Type: Asia Reports

Asia Reports provide the summaries of events held by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies on key foreign policy issues in the region.

Full list of Asia Reports: https://sigur.elliott.gwu.edu/reports/

India’s Indo-Pacific Vision and Ties with Japan

Asia Report #46 | December 2019

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The rise of India has been a major catalyst for the development of the idea of the “Indo-Pacific” and a broadened understanding of Asia. Within the Indo-Pacific, the relationship between the region’s two most important democracies, India and Japan, has taken on particular importance.  The Sigur Center and The Rising Powers Initiative welcomed Sujan R. Chinoy, Director-General of the New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and a decorated Indian diplomat, to speak on the Indo-Pacific and India’s role and partnerships.

In his overview of the growing role of Asia and its significant players, Sujan Chinoy put forth the argument that America’s push towards globalization after the U.S.S.R. dissolved opened the door for Chinese expansionism. However, Chinoy argues that the Indo-Pacific and Asia are much more than just about China’s growing influence; instead, the Indo-Pacific comprises numerous land and maritime micro-economies that allow for a flourishing regional marketplace and the simultaneous rise of several regional powers. For example, India is ranked the world’s third largest GDP in purchasing power parity; South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines are performing well and rapidly developing.

 

Asia’s Looming Strategic Challenges

The dynamics at play in the Indo-Pacific now extend far beyond economics, with a new security dimension as China’s rapid military growth brings disturbances to the existing equilibrium. Chinoy asserts that China’s rapid military rise makes the following fact more apparent than ever before: Asia is not monolithic. He points to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the internal divisions within the organization in dealing with China. Considering how these closely-knit states are unable to come to a consensus provides a pressing example of how Asia is, in fact, heterogeneous with many separate regions and interests.

India is approaching this situation by establishing a vision for the Indo-Pacific as an open and inclusive region, and one that needs a structured plan for the long term in order to continue developing and reach the economic development goals of resident states. Chinoy notes that India is also stressing the importance of equal access to the commons, i.e., freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as shared access to the region’s abundant natural resources. Two-thirds of all globally transported oil and natural gas pass through the region as well as one-third of the world’s bulk cargo, meaning it is vital that open access to these transport routes are maintained.

 

The Strengthening Bond Between India and Japan: Economics Plus

India and Japan’s special relationship has grown more tightly bound in the last decade and is fundamentally based on shared goals and strategies for the region. Chinoy notes that especially since Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi took the helm of their countries, joint humanitarian, infrastructure and economic initiatives have flourished.  Chinoy suggests that their strategic partnership has the potential to challenge China in terms of influence over the Indo-Pacific. He sees the most important aspect of India and Japan’s relationship as their shared long-term goals. In his 2018 speech at Shangri-La, Prime Minister Modi when discussing Asian regional development goals, stressed that it is not just about money, but about quality and long-term sustainability.

Japan and India are stepping up cooperation in areas as varied as manufacturing, workforce development, agriculture, defense and security operations, and connectivity projects. As it stands, Japan and India have over fifty different mechanisms for high level policy interactions, a number that is constantly increasing. Japan has invested over $30 billion in India and is India’s largest foreign contributor in manufacturing and engineering sectors. Japan has helped India fund its $18 billion bullet train purchases which will connect Mumbai and Ahmedabad, as well as help India develop a strong metro transportation system in New Delhi. India  offers a secure foreign market for Japanese companies, with more than a hundred opening branches in India each year and over fourteen hundred already established. Japanese automobile brand Suzuki manufacturers its cars in India, reaching production levels just next to Japan. Chinoy notes that Japan is renowned for its standards of excellence in various industries, and by sharing their manufacturing norms, India will soon be in a position to create rigorous standards of engineering on its own.

In the agriculture and economic development fields, Japan and India are also doing more together. Historically Japan has not been involved in Indian agriculture, but in May 2018 India and Japan announced the establishment of the Japan-India Food Business Council. Japan also helped India open over a hundred medical facilities over the last year and offered advanced medical training for Indian trauma and geriatric doctors. In 2018 the Indian government announced the creation of these medical centers and initiatives as part of its new national health program “Ayushman Bharat.” Japan also assisted India in the creation of robust disaster protocols for weather-related events.

Chinoy detailed several ventures on workforce and human capital. The two countries have developed a worker exchange program whereby Indian citizens can travel to Japan to work in information technology and help close the Japanese labor gap, and Japanese workers help establish institutes of manufacturing around India to impart their stringent engineering standards and procedures. Additionally, India and Japan facilitated an intern exchange program whereby current students can travel to the other country and develop their technical skills for future applications in the workforce. Japan has helped spearhead initiatives like Digital India and Start-up India, which Chinoy argues will open the door for joint progress towards ‘Society 5.0’, wherein Japan and India would collaborate on artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, and big data. This will be facilitated in part with Japan funding a start-up in Bangalore, India’s technology hub.

Chinoy posits that as India’s economy blossomed with reforms, so has the attractiveness  of the Indo-Pacific as a destination for foreign investment and development activities. In 2018 the U.S. passed the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, meant to increase funding for infrastructure development in both Asia and Africa. This is in addition to the U.S.’s Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy (Asia EDGE) designed to improve energy security and access to resources in the Indo-Pacific. Even with these programs, however, the level of U.S. funding in the region is still much lower than that of China and its Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, Japan does not have a history of trade and investment like that of China, and India is torn between domestic projects and military spending to counter Pakistan. To address this challenge, Chinoy points out how Japan and India have been working towards the development of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a partnership between them and African countries focusing on economic development, human capital and quality infrastructure.   

Prospects

With rising great power tensions between the United States and China, Chinoy notes that  many Indo-Pacific countries are apprehensive about having to choose loyalties in the future.  Chinoy stresses that in order to continue the current upward trend of economic development, countries should not be forced into this difficult position. Instead, regional states should formulate an understanding of how the U.S.-China competition can benefit the region though multiple competing initiatives. This situation demands greater transparency in the Indo-Pacific by all countries, particularly since the Chinese, Indian, Japanese and American models for economic and infrastructural growth are not the same. Chinoy concludes that stability and a robust economic zone are keys to the Indo-Pacific’s success in the future, and that cooperative relations, even uneasy ones, are better than outright competition.

By Emilyn Tuomala, M.A. Candidate, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University

Strengthening Democracy through Open Governance: Shared Values in US-Taiwan Relations

Asia Report #45 | June 2019

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In 2014, young protesters took to Taiwan’s streets to oppose a trade agreement with China and temporarily seized control of the national legislature. This protest, now known as the Sunflower Student Movement, prompted a shift in Taiwanese politics that continues to influence its democracy today. Indeed, Taiwan is gaining a reputation as one of the world’s leading states promoting democracy activism through the innovative use of digital technology. Recently, the Sigur Center hosted Audrey Tang, the first Digital Minister of Taiwan, to discuss Taiwan’s now experienced civil society and the country’s technological approach to open governance. Additional commentary came from GW professors Scott White, Director of the Cybersecurity Program and Cyber Academy at GW, and Susan Aaronson, Research Professor of International Affairs.

