and American leadership in the world will be two of the most consequential factors:

 

Japan

In an op-ed for the center-right The Japan Times, Kuni Miyake, president of the Foreign Policy Institute and research director at Canon Institute for Global Studies, suggests that U.S. policy toward China remains the central concern for Japan. Miyake adds that while President Trump has been unpredictable toward China, U.S. policy has traditionally been consistent and he does not expect a potential Biden administration going back to engagement with China:

A commentary article from the left-leaning The Mainichi worries that no matter who wins in November, bilateral trade negotiations with the U.S. will remain a demanding challenging for Japan:

  • “The schedule and style of talks may differ substantially depending on who emerges the victor, but both President Donald Trump and Democratic challenger Joe Biden are likely to push for greater market access to Japan as they focus on protecting American industries and jobs to revive the U.S. economy hit by the coronavirus pandemic.”

A commentary article from The Japan Times proposes that if Trump wins a second term, Japan would need to focus on building stronger ties with other democracies around the world:

 

Russia

In response to Biden’s comment on Russia being the greatest security threat to the U.S. and its allies, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said:

Facing U.S. allegations of election interference, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Head Sergei Naryshkin emphasizes that Russia is not planning to meddle in the US presidential election and wishes less confrontations in the U.S. society:

Responding to a question on the potential domestic turbulence of the U.S. election, Naryshkin foresees that the upcoming U.S. election could be destabilizing for the country:

In an op-ed for the government-funded RT, Glenn Diesen, a professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway and an editor at the Russia in Global Affairs journal, warns that Biden’s perception of Russia as the greatest security threat is based on emotion and outdated ideology, which creates concerns about the future of European security:

In an op-ed for the independent, Dutch-based The Moscow Times, Tatyana Stanovaya, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that while it is generally believed that the Kremlin favors Trump over Biden, Russian elites may see some benefits under a potential Biden administration:

 

RPI acknowledges support from the Carnegie Corporation and MacArthur Foundation.

Rising Powers Evaluate the Quad’s Future

Policy Alert #215 | October 14, 2020

In the first week of October, the Quad – a strategic forum that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. – held its second-ever foreign ministers meeting in Japan. Despite the anticipation of the meeting’s potential progress in transforming the Quad into an “Asian NATO,” the ministerial meeting in Tokyo did not lead to any joint statement nor significant deepening of security cooperation, while the U.S. stood out as the only participant who made specific remarks targeting China at the meeting.

Due to President Trump’s COVID diagnosis, Mike Pompeo had to cut visits to Mongolia and South Korea from his Asia trip, but the U.S. Secretary of State took the opportunity in Tokyo to rally support from Washington’s closest allies in the Indo-Pacific for a deeper collaboration against China’s regional influence and to accuse China of covering up and worsening the pandemic. Secretary Pompeo stated that it is “more critical now than ever that we collaborate to protect our people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption and coercion,” pointing to recent Chinese activities in the East and South China Seas, the Mekong region, the Himalayas, and the Taiwan Strait.

In contrast, Australia, Japan, and India made no specific mention of China or the Communist Party of China by name. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne emphasized that the Quad “has a positive agenda” and that the region should be “governed by rules, not power.” Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said that the goal of the Quad should be “advancing the security and the economic interests of all countries having legitimate and vital interests in the region.” Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi expressed interest in expanding multilateral cooperation with European countries, stating that it is “important to cooperate with as many nations as possible that share these basic values and common rules.”

In this RPI Policy Alert, we survey the Rising Powers on how they evaluate the Quad’s future role in the Indo-Pacific amid the rising level of geopolitical competition in the region.

 

China

Before the Quad meeting, Beijing clearly iterated its concern of China being the center of attention. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin commented on the Quad meeting by advocating against “forming exclusive cliques” while insisting that “multilateral and plurilateral cooperation should be open, inclusive and transparent.” Wang also added, “Instead of targeting third parties or undermining third parties’ interests, cooperation should be conducive to mutual understanding and trust between regional countries.”