“Fork the Government”

In addition to serving as Taiwan’s Digital Minister, Tang is an activist and contributor to Taiwan’s g0v (“gov-zero”), which is a community focused on equipping civil society with tools to shape a better democracy. Minister Tang cited g0v and its work to “fork the government” as the first major component of Taiwan’s open democracy. The term “fork” refers to the act of changing the direction of something without necessarily destroying it. For g0v, this means taking government services g0v thinks could be improved and producing a “shadow government” version with which it can transparently tinker parallel to the official version. One example is Moedict, an improved version of the Ministry of Education’s online dictionary. The goal of this process is not to replace government services. Instead, g0v purposefully does not copyright its websites so that the Taiwanese government can elect to incorporate the “forked” versions into the official government domain. Thus, Minister Tang described this “forking” process as a way to fulfill public needs while “gently pushing” the government to pursue changes.

Beyond improved online services, however, Minister Tang’s ultimate goals for Taiwanese democracy include transparency, accountability, participation, and inclusion. While many of the technologies and methods being used in Taiwan are new, she argued that Taiwan is already one of the most open democracies in the world and that these achievements are especially notable when placed in contrast with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Stark Contrast to PRC in Transparency

Whereas the PRC tracks its population for its social credit system, Taiwan uses the same technology to track and publicize the actions of its government. For example, g0v created budget.g0v.tw/to track the government budget and visualize trends. Similarly, the group’s  Vote.ly.g0v.tw/was created to make the voting records of individual legislators easily accessible and to provide broader insights by sorting and ranking legislators according to the collected data. This kind of transparency is applied to specific legislation as well. One of the most recent g0v projects is the LSL Calculator, which visually clarifies different proposals to amend labor regulations in order to help workers better understand and review the impacts of each proposal.

Taiwanese policy radically differs from the PRC in other ways as well. While the PRC requires companies to establish a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) branch, Taiwan flips this principle and requires each government agency to include a Participation Officer (PO) whose main job is to listen to public opinion and cooperate with citizens to make policy plans. This more horizontal mode of government relations also applies to Taiwanese companies, which are granted a year to violate state regulations with the condition that the company must share its data and recommendations with the public at the end of the trial period. This sandbox system of regulatory co-creation allows for innovation within the government, as the public can choose to incorporate the recommendations of companies into official regulations. Minister Tang made clear that Taiwan’s policies are not merely different from the PRC’s, but normatively better as well. “Chinese action is bravado that is not a projection of power, but rather a projection of insecurity,” she said.

In contrast to the PRC’s logic to leverage state opacity, Minister Tang argues that an open government such as Taiwan does not necessarily sacrifice the security of the government. In fact, she claims that Taiwan is uniquely equipped to handle adverse events such as foreign attacks on elections through campaign donations or targeted misinformation in social media. To combat the former, Taiwan releases all donation records to its public so that any interference can be identified. However, the government only releases the records in paper format, which is why g0v conducts crowdsourced projects to run optical character readers (OCRs) on all 2637 pages of data. This data is then digitized, organized, and published in a searchable format within 24 hours of the release of the original document.

In the fight against disinformation on social media, Minister Tang notes that there are limitations on what a state can and should do without leaning into problematic censorship or government propaganda. G0v’s solution is collaborative fact-checking through the use of bots. When individuals feel unsure about a piece of information, they can forward it to a bot that sends the post to a group of fact-checkers. After the fact is checked, the information is sent to everyone who forwarded the original post regardless whether they sent they initially flagged the post or not.

Additional Expert Commentary on the Broader Context

In his comments, White pointed out that a state’s security goes beyond election security. White’s main concern with Taiwan’s pursuit of open governance is that there is some government activity, especially as regards security, that he believes warrants top secrecy. Minister Tang’s response was that the openness she advocates does not apply to every detail of governance. Minister Tang herself avoids looking at any sensitive information and passes that work to others on her team. Aaronson, meanwhile stressed that while transparency, accountability, participation, and inclusion are valiant and important goals to pursue, democracy is fundamentally built on trust. Although the strategies being implemented in Taiwan help preserve trust, it is not clear how governments can work to rebuild trust that has been lost. Given this, she argues that the threat of misinformation and disinformation, which contribute to the erosion of trust, should be given more weight in Taiwan.

Another concern for Aaronson is that Taiwan’s crowdsourced projects, while intended to improve participation and inclusion, could be dominated by special interest groups, such as corporations or a small subset of especially motivated citizens. In this sense, all of the tools being employed by g0v and the Taiwanese government may not do enough to reflect the views of the average citizen. A related example is Taiwan’s use of PStreolis, an AI moderated conversation tool that only allows people to indicate whether they agree or disagree with statements to chart areas of consensus. According to Minister Tang, Polis is often used by the Taiwanese government to get a sense of public opinion. However, Polis seems to have some challenges currently to screen out non-citizens from participating. Taiwan’s democratic technologies may need to be refined to achieve its desired goals.

Conclusion

Taiwan’s unique approach to democracy may still be too new for definitive conclusions; what is clear, though, is that both academics and the global community should be paying closer attention to Taiwan’s pursuit of open governance. Even mature democracies are experiencing serious concerns of balancing openness with state security interests, effectively building trust, and ensuring equitable use of technologies. Taiwan’s bold approach to democracy may come with some new challenges, but moving forward, the Taiwanese experiment with emerging technologies for open governance under the new Digital Minister is bound to hold important lessons for the United States and other states with shared values.

 

By Yehna Bendul, Staff Assistant, and Kathleen K. McAuliffe, Ph.D. Student, The George Washington University, and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative

The views expressed are the speakers’ own.

This event was co-sponsored by the Institute for International Economic Policy at the George Washington University.

 

Countering China’s Sharp Power: Disinformation and Social Media in Taiwan

Asia Report #44 | January 2019

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As the United States wavers in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan has become a prized whetstone for China to hone its sharp power strategies. The Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the Organization for Asian Studies hosted Jessica Drun, a fellow at the  Center for Advanced China Research’s Party Watch Initiative, and Maggie Farley, former Los Angeles Times foreign correspondent and adjunct instructor of journalism at American University, to discuss the role of social media and disinformation in recent cross-strait relations in a panel entitled “Media Literacy and Fake News: Countering China’s Sharp Power Impact.”

Taiwan’s Social Media Landscape

Jessica Drun began the panel with an explanation of Taiwan’s social media landscape. Since the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, China has been increasing pressure on Taiwan by “poaching diplomatic allies, squeezing its international space, and sending fighter jets near Taiwan.” Despite Tsai’s commitment to maintaining the status quo, China demands that she directly affirm the 1992 Consensus, an unofficial agreement between Chinese officials and Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party which acknowledges the existence of “one China” and served as the baseline for cross-strait relations under the previous KMT administrations. In the wake of the DPP’s presidential victory, China has increased its efforts to foster direct ties to local KMT-held districts with economic investment packages.