After the meeting, the Chinese Embassy in Japan released a statement criticizing Secretary Pompeo. The statement accused Pompeo of “repeatedly fabricated lies about China” and “maliciously manufactured political confrontation” and reiterated Beijing’s position of urging Washington to “abandon the Cold War mentality and ideological bias.” Subsequently, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying repeated that “organizing closed and exclusive cliques will not help enhance mutual trust and cooperation,” while she also emphasized that Beijing wishes “relevant countries will bear in mind the common interests of all countries and mankind and focus on beating the virus with collective efforts while creating a peaceful environment and cooperation opportunities for regional and global economic recovery.”

 

India

Since the September sideline meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) September gathering in Moscow, the tensions between India and China have been de-escalating as both sides agreed to disengage troops at the disputed border. At the ministerial meeting in Tokyo, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar avoided mentioning China and its ruling party and suggested the Quad should emphasize the “security and the economic interests of all countries having legitimate and vital interests in the region.” While not directly targeting China, Minister Jaishankar made the point that, “As vibrant and pluralistic democracies with shared values, our nations have collectively affirmed the importance of maintaining a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.”

 

Japan

The rising tensions between China and the U.S. present a serious diplomatic challenge for Japan’s new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. Similar to the remarks from Australia and India, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi avoided echoing Secretary Pompeo’s direct criticism against Beijing, but instead emphasized Japan’s interest in multilateral cooperation by advocating the potential inclusion of France and Germany in the Indo-Pacific dialogue. In addition to the Quad meeting, Minister Motegi and Secretary Pompeo met on the sideline and reinforced the significance of U.S.-Japan bilateral relations as a cornerstone of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific under the Suga administration.

Rising Powers and the Afghan Peace Process: How Do They See the Pros and Cons?

Policy Alert #214 | September 30, 2020

Peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government resumed in the second week of September, signaling the next iteration of complex negotiations against the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic. Since assuming office, President Donald Trump has been vocal about his commitment to pulling troops out of Afghanistan and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo flew to Doha to launch the latest talks. If successful, all American military personnel will leave Afghanistan by spring of 2021.

Challenges to a successful outcome is manifold: turmoil of Afghan domestic politics, intrusion from the broader region, and the inconsistent foreign policy of the United States on Afghanistan. Prior attempts to negotiate a roadmap to peace in Afghanistan include a series of meetings between China, the United States, and Russia in 2019, in which the major world powers notably convened without involving Afghanistan itself.

This year, more attempts were initiated for the peace process, which include the plan signed by the United States and Afghanistan on March 1st, stipulating an immediate cease-fire and a commitment by the Taliban that Afghanistan would not serve as a base for terrorist activities against the United States. Further talks for peace were scheduled to begin on March 10 but were paused over the issue of prisoner exchange. As talks subsequently resumed, however, Afghan Senior Vice President Amrullah Saleh was targeted in a convey bombing in Kabul, presumed to be by the Taliban.

With the consistent level of violence in Afghanistan, there is concern that President Trump’s plan to withdraw American troops will add to the region’s instability. Failure of any agreement brokered by the United States leaves room for other rising powers such as China and Russia to influence future negotiations and outcomes even if the process is now ostensibly intra-Afghan. In this RPI Policy Alert, we ask how the Rising Powers are reacting to the on again, off again peace talks on Afghanistan and how they view their interests being served.

China

China consistently supports the peace progress while expressing a clear interest in the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. After the signing of a peace deal between the U.S. and Taliban in February, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated: “China welcomes the signing of this agreement between the US and Taliban, which we believe will play a positive role in promoting a political settlement of the Afghan issue. China firmly supports a broad and inclusive peace and reconciliation process that is “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned”… Foreign troops should withdraw in an orderly and responsible way so that the situation in Afghanistan will experience a steady transition with no security vacuum for terrorist forces to seize upon and expand themselves.”

Following the announcement of intra-Afghan peace talks in September, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin welcomed the progress emphasizing that the progress is Afghan-led: “Both parties of the intra-Afghan negotiations are brothers. After all these years of twists and turns, they finally came to the negotiating table and opened a new chapter in the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan … China always respects the independent choice of the Afghan people, firmly supports the “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” peace and reconciliation process, and will continue to be a supporter, mediator and facilitator of the process as always.”

India

India has elevated its engagements in the peace process. In June 2020, India’s Official Spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs Anurag Srivastava expressed concern about terrorism in Afghanistan, as well as the connections between terrorists and Pakistan: “We note with serious concern reference in the Report to the continued presence of the senior leadership of the UN designated terrorist organization Al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan; as well as a large number of foreign terrorist fighters, including up to 6500 Pakistan nationals, operating in Afghanistan. Besides, UN designated entities like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed, operating from Pakistan controlled territories facilitating trafficking and imparting training to other terrorists in Afghanistan.

During the intra-Afghan peace talks in September, India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar participated via videoconference, while an official delegation led by Joint Secretary J. P. Singh represented India in person, which marks the first time India participated in an official gathering involving the Taliban. Following the event, Minister Jaishankar tweeted five goals of the peace process: (1) be Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan- controlled, (2) respect national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanista, (3) Promote human rights and democracy, (4) ensure interest of minorities, women and the vulnerable, and (5) effectively address violence across the country.

A press release from India’s Ministry of External Affairs highlights India’s support to the economic development projects in Afghanistan and expresses support to the progress of intra-Afghan peace talks: “India’s policy on Afghanistan had been consistent. India believes any peace process must be Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled, has to respect the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and preserve the progress made in the establishment of a democratic Islamic Republic in Afghanistan.”

Russia

While Russia has publicly supported the peace talks and noted it is in the interest of all parties to resolve the conflict, in a February press conference, the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson warned about the credibility of the United States: “One cannot rely on Washington’s statements of intentions. This is pointless and inexpedient. All US statements on troop withdrawals were changed in short- or medium-term perspective as regards the numbers of withdrawn troops, dates of withdrawal or the fact of withdrawal as such. This is why it is useless to rely on such statements. The United States has a national tradition – to change its statements all the time.”

Japan

To support the peace talks, Japan has offered cultural grant assistance to Afghanistan to help repair landmark sites damaged by Taliban violence. In February 2020, Japanese Ambassador to Afghanistan Suzuka Mitsuji and UNESCO Representative to Afghanistan Jordan Naidoo signed documents promising Japan’s donation of 423 million yen to repair the giant Buddha statues of Bamiyan Valley that were damaged in a 2001 bombing.

 

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

How Are Rising Powers Viewing Shinzo Abe’s Legacy?

Policy Alert #213 | September 9, 2020

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the country’s longest-serving prime minister, announced that he would resign from the position due to his worsening condition of ulcerative colitis – the same disease Abe has been battling for decades and ended his first stint as PM in 2007. Abe’s abrupt resignation comes at a time when Japan faces various uncertainties at home and abroad.

Domestically, Japan is challenged by an ongoing threat of COVID, the economic downturn caused by COVID, and the task of preparing for the upcoming Tokyo Olympic games. Internationally, there is a rising level of Chinese assertiveness in the region, intensifying geopolitical and economic competitions between the U.S. and China, and the uncertainty of future U.S. policy amid the upcoming Presidential election.

How do the Rising Powers perceive Abe’s political legacy and the absence of his leadership in the future? In this RPI Policy Alert, we survey the Rising Powers’ reactions to Abe’s sudden resignation.

Japan

The most pressing challenge for Japan’s ruling LDP is to elect Abe’s successor. Among the competition, Abe’s right-hand man Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga is seen to be the likely winner as he wins backing from powerful factions within the party. At news conferences and media interviews, Suga pledges to continue the economic reforms of “Abenomics” while promising to overhaul the health ministry.

China

China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian made the following remarks on Abe’s resignation during the Ministry’s regular press conference:

In recent years, China-Japan relations got back to the right track and achieved new progress. Leaders of the two sides reached important consensus on building a bilateral relationship in keeping with the new era. We speak positively of Prime Minister Abe’s important efforts in this process and wish him a speedy recovery.

We stand ready to work together with the Japanese side to stay committed to the principles and spirit established in the four political documents and deepen anti-epidemic and socioeconomic cooperation to ensure the sustained improvement and development of China-Japan relations.”