As part of its efforts to further undermine Tsai and the DPP, China has begun to exploit Taiwan’s massive social media use. Amidst an incredibly high rate of internet access, approximately 80 percent of internet users use social media. Facebook is the most popular site (77 percent of Taiwanese internet users), and is closely followed by messaging app Line (71 percent). Twitter is only used by 21 percent of Taiwanese users, but serves as an important platform for politicians to engage with audiences outside of the island. For politics, however, the online bulletin board PTT is the most popular venue. The 2014 election for the mayor of Taipei was the first in which candidates used social media platforms as part of their campaign strategy, and its use was cited as a major factor in the DPP’s win over the KMT in the 2016 elections.

Enter China

Drun explained that the increasing role of social media in Taiwan’s elections caught China’s attention. Chinese universities began heavily researching Taiwan’s social media usage and the government began to develop a strategy on how to utilize the technology to its advantage. During the 2016 election cycle in Taiwan, Chinese internet users were suddenly granted access to Facebook, which had been previously banned. Mainland users—easily identified by their use of simplified characters, parroting of Chinese government slogans, and an “unwarranted degree of animosity”—spammed the Facebook pages of Tsai and Taiwan’s major media outlets in January 2016. A localization “battle plan” for the spam campaign began with a post on Chinese social media site Weibo that same month that encouraged users to use traditional characters, avoid use of profanity, “keep emotions in check,” and promote anti-independence documents. The post further advocated for users to “friend” Taiwanese residents to appear local themselves.

The effectiveness of such tactics is perhaps most apparent in the tragic suicide of Su Chi-Cheng, head of Taiwan’s representative office in Osaka, Japan in September 2018. Following the devastation of Typhoon Jebi, travelers were stranded in the Kansai International Airport. A story quickly spread through the Taiwanese social media community that the Chinese consulate in Osaka had sent buses to the airport to assist stranded passengers, but would only aid Taiwanese travelers if they swore their alliance to China. A wave of outrage at the Taiwanese office’s lack of response to their citizens’ plight drove Su to suicide. Later inquiries to Kansai International Airport officials revealed, however, that the Chinese consulate—and indeed no diplomatic mission—had the authority or access to provide buses to the airport at the time. The original post condemning the Taiwan office’s alleged lack of action was later traced to a Mainland user.

Such interference, and its scope and effect on election, remains difficult to source due to IP spoofing. However, Drun suggested that the KMT’s sweep of local elections this past year was indicative of how penetrative China’s sharp power is: while relations between top officials remain frozen, local engagement is increasing. Drun attributed part of China’s success to the existing societal and political cleavages in Taiwan that are ripe for exploitation, as well as the unwillingness of the Taiwanese media to tie election outcomes to Chinese meddling. She suggested that Taiwanese officials need to reach a bipartisan consensus to establish a working group to tackle the problem and encouraged the media to disavow Chinese “influence” as “interference.”

Tools of Disinformation

Maggie Farley followed with a discussion of how misinformation and disinformation are effective tools for foreign interference in elections and developments in Taiwan’s efforts to curtail China’s sharp power. “Fake news,” Farley explained is hardly a new phenomenon: it is simply propaganda by another name. She further distinguished between misinformation, the unintentional spreading of inaccurate information, and disinformation, the deliberate distortion or misrepresentation of actual facts with ulterior motives.

Creators of disinformation are skilled marketers: they want users to do the work for them by spreading their wares organically. They tailor their message to encourage “sharing” behavior by unwitting users. The primary strategy is utilizing users’ existing confirmation biases and social biases: users are more likely to believe disinformation that affirms their pre-existing beliefs, and they are also prone to sympathizing with disinformation that reinforces in-group/out-group dynamics. Social media’s own technological bias only makes this effort all the easier: algorithms are designed to elevate content that is popular, even if it is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, social media platforms carry the additional weakness of privileging content from users’ “friends,” and disinformation peddlers can acquire “friendships” with users with only a few clicks. A final, but key, advantage of disinformation campaigns is the asymmetry between the interferers and those who must defend against it: disinformation is successful even if it only spreads confusion and muddles public debate, but clearing such confusion is a much more difficult task.

Taiwan’s social media community is fertile ground for China’s disinformation campaigns for a number of reasons. First, internet use and social media access are incredibly high, and second, cross-strait relations are a contentious and polarizing issue of identity and because the Taiwanese government’s options in responding to the problem are limited by its laws that protect free speech. Third, the Taiwanese media are often characterized as “churn-alism” rather than “journalism”: reporters are incentivized by their story’s spread on social media, but not accuracy. The mainstream media can thus become an unwitting conduit of disinformation efforts. Finally, China has the advantage in terms of sheer scale: the size of China’s so-called “50 Cent Army,” or “cyber troops,” remains unknown, however, the Taiwanese government claims it fends off at least 2500 attacks per day. Farley noted, however, that these attacks are only the ones that Taiwan can identify.

Fighting Back

While the situation seems bleak, Farley offered an optimistic report of the Taiwanese government’s efforts to defend itself from China’s interference. A number of citizen-led fact-checking programs have been launched. Cofacts and MyGoPen are fact-checking accounts on the Line messaging platform that allows users to verify suspect stories before they spread them. The “civic tech community” behind Cofacts, g0v (“gov-zero”) also launched the browser extension NewsHelper that verifies content as users visit websites and website Taiwan FactCheck Center. The government has also prioritized timely response to disinformation stories with its Real-time News Clarification Page.

Digital Minister Audrey Tang, meanwhile, is promoting a different strategy: rather than focusing on response, she advocates for treating disinformation like an epidemic. Disinformation cannot succeed if users are inoculated from its effects and educated on how to suppress its spread. To that end government is currently limiting its legal strategy to reinforcing existing laws and instead prioritizing improvements in media literacy and critical thinking skills in schools so that users will be able to identify and ignore disinformation on their own. Whether or not Taiwan can contain the disinformation virus, however, remains to be seen.

 

By Kathleen K. McAuliffe, Ph.D. Student, The George Washington University, and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative

The views expressed are the speakers’ own.

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Regional Trends in the Indo-Pacific: Towards Connectivity or Competition?

Asia Report #43 | October 2018

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With China’s celebration of the fifth anniversary of its Belt and Road Initiative, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) gaining speed, and India and Japan’s Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) in development, it appears that the Indo-Pacific is moving toward connectivity. However, security considerations, trade tensions, and criticisms of each initiative persist. Experts on Japan, India, and China convened at The George Washington University to discuss each country’s calculus and the general trends in the region at an event co-sponsored by the Rising Powers Initiative and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. Moderator and RPI Director Deepa Ollapally posed three broad questions to the panel: What does the concept of “Indo-Pacific” mean to each country? What are the primary motivations behind their vision of the Indo-Pacific? Is the region moving toward connectivity and cooperation or competition and conflict?

Japan

Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Affairs and Gaston Sigur Chair in Japan-US Relations at The George Washington University, explained that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept is not new in Japanese foreign policy. Following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Japan began to expand its vision of “East Asia” by focusing on ASEAN. Notably, Japan advocated for an alternative to the China-backed ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) format to one that also included India, Australia, and New Zealand (ASEAN+6), which is developing into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) multilateral free trade agreement. During the administration of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan also began anti-piracy and refueling operations in the Indian Ocean to support the US military after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Japan’s recent ventures, such as the AAGC, are thus best understood not as a radical shift in foreign policy, but as innovative expansions.

The major drivers behind this are the rise of China and concerns about the long-term direction of US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. There is a wide consensus that Japan needs to be more proactive in shaping a regional and global environment that is congenial to Japan’s own long-term interests. Although the security alliance with the US is critical in this regard, it is increasingly becoming insufficient. Given that Japan has still not fully recovered from its financial recession in the 1990s, “checkbook” diplomacy is not a viable option and domestic resistance to expand use of the Self-Defense Forces abroad prevents a reliance on military force. Thus, Japan promotes the Free and Open Indo-Pacific in terms of shared values and norms, and views the strategy as a holistic approach to securing both its strategic and economic interests abroad, or what the Japanese refer to as “comprehensive security.”

As to whether or not the region is headed toward connectivity or competition, the biggest concerns for Japan are the tensions in US-China relations and the ability for Japan and other countries in the region to moderate the negative effects without drawing the ire of either the US or China in the process. Although some analysts in Japan argue for direct and aggressive competition with China, the Abe administration is moving toward the alternative, which is a mixed strategy of soft competition and positive engagement. Despite its wariness about China, Japan acknowledges that China is a central part of both the Asian and global community that cannot realistically be ignored or contained.

India

Jagannath Panda,Research Fellow and Head of the East Asia Centre, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in New Delhi, explained that India also sees the Indo-Pacific strategy as a convergence on liberal values in the region. India prioritizes Southeast Asian and ASEAN countries as the center for the region and has engaged in numerous connectivity and development projects. As part of its Go West policy, India has been working with Iran and Afghanistan to develop alternative links to Central Asian countries. The most recent development is the proposed Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) with Japan, that will expand the region along India’s historical and contemporary ties to Africa.

According to Panda, this is a prime example of the defining characteristic of India’s conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific: inclusiveness. Until recently, Indian foreign policy has relied on nonalignment, but even as India becomes a major player, it is “aligning without alliance,” and promoting strategic economic development and collective security. Just as African countries are included in this view, China is not inherently excluded from India’s regional connectivity projects, however, India expects China to be a responsible player. Despite the tensions in China-India relations and India’s support for the Washington Consensus, India also subscribes to the Beijing Consensus because it provides a valuable alternative development model that promotes the protection of emerging economies. Thus, India participates in China-led projects such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Its recent efforts on the AAGC should thus be understood as an alternative to China’s BRI rather than a direct competitor. India’s concerns with the BRI are its bilateral format that puts recipient countries at a disadvantage in negotiations for investment. The AAGC is designed to be consultative, transparent, and grounded in liberal norms.

Panda argued that because the region is in a state of flux there would most likely be some conflict, but there is room for both the liberal and alternative worlds to cooperate and grow in the region. To mitigate conflict, countries in the region should develop consultative measures and prioritize cooperation and constructive engagement.

China

Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at The George Washington University, reined in hyperbolic expectations and descriptions of the BRI that have been dominating US policy circles. Echoing Panda, he reiterated that the BRI is inherently bilateral, but explained that China is primarily interested in using the BRI to support its domestic concerns. Economic growth, which was as high as 20 percent when it joined the World Trade Organization, has dropped to almost zero. BRI projects abroad provide a market for China’s overcapacity for production, facilitate the relocation of Chinese firms to areas that are more competitive in terms of labor costs, increase trade and use of Chinese currency abroad, and reduce vulnerability to US interference in its trade routes. Domestically, BRI-funded projects connect the poorer southern and western regions of China to foreign markets directly, increase domestic consumption of goods, and provide funding for infrastructure projects that have stagnated in recent years. The BRI also creates an image of international prestige and power that can serve as evidence of success in achieving the goals set by the 19th Party Congress: the recent inclusion of Latin American countries is on its face not practical, but adds to the BRI’s reputation of dominance.

Sutter noted, however, that the BRI is already demonstrating the same pitfalls of its “Going Out” policy in the early 2000s: despite the fanfare and promises, many projects are not completed and promised funds are slow in reaching their recipients—if ever. Similarly, while there has been international criticism of China making exploitive loan terms, China is also not willing to invest in high-risk ventures where development aid is most needed. Studies of China’s efforts in Africa show that while it is a player on the continent in terms of development aid and investment, it is hardly “dominant.”

Thus, Sutter concluded that while the BRI will have many projects abroad, China will not engage in poorer countries, nor will it dominate in Africa or the Indo-Pacific region. China is open to cooperation with countries like India and Japan—even the US—when interests overlap. Such cooperation would help offset the financial risks of larger projects.

Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific seems to be moving toward connectivity, but may experience conflicts and tensions in the process. The degree to which such conflict can be minimized is tied to the US’s foreign policy in the region. The major powers of the Indo-Pacific, especially Japan, are largely motivated by their uncertainty about US foreign policy. The US has instigated a trade war with China and aggravates liberal countries’ efforts to engage cooperatively in the region. The decision to back out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and impose tariffs on regional allies has also motivated India and Japan to hedge their bets elsewhere. There remain, however, opportunities for the US to contribute to a smoother transition to connectivity by supporting joint projects and trade agreements that promote the development of consultative frameworks and meaningful cooperation.

By Kathleen K. McAuliffe, Ph.D. Student, The George Washington University, and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative. 

This Asia Report is the third in a three-part series on connectivity and competition in the Indo-Pacific. To read the two Policy Briefs released ahead of this event, click “Between the AAGC and BRI: Japan’s Emerging Calculus” and “The AAGC: India’s Indo-Pacific Fulcrum?”

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Taking Stock of Cross – Strait Relations: Chinese Postures and Taiwan’s Prospects

Asia Report #40 | March 2018

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China recently has ramped up its bilateral pressure on Taiwan. This has coincided with a rise in uncertainty of American commitment to the island. The United States Department of State’s removal of the Taiwanese flag from its website has further alarmed Taiwanese as they look to counter growing Chinese influence. With a backdrop of uncertainty for a longstanding U.S. partner, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies convened a Roundtable of experts to discuss political and strategic trends pertaining to the dynamics of Taiwan-China-U.S. relations.

Mark Stokes of the Project 2049 Institute headed the Roundtable by explaining Chinese strategic pressure on Taiwan. This pressure involves both political and military coercion that seeks to change the status quo in favor of Chinese mainland interests that presents Taiwan as a “rogue” territory of China. But Stokes asserts that what China hopes to achieve is contrary to the objective reality.  Given that legitimate governments exist on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the United States has an interest in balancing legitimacy between the two sides, Stokes argued.

According to Stokes, China sees the issue of Taiwan as a zero-sum game and aims to establish that Beijing is the sole representative. Therefore, China vies to delegitimize Taiwan’s sovereign government and place Taiwan within Beijing’s own broader geostrategic outlook for the region. Taiwan’s independent democracy also irks China, fearing that a robust democracy so close to its borders could have a spillover effect on the mainland. Stokes explains that there are a number of Chinese political groups working to push the narrative of one country, two systems. China also works to damage Taiwan’s relations with other nations by blocking their admittance to multinational organizations, including the United Nations. To counteract these measures, Stokes argues that the United States should develop a more normal relationship with both sides, while still honoring the One China Framework. By developing a more normal relationship with both China and Taiwan, the U.S. would work within the objective reality of the current situation. This would give more legitimacy to President Tsai Ing-wen’s government and show the world the United States continues to oppose the influence of autocratic regimes, Stokes said.