India

In response to Abe’s resignation, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted:

Pained to hear about your ill health, my dear friend @AbeShinzo. In recent years, with your wise leadership and personal commitment, the India-Japan partnership has become deeper and stronger than ever before. I wish and pray for your speedy recovery.”

Russia

President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov told news agencies that “Shinzo Abe really made an invaluable contribution to the development of bilateral Russian-Japanese relations” and Russia hopes Abe’s successor “will be equally committed to further developing Russian-Japanese relations.”

 

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

China’s Growing Pains the Rising Powers

Policy Alert #212 | July 17, 2020

In responding to criticism over its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, China has adopted a new, more assertive “wolf warrior diplomacy,” but it has also taken a more aggressive stance in its territorial disputes. Simmering tensions since May on their Himalayan border came to a head on June 15th, when a violent clash between Chinese and Indian forces broke out in disputed territory in the Galwan Valley. The brawl resulted in casualties for the first time in 45 years, with twenty Indians killed and an undisclosed number of Chinese deaths. A fourteen-hour marathon meeting of commanders from both sides was held on July 14th, and relations between the two countries appear to be getting a reprieve. Nevertheless, the violence turned attention to other altercations China has been party to in recent months: a Chinese survey ship was in a month-long stand-off in Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone, a Chinese vessel rammed a Vietnamese fishing ship and China instituted a unilateral fishing ban in the South China Sea, and both the Philippines and Vietnam protested a new wave of Chinese claims on disputed islands. In response, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced a stronger stance against Chinese actions in the South China Sea. In its 2020 White Paper, the Japanese Ministry of Defense pointedly criticized China for agitating in disputed waters in the East China Sea during the pandemic. While Russia has managed to stay out of any direct conflicts, it was nevertheless caught in the awkward tension between the two other key members of the BRICS at their trilateral “RIC” meeting.

In this RPI Policy Alert, we take stock of the Rising Powers’ temper amidst the turbulence in the Indo-Pacific. 

 

CHINA

Following the phone conversation between Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Spokesperson Zhao echoed China’s confidence that the two sides “can properly deal with the current situation, jointly uphold peace and stability in the border areas, and ensure a sound and steady development of bilateral relations.” In response to a press inquiry regarding the bans on Chinese apps and the announcement that Chinese companies would be barred from road construction projects in India, Spokesperson Zhao argued that such action “hurts India’s interests.” In response to a request for comment on Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the border area on July 3rd, Spokesperson Zhao warned that “Neither side should make any move that may complicate the border situation.” China’s account of the June 15th incident was added to the transcript of the Foreign Ministry’s June 19th regular press conference. When questioned about Japan’s White Paper on July 14th, which asserts that China has continued to agitate the territorial dispute in the East China Sea, Spokesperson Zhao retorted: “Japan’s Defense of Japan 2020 white paper is fraught with bias against China and false information. China has already stated its solemn position. As a responsible major country firmly committed to pursuing a neighborhood diplomacy of building friendships and partnerships with its neighbors and upholding a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, China has been safeguarding, building and contributing to world peace, stability and prosperity. At the same time, China is unswerving in upholding its sovereignty, security and development interests.”

 

INDIA

Following the most recent Meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs on July 10th, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported that it was “reaffirmed that both sides will ensure complete disengagement of the troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquility in the border areas in accordance with bilateral agreements and protocols.”

While the Ministry conveyed reports of peaceful disengagement, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a seemingly different stand. In an address to the nation on June 17th, Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed that the deaths of Indian soldiers at the border would not “be in vain”: “India’s integrity and sovereignty is supreme for us, and no one can stop us from defending it. Nobody should have any iota of doubt about this. India wants peace. But on provocation, India will give a befitting reply.” On July 3rd, Prime Minister Modi visited the border towns of Leh and Nimu to meet with Indian troops. In his speech to wounded soldiers in Leh, Prime Minister Modi praised the soldiers for their efforts: “I have come to salute you all today. You have fought bravely! […] The way you stood up to the powers, the world wishes to know who are these brave-hearts?” In none of the speeches did he specifically mention China, but anti-Chinese sentiment has been displayed by other arms of the Indian government. On June 30th, the Department of Telecommunications ordered internet operators in India to block fifty-nine Chinese apps, including social media platforms TikTok and WeChat. Minister of Road Transport and Highways Nitin Jairam Gadkari announced on July 1st that Chinese firms would no longer be allowed to bid on road construction projects. The Bureau of Indian Standards and the Trade Ministry have reportedly begun investigating how to impose both tariffs and non-tariff measures to slow the import of Chinese goods, including tougher and more frequent inspections. On July 15th, the Ministry of Defence announced that in addition to the thirty-three fighter jets it is purchasing from Russia, the government approved the purchase of defense weapons and equipment up to $39.9 million

 

JAPAN

On July 14th, the Japanese Ministry of Defense released its annual White Paper on Japan’s security environment. In the full Japanese report, the government criticized China for continuing to challenge the status quo in the East China Sea territorial dispute in the midst of the pandemic, although that assertion was not included in the English digest version

 

RUSSIA

Following the incident in the Galwan Valley, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharov expressed Russia’s hope for resolution: “We hope that these two states, as responsible members of the international community, will be able to find mutually acceptable ways to ease tensions as soon as possible, using well-functioning mechanisms of bilateral dialogue in accordance with their political agreement on non-violence.” Russia’s planned meeting of the trilateral “RIC” subset of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) went on as scheduled on June 23rd. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied that he attempted to help mend ties between them: “We have never set the goal of helping India and China improve their bilateral relations. These countries have everything they need to address and review any problems that arise in their relations, as problems can arise between any countries, including neighbouring states. I don’t think that India and China need help and assistance aiming to somehow resolve their disputes or situations.” In early July, India finalized an order of weapons and fighter jets from Russia.

 

Rising Powers Respond to Anti-Racism Protests

Policy Alert #211 | June 18, 2020

On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, an unarmed black man, was killed by police in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The gruesome act was caught on camera and widely shared on social media. Protests against police brutality and racism quickly spread across the United States and across the globe. In this RPI Policy Alert, we survey the Rising Powers’ response to these protests and their take on politics and race in the US, rarely if ever, holding up a mirror.

 

CHINA

At a regular press conference, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian condemned racial discrimination in the US: “[W]e are following the latest developments of the situation following the death of George Floyd. ‘Black lives matter.’ […] What is happening right now once again shows the seriousness of racial discrimination and violent law enforcement by the police, and the urgency for the US to address them. We hope the US government will take concrete measures to fulfill its due obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to protect the legal rights of ethnic minorities in the US.” In response to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s allegation that the Chinese Communist Party is exploiting George Floyd’s death for propaganda, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying argued that his suggestion was uncalled for: “Even under such circumstances, Mr. Pompeo is still full of lies and slanders. It’s just sad. From Martin Luther King, Jr.’s speech ‘I have a dream’ in 1963 to George Floyd’s moan of ‘I cannot breathe’, 57 years have passed, and yet equal rights is still a dream for ethnic minorities in the US, a country where serious systemic racism still exists. This is not foreign propaganda; this is an everyday phenomenon in the American society that should be reflected upon, as unanimously appealed by people from all walks of life in the US.” At another press conference, an exchange between a reporter from the Global Times and Spokesperson Hua highlighted the US’s “double-standards” in each country’s treatment of members of the press. Earlier this month, the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute released a report pointing out that despite recent efforts by Twitter and Facebook to remove accounts created and used by state-linked information operations, recent activity by China-linked accounts on Twitter indicate that “the operation continues and has pivoted to try to weaponise the US Government’s repost to current domestic protests and create a perception of a moral equivalence with the suppression of protests in Hong Kong.” 

 

INDIA

In a phone call with President Trump to discuss the 2020 G7 Summit and the COVID-19 pandemic, Prime Minister Narendra Modi “expressed concern regarding the ongoing civil disturbances in the US, and conveyed his best wishes for an early resolution of the situation.”