Joyce Juo-yu Lin, Director of the ASEAN Studies Center at Tamkang University, delivered remarks on Taiwan’s internal initiatives to counter Chinese influence. Lin spoke at length on the role of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) as an economic initiative working to attract two-way investment and growth between Taiwan and its southern neighbors. Taiwan has had previous Southbound Policies, but the NSP has focused more on attempts to maintain economic sovereignty and increase domestic economic initiatives. The NSP works to attract Southeast Asian immigrants to Taiwan to boost the domestic economy. Therefore, the NSP is more people-oriented than previous policies, Lin argued. This orientation has helped to legitimize Taiwan’s government in the region, because Taiwan increasingly has served as a destination for workers seeking opportunity. As a testament to the effectiveness of this policy, Lin states that China has tried to influence Southeast Asian nations into boycotting the NSP. Yet Lin is optimistic about the future of Taiwan’s NSP and how it could coordinate with organizations like ASEAN into fostering further development for Taiwan. She hopes the NSP can be used as a shield in warding off Chinese influence.

Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor and Assistant Dean for Education Policy at Davidson University, explained in detail the current domestic political and economic climate of President Tsai Ing-wen’s government. Rigger painted a picture of Taiwan’s positive economic outlook despite pessimism from the general population. President Tsai Ing-wen has faced low polling numbers in contrast to the economy’s relative success. Rigger interpreted the polling as having to do more with economic expectations, but also noted deep-seated anxiety over cross-strait issues as an additional factor. Additionally, she cited mixed messages from the U.S. on its support of Taiwan as an inhibiting factor to public confidence in the Tsai Administration.

Contrasting the negative polling data, Rigger explained that Taiwan’s economy is performing quite well. Last year’s GDP growth totaled 2.8 percent, and exports rose by fifteen percent, Rigger noted. Taiwan’s previous shaky housing market is rebounding due to price cuts and has been adjusting out of a bubble. This has led to more affordable housing for the younger working population. Rigger added that wages have increased and unemployment has reached a ten-year low. Although the number of Chinese tourists to Taiwan has fallen due to increased pressure by the PRC government, total number of tourists has risen by twenty percent. Rigger concluded that the reason for anxiety across the population is due to long term economic anxiety despite short term results. Good economic news has not sunk in for the population because longer term trends like American commitment to the island and Chinese assertiveness continue to cast a shadow on future economic gains. But Rigger added that Tsai would see no benefit to changing her cross-strait policy. In fact, a poll from January 2018 showed sixty percent of Taiwanese are satisfied with Tsai’s cross-strait policy. Rigger called for shoring up American commitment to Taiwan in response to recent uncertainty. She explained that current American officials have acted without understanding the long-term U.S. policies for Taiwan. A more rigid U.S. commitment to Taiwan could help contain Taiwan’s own economic anxieties.

This Roundtable highlighted the need for a robust reexamination of U.S. commitment to Taiwan in the face of growing Chinese pressure and influence. In order to effectively counter Chinese influence, Stokes called for a realignment of the relationship in accordance to the objective reality of Taiwan’s legitimate sovereignty. In closing remarks, he asserted this review must come from the White House directly in order to be effective. Lin observed the importance of Taiwan’s NSP in leveraging Chinese economic influence and as a way of generating Taiwanese legitimacy abroad. In order to ease the nerves of Taiwan’s economic insecurity, Rigger reinforced Stokes’ call for a more proactive U.S. relationship with Taiwan. Domestic action, combined with U.S. support could help legitimize Taiwan’s sovereignty and strengthen its economic prospects for the future.

By Justin Seledyn, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Sigur Center for Asian Studies 

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York for support for its activities.

 

U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations: Domestic and International Drivers

Asia Report #41 | February 2018

President Donald Trump made headlines shortly after his electoral victory by accepting a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen. It signaled what some saw as a renewal of American commitment to Taiwan in the face of Chinese criticism.  But over a year later, Taiwan is still waiting for a specific policy towards the island nation from the Trump Administration. President Trump has often been unrestrained with his criticisms of trade arrangements between the U.S. and mainland China. Yet dialogue over Taiwan’s place in the new Administration has been few and far-between, peculiar for a nation ranked as the tenth largest goods trading partner of the United States.

Recently, two panels of experts met at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies to address the issues and opportunities regarding the U.S. – Taiwan economic relationship. The first panel analyzed the political environments in the U.S. and Taiwan that affect economic ties. They discussed the challenges facing both countries internal political and economic environments, and certain motivations and drivers that affect the bilateral partnership. The subsequent panel discussed economic challenges and opportunities facing the relationship. These included the need for greater dialogue at a time of increased uncertainty, and ways in which American domestic industry could benefit from the expertise of Taiwanese multinationals.

Political Environments in the US and Taiwan for Economic Ties

Leading the first panel was Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, GW. Sutter honed in on the apparent shift in policy within the Trump Administration. For the previous two American Administrations under Obama and Bush, the One China Policy enjoyed relative consistency in their dealings with both Taiwan and mainland China. Although there have been exceptions to America’s strict adherence to the policy, Sutter explained that both Administrations mostly acted in ways as to not upset the mainland.

This dynamic shifted when President Trump accepted Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s congratulatory phone call in the wake of his electoral victory. It appeared Trump was willing to create better communication between Taiwan and the U.S. at the risk of rattling Beijing. And indeed hardliners within China criticized the phone call not soon after. Sutter asserted that Trump has repeatedly used tension like the one stirred up in the wake of the phone call as a tool, and that he is less concerned with angering Beijing. Yet since the call, communications and policy towards Taiwan have stalled, and Sutter questioned Trump’s own stake in America’s partnership with Taiwan. He noted conversely how the Republican Party’s platform is quite critical of Beijing and adamant in its support of Taiwan, and wonders if policy could eventually shift more in favor of Taiwan. Regardless of strategy emanating from the White House, Sutter explained that other offices in Washington have devised strategies involving Taiwan, primarily the Department of Defense in its broader Pacific security strategy. Sutter concluded that we should watch and see if the Trump Administration will in fact undergo a Taiwan policy review and how security concerns over Chinese expansionism could affect Taiwan.

Syaru Shirley Lin, Professor of Global Political Economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, took up Taiwan’s domestic challenges and its economic and political outlook for the future. Many of Taiwan’s current economic shortcomings come at the added risk of becoming more reliant on the mainland for trade and investment, she highlighted. Taiwan is currently facing a slew of domestic impediments that are putting great pressure on the current government. Slower growth has led to rising discontent and increased political polarization. Higher incomes have challenged firms’ abilities to keep labor costs in check, with many seeking cheaper labor abroad. Lin said that this has led to an increased generational divide, with many youth left underemployed.

With fewer youth able to find higher paying jobs, Taiwan’s population growth has suffered, and the island is faced with a rapidly aging population. These young workers are often unable to pay the exorbitant housing prices in major cities like Taipei, making it harder for them to settle down and start families. In order to address needed domestic reform to the economy. President Tsai has introduced several reform ideas like pension reform (popular among the youth), labor reform (increased days off per week to two), and a small increase in minimum wage. Ideas like pension reform have predictably been met with opposition from older generations nearing retirement. Minimum wage increases have been scoffed at as too small and ineffective. Lin interpreted these efforts as necessary, yet at the same time the political cost of implementing them is severe.

Lin asserted that support for the Tsai Administration has been volatile. Its recent decline has impacted President Tsai’s ability to press for further reform. President Tsai also faces the challenge of weaning Taiwan’s economic reliance on mainland China. Currently, China accounts for one quarter of all Taiwanese trade, and many see China as an outlet for cheaper labor and products.  Lin described Taiwan’s Southbound Policy which hopes to counteract reliance on China in exchange for greater partnerships with ASEAN countries. She stated that Taiwan should continue to work closely with the U.S., Japan, and the United Kingdom in order to maintain their economic freedom and assuage their economic concerns.

Joshua Meltzer, Senior Fellow of the Global Economy and Development Program at Brookings, went into further details of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship that is facing changing circumstances. He explained that historically, the relationship has thrived on stability which has paved the way for bilateral trade. But the Trump Administration’s trailblazing approach to Taiwan, and President Trump’s own volatile decision-making, has led to uncertainty in the relationship that has coincided with an uptick in Chinese assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific.

While there is a gathering fear of increased reliance, Meltzer noted that Taiwan in fact has a more entrenched national identity separate from China. This is particularly palpable among younger generations, as both Lin and Meltzer noted. Therefore, a strong U.S.-Taiwan partnership is vital in leveraging China’s growing regional influence. Yet Meltzer asserted that the current U.S.-China relationship has also become unstable and unsustainable. President Trump’s tough campaign talk of unfair trade deals with China has left some worrying that Taiwan could be used as a pawn as the U.S. seeks fairer agreements with the mainland. Meltzer concluded with offering options for the partnership to foster more confidence within Taiwan. He argued that Taiwan should leverage its high-tech manufacturing expertise for possible developments in trade. He also stated that the decreased importance of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal could give Taiwan more breathing room to seek out other opportunities. Meltzer surmised that American departure from TPP has meant fewer trade talks and outcomes between the U.S. and Taiwan, and hoped to see more zealous talks in the future.

Trade, Investment and Services: Opportunities and Challenges

President of the US-Taiwan Business Council, Rupert Hammond-Chambers, began the panel that focused on ways of strengthening economic partnerships between the U.S. and Taiwan. Hammond-Chambers began by analyzing the “managed mediocrity” of the current status quo in regards to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. He argued that the current American posture is deeply frustrating for Taiwan and that the U.S. should be doing more to foster trade opportunities. There is a sense of an absence of ambition with respect to the relationship, evidenced in part by a lack diplomatic appointees and leadership within agencies like the U.S. Department of State.

Now a year into the current Trump Administration, Hammond-Chambers expressed frustration over the lack of progress. He stated that the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), which serves as the primary economic dialogue between the U.S. and Taiwan, is not up to date. In fact, regular cabinet-to-cabinet exchanges have become infrequent. Face to face dialogue is essential for making new gains and clearing uncertainties, he argued. This lack of communication with one of America’s top trading partners comes at an unhelpful time for Taiwan. Hammond-Chambers argued that the United States should help Taiwan shore up its energy grid. As Taiwan looks to diversify its energy intake away from nuclear power, he explained how the U.S. could provide natural gas and renewable energy investment for the island. This opportunity could spark renewed trade fervor between the two sides, be win-wins for the Tsai and Trump Administrations, and help to secure Taiwan’s energy grid in the face of Chinese hostility. Conversely, Hammond-Chambers explained how Taiwan should continue investing in key American sectors. Foxconn, one of Taiwan’s paramount transnational businesses, has pledged large investments into a new high-tech Wisconsin plant that would produce LCD panels. Hammond Chambers would like to see more of this level of outbound investment from Taiwan, acting in concert with Taiwan’s Southbound policy.

Shihoko Goto, Senior Northeast Asia Associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center, reiterated the need for Taiwan to continue making outbound investment deals. She highlighted the imperative of maintaining competitiveness in major sectors on the island. Ensuring the competitiveness of the service sector is key to Taiwan’s future growth, she asserted. In order to stay competitive, Taiwan under the Tsai Administration must continue developing its human capital and encourage innovation and entrepreneurship. These measures will help retain young, talented Taiwanese who are currently heading to the mainland to grow businesses.

Goto added that under the Trump Administration, Asian nations are not expecting favorable bilateral trade deals. Therefore there is more need for countries like Taiwan to pursue their own agreements. Taiwan’s comparative advantage in high-tech manufacturing is one area where it could leverage its advantages to achieve success. In order for Taiwan to remain competitive, Goto argued that it should continue to advertise its respect for the rule of law and that inbound investors to Taiwan will be protected. The Tsai Administration should also continue to spur domestic demand through innovation and increased productivity.

Concluding the afternoon panel was Vincent Wang, Dean of the School of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Politics at Ithaca College. He began by reinforcing his colleague’s points, arguing that maintaining a good economic relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. is critical in meeting stated goals. An economically prosperous and stable Taiwan is in the best interest of the U.S., yet Wang outlined how current U.S. actions negatively impact this goal. He argued that although the U.S.-Taiwan partnership is different than other American foreign partnerships, trade agreements should still be conducted without preconditions that hinder progress.

Taiwan has been firmly in the American camp so far, but Wang highlighted Taiwan’s growing dependence on China economically. It is now more important than ever for the U.S. to engage Taiwan. Criticizing Taiwan could serve to isolate it or force it to draw closer with China, according to Wang. Concluding, Wang reiterated Robert Sutter’s earlier assertion: the U.S. needs an economic strategy for Taiwan that builds off of security strategies already in place for the Asia-Pacific. Without a coherent strategy, Taiwan’s stake in the international community could suffer as China continues to put pressure on the island.

It can be surmised from these discussions that the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations rests on formulating a coherent strategy with attainable goals. The current Administration’s stop-and-go approach when dealing with Taiwan has negatively impacted economic ties with a major trading partner. Lack of engagement will allow China to further influence Taiwan bilaterally and through multilateral economic initiatives. Because of Taiwan’s expertise in high-tech manufacturing, the U.S. economy would benefit from more robust ties and could do more to limit China’s influence on Taiwan’s sovereignty.

 

By Justin Seledyn, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Sigur Center for Asian Studies

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York for support for its activities.

Energy Security in Asia and Eurasia: Are States Choosing Nationalism or Globalism?

Asia Report #39 | February 2018

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Asia’s need for energy resources has sparked new debates involving energy security within rising powers in the region. Increased economic development has pushed these countries to consider new strategies for energy procurement in the 21st century. Key Asian nations have invested in renewable energy sources in an effort to diversify their energy assets as well as to fuel their expansion in the coming years. But traditional sources for energy, mainly petroleum, are still tremendously important. Some analysts fear energy conflicts could develop out of countries’ desires to lock down supplies of petroleum outside of Asia.