 

JAPAN

Japanese public broadcaster NHK came under fire for an animated video explaining the protest for a children’s program that was criticized for being “tone-deaf and offensive.” In addition to omitting discussion of police brutality and racial injustice, the since-removed video also used insensitive caricatures of Black Americans. Although the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun was the only major news outlet to weigh in on the protests, several rallies have been held in Tokyo and Osaka, including one held in response to the police’s treatment of a Kurdish man in the capital

  • The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun questioned President Trump’s handling of the unrest, which it characterized as “exacerbat[ing]” the situation with “provocative remarks: “Leaders from all walks of life must send a message of reconciliation to the public to calm the situation. Trump’s behavior is far from that. He criticized Democratic governors for being weak and stressed the need to control their states by force. With the presidential election approaching in November, he seems to be focusing only on white voters.”

 

RUSSIA

At a regular press conference, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reported that Russia was monitoring the protests in the US and had been in communication with the US State Department regarding law enforcement’s injury of Russian journalists covering the events. Spokesperson Zakharova went on to criticize President Trump’s Executive Order on Advancing International Religious Freedom amidst the domestic crisis: “I would like to believe that before showing their zeal in protecting the rights of the ‘suppressed’ and ‘dissenters’ in other countries, US authorities will start to scrupulously observe democratic standards and ensure the freedoms of their citizens at home.”  

 

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Revisiting the World Order under a Pandemic – The Taiwan Factor

Policy Alert #210 | June 3, 2020

The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei and catapulted it to global attention. China claims Taiwan as its territory and has blocked the island’s participation as an autonomous actor in international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Although Taiwan was allowed to attend the WHO’s annual World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer from 2009 to 2016 under President Ma Ying-jeou, it has not been allowed to attend during President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, which the Chinese government views as too independence-leaning. Despite a coalition of governments led by the United States, including the European Union, Japan, and fourteen of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies expressing support for Taiwan’s inclusion in the 2020 Assembly, it was not allowed to participate as an observer due to Chinese pressure. Tensions between WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and the Tsai administration had been souring, beginning with charges that inquiries from Taipei for verification about the virus’s potential for person-to-person spread were allegedly ignored by WHO officials in January. Relations spiraled downwards in April, when Tedros accused Taiwan of coordinating a campaign of harassment against him, which the Tsai administration denied. Yet Taiwan’s resounding success in stopping its own outbreak–with a reported total of 443 confirmed infections and seven deaths at publishing–and donations provided through its “Taiwan Can Help” program have only continued to keep Taiwan in the spotlight and called into question China’s intransigence in the midst of the pandemic.

In this third installment of RPI’s Revisiting the World Order under a Pandemic Series, we provide an overview of perspectives from China, Taiwan, and the international community on how the pandemic is affecting cross-strait relations and how that dynamic is affecting the two sides’ place in the international community. For more insight on this topic, we encourage our readers to watch the video from the COVID-19 and Taiwan’s International Space Reimagined webinar hosted by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the East Asia National Resource Center.

 

Views from Taiwan

 

Views from China

 

Views from Outside Experts

 

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Revisiting the World Order under a Pandemic – China’s Prospects

Policy Alert #209 | May 28, 2020

RPI’s Special Series on Revisiting the World Order under a Pandemic continues in this Policy Alert, which focuses on how the COVID-19 pandemic is raising new debates on how to view the world order and power. In this issue, we focus on China’s prospects in a shifting world order with insights from Chinese scholars and international experts. 

China’s role as the origin country of the novel coronavirus, coupled with its position as the world’s production hub and rising influence in international relations, has put the country front-and-center on the international stage as the pandemic continues. As it gained control of the virus, China pivoted from recipient of aid to a major provider of it. This shift has been met with suspicion and criticism as well as assertions that China’s initial response worsened the situation for the international community. China’s influence at the World Health Organization has also faced scrutiny for both the WHO’s sluggish response to the pandemic and the ongoing political issue of Taiwan’s potential participation in the midst of a global crisis, which will be addressed in our next Policy Alert. Amidst a barrage of criticism from the United States, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lijian Zhao promoted a conspiracy theory that the virus originated in the United States on Twitter. The move has been regarded as an exemplification of repeated fumbles by China to increase its standing in the world order.  

A note to our readers: Some of the pieces below have been published by journals that maintain paywalls for full access to their content. We would like to remind our student readers that they may have full access to these journals through their universities’ digital collections or by logging on to their universities’ virtual private networks (VPNs). 

 

Views from China

 

Views from International Experts

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.