Experts in the fields of energy, political economy, and Asian security recently met to discuss their new book, Energy Security in Asia and Eurasia, co-edited by Mike Mochizuki and Deepa Ollapally (Routledge, 2017), which provides case studies on the major players in Asian energy security. The book delivers analysis on the trends of aspiring and rising powers in Asia to satisfy their energy needs, and whether these demands will mold into nationalist, realist, or market oriented globalist policies towards energy security in the future.

 

Political Economy

Tackling the political economy realm of energy security, Robert J. Weiner began by addressing energy procurement in a market setting. He explained the extent to which nations rely on the market in addressing their energy needs: if nations lose faith in the global market, they may turn to nationalist resource policies to protect themselves. This issue is particularly pertinent in Asian resource-poor nations (i.e., those countries that consume more energy than they produce domestically) like China. In 2014, China surpassed the United States as the largest oil importer. Weiner explained that to secure their need for oil, China has purchased overseas oil fields, a practice common in the global market.

The practice of buying petroleum fields, not just barrels of oil, raises questions for those interpreting China’s energy security, namely if countries like China are competing unfairly when buying overseas petroleum. Although this strategy is not revolutionary, it is relatively new in Asian countries like China. However, Weiner’s extensive analysis of transactions and purchases of oil fields, laid out in the book, revealed little evidence of China competing unfairly in this marketplace.

 

Domestic Factors in China

Robert Sutter analyzed the domestic debate and factors leading to China’s energy security policy in 2017. He made note of the relative adolescence of China’s procurement strategy, having only become a net importer of oil in the 1990’s. Previous policies under Deng Xiaoping emphasized developing light industry and kept China from becoming heavily dependent on oil. China’s more recent expansion into the heavy industry sectors has at times left China starving for increased energy inputs. This led to 2004 brownouts in many Chinese cities, and manifested an internal debate on the direction of China’s energy security, Sutter explained. Some questioned China’s lack of a central energy ministry and the administrative organization of China’s energy sector (senior oil officials belong to China’s Communist Party ranks). A later debate focused on China’s energy conservation and efficiency which led to an increased stake in renewable energy. But perhaps the most serious issue facing China’s energy security in the 21st century is its vulnerabilities in importing oil from overseas. Debates arose over how to secure the Malacca Straits energy transit, the main artery for Chinese seaward petroleum imports. Due to their location near the contested waters in the South China Sea, Chinese officials understand the necessity of protecting the Straits from potential adversaries, including the United States. These concerns influenced an expansion strategy for the Chinese navy and investments in trans-Asian pipelines. Sutter also highlighted that although there is potential for petroleum extraction in the South China Sea, this is trumped by acquisition and reinforcement of islands for security purposes. Sutter concluded that the urgency of the energy debate within China has become less serious than in the early part of the century, and has largely aligned with pragmatic approaches to energy procurement. These include investments in pipelines, doing business with isolated countries like Iran and Sudan, and even importing oil from the United States.


India’s Strategy

Deepa Ollapally next explained India’s strategy for solving its 21st century energy security and the internal debates at play. Over the last decade, Indian energy security is being labeled as a national security issue, highlighting the level of concern placed on energy for the national government. Many of the factors influencing Indian energy security involve China, Ollapally noted. The idea that India has to compete for resources with a far stronger and more decisive China has accentuated the sense of India’s energy vulnerability and insecurity. This is played out most in New Delhi’s drive for overseas oil acquisitions and India’s maritime outlook in the Indian Ocean. This has created a sizeable nationalist energy security “camp” within Indian policy circles, which lobbies for a strong military. Often times, these debates are not necessarily focused on energy, rather, it blends with India’s ambition to play a bigger geopolitical role as a major rising power . These arguments are reinforced by what India sees as Chinese encroachments along the Sino-Indian border as well as China’s own military and naval investments in the region.

But Ollapally points out that there are other camps, namely realists and globalists that are also steering domestic discourse within India. Energy realists are reluctant to make energy security a military issue and see the value of working with China pragmatically to solve energy challenges. They want to ensure that India does not overpay for overseas oil assets and want to keep competition with China within bounds. Realists also argue India cannot just rely on the market or the U.S. for maritime transit security of its energy shipments. This was reinforced in the Indian Navy’s 2007 Maritime Military Strategy that linked the Navy to energy transit security, a position continued in subsequent doctrines. The globalist camp feeding public discourse in India falls in line on some issues with realists, arguing for India to integrate into the energy global supply chain. They argue that this would guarantee lower energy costs. They see naval investments wasteful in terms of procuring energy resources and not inextricably linked to energy security. India’s success story of higher growth rates after international integration over the past two decades is giving globalist arguments, shared by many realists for their own reasons, more currency on energy issues. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to turn around long standing policy and champion climate change activism during the Paris Climate talks in 2015 was followed by the launch of the International Solar Alliance in India in 2017. This has helped India invest in renewables, take a leadership role, and opened India to a more globalist approach to its energy security.


Japan’s Outlook

Mike Mochizuki presented on Japan’s energy security needs and outlook. Mochizuki explained that, after the oil crises of the mid-1970’s Japan has done well to diversify its energy input. The Japanese government invested in efforts to make Japan’s energy grid more efficient, investing in resources such as nuclear, largely as solution to Japan’s lack of abundant indigenous energy resources. Japan still has reason for concern, Mochizuki noted: nuclear energy has become unpopular following the 2011 Fukushima Disaster. In 2010, 29% of Japan’s electric grid was fueled by nuclear power. Following the disaster all nuclear power was halted, but the government expects nuclear power to eventually accommodate 25% of Japan’s energy needs, a figure that is optimistic, Mochizuki noted. One reason for the misplaced optimism is the strident local opposition to power plants. Many Japanese, including the ruling LDP government, support investing in alternative forms of energy. There has been an increased demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG), for instance. Shipments for LNG are also free from maritime transit chokepoints (in contrast to oil shipments through the South China Sea that face security challenges). Regardless, Mochizuki analyzes that Japan remains confident that the United States will maintain security transit for Japan’s overseas shipments for however long the alliance remains strong. Like India, Japan worries about increased Chinese assertiveness, therefore Mochizuki mentions the potentials for Japan to develop new partnerships with Russia to lessen the concern about Chinese behavior.

 

America’s Role

The book’s final contributor, Charles L. Glaser, examined American influence and the role it plays in Asian and global energy security. Glaser began by explaining the shared international interest for a stabilized and productive global energy market. China’s purchasing of oil fields can be seen as beneficial to the global consumer, since China will contribute to the global supply of petroleum and in effect lower prices. But Glaser did warn of increasing Chinese naval presence in the Pacific which could threaten American efforts to defend its allies maritime transit routes. During peacetime, Glaser argues, America does not face immediate challenges in ensuring security, but a theoretical war with China could see sea lanes being disrupted. Those most affected by sea lane disturbances would be those who rely on transit through the South China Sea, mainly Japan and South Korea. But currently the United States holds the advantage of being able to significantly restrict Chinese oil flows through the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca in the event of war. Glaser added that China is privy to this threat to its own energy security, which is why the region has witnessed a large increase in Chinese naval assets and abilities in response. Glaser argues that the threat of conflict between the United States and China will be generational, i.e., a long term threat to United States security interests in the East and South China Seas.


Conclusion

Asia’s continued fast pace development will be sure to challenge energy security concerns for the foreseeable future. The unexpected energy independence of the United States and its new role as an energy supplier is still evolving. These developments will have palpable effects on the ability of the United States and its allies and quasi-allies to procure energy needs and balance a rising and increasingly capable China. Energy Security in Asia and Eurasia provides a holistic view on the ways in which energy will affect the rising powers of Asia, and whether countries will decide to pursue free market, globalist approaches to satisfy their energy needs or focus on self reliant, nationalist policies.

 

By Justin Seledyn, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Sigur Center for Asian Studies

The co-editors thank the Carnegie Corporation for support for this book project. We also acknowledge the MacArthur Foundation for supporting our research on maritime and energy security in the Indo-Pacific which contributed to this project. 

Asia’s Reckoning: China, Japan, and the Fate of US Power in the Pacific Century

Asia Report #38 | November 2017

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Asia’s Reckoning: China, Japan and the Fate of US Power in the Pacific Century

China’s rise to power has been accompanied by its increased assertiveness in Asia. As it has established itself as the dominant power in the region, Chinese ambitions have often clashed with interests of other powers, especially Japan. A conflict in Asia has the potential to reverberate across the world today since China and Japan are the fulcrum of international trade. The pragmatism of the two Asian giants means that the possibility of an armed conflict occurring is low. However, recent escalation of tensions especially over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands means that a conflict is more likely now more than ever. What does this entail for the US role in the region? Richard McGregor, journalist and a former visiting scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies discusses the bilateral history of China and Japan and addresses the question of the US role in light of the changing dynamics in the region in his new book Asia’s Reckoning: China, Japan and the Fate of US Power in the Pacific Century. He presented his views at a recent book launch at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

China-Japan Antagonism

Before discussing the reasons for the hostilities between China and Japan, McGregor noted what it entails for the US. If China and Japan were to get along, it would effectively mean the end of Pax Americana in the Pacific. Thus, in a way the hostilities actually help the US maintain its current presence in the region. From the 1950s onward, there are several events that have laid the foundation of a conflict between the two powers.

First, both China and Japan were isolationist states that were forced open by Western powers. On the one hand, Japan coped well with the invasion of foreign influence through the Meiji restoration. On the other hand, however, China could not embrace the West as easily as Japan did. Second, both China and Japan have struggled to gain recognition from Western countries. Essentially, they are revisionist powers in the quest to be treated at par with the West. Finally, the changing regional order has always pitted China and Japan against each other. Prior to the 1850s, a Sino-centric world existed in Asia. This Sino-centrism is viewed seriously in Japan even today, although they claim to have never been a tributary state. In the 1920s, Japan became a beacon of progress in Asia. Subsequently, a military government took the reins in Japan in the 1930s and established a rigid hierarchy in Japanese society. Fuelled by its economy, Japan continued to remain dominant in Asia throughout the 20th century until it was overtaken by China over the last decade.

Pax Americana and the Current Asian Order

The conventional view of the history of the conflict is that China was invaded by Japan, who never apologized for its colonial regime. Some of the reason why anti-Japanese propaganda in China is so widespread is because it is partly based on historical experience. McGregor argues that this past history can be further divided into ‘history of history’ and thus there are layers of hypocrisy in any view.

In the aftermath of WWII, Japan was to remain the dominant East Asian power. But it was Pax Americana that laid the template for a post-war regional order.  This began with the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951. China was not invited to participate in these talks. Thus, Beijing bases its vision for the international order on the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, which envisaged a post-war world where China would be a great power. East Asia witnessed many economic miracles, with the notable exception of North Korea. This was made possible due to the well-trained bureaucracies and strong, financial  controls in these countries and a wide US market for their exports. Meanwhile, the responsibility of the regional security was guaranteed by the US military through its robust naval presence and its role in preventing post war Japanese aggression.

The flip side of this new order was the fraught underlying politics in the region. With the US military assuming the role of regional security provider, pre-existing conflicts were essentially frozen between the 1950s–1990s and early 2000s. As a result, a political solution for the Korean peninsula, the Chinese civil war or the long-standing China-Japan hostilities were never found. Graham Allison of Harvard University has applied the concept of the Thucydides’ Trap to explain the future of Pax Americana. According to Allison’s argument, a rising power will always clash with a dominant power. Thus, the US may inevitably find itself in a military conflict with China. However, McGregor believes that China wants a gradual US exit from the region since a rapid exit may threaten to destabilize the region.

Changing Dynamics

The US-Japan alliance is strong since the two powers are on a more or less equal footing given their economic might. This alliance will remain vital for the interests of the two allies to defend the weakening status quo with China’s role. In the 1960s-1970s, US Defense Secretaries had urged Japan to be more proactive militarily to defend its interests. However, with the rise of China and increasing threats from North Korea, McGregor finds this is starting to change. Historically, a conservative Japan has always adopted a more aggressive stance in its national security interests. This has further intensified under Prime Minister Abe’s government.

Japan’s activism in realizing its security responsibilities was not always encouraged by the US. Many US allies after the 1950s such as Thailand, Australia and New Zealand were wary of Japan. Henry Kissinger had always been inclined towards China and strongly opposed an alliance with Japan. Japan’s techno-nationalism was generally seen as a threat by the US. Further, many Japanese conservatives harbored some resentment against the US. After its defeat in the war, some Japanese had reservations on the pacifist constitution that was imposed on them or how the US bypassed Japan in defining its relations with China. In addition, Japan had always wanted recognition for the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands. Initially, the US recognized residual claims but later settled only on administrative recognition.

According to McGregor, decades of trade wars between Tokyo and Washington did little to ease the reservations of the Japanese conservatives. Certain attitudes of US diplomats and officials further added insult to injury. For instance, Prime Minister Abe’s officials did not appreciate being lectured on history by US delegations. It is also likely that Former Vice President Joe Biden’s characterization of Japan as “a forty year old kid who won’t move out of his parent’s basement,” meant to be a reassurance for a Japan that cannot have nuclear weapons, was not received well in Japan.

As Japan and the US dealt with minor hiccups in their alliance, China was the main beneficiary from the US role in providing security in Asia. China needed a peaceful environment to rise. After 1971 and the subsequent modernization, China focused on building up its economic might as the regional security was guaranteed. In 2000-2001, China joined the WTO and has since benefitted from the American made liberal world order. McGregor identified many competing arguments on what the next regional and global order would look like, from Zbigniew Brzezinski’s US-Japan alliance to William Sapphire’s combination of US-China, US-Japan and China-Japan alliances. The bottom line remains that if China wants to change the current status quo, it would have to pull Japan away from the US.

There were three turning points in the relatively short history of diplomatic ties between China and Japan. The first was in the aftermath of the Taiwan Straits crisis in the mid-1990s when the US and Japan authored new security doctrines to include Taiwan. The second came when Japan revised its school textbooks with nationalistic fervor. The final came as China overtook Japan’s economy in 2007-2008. This was a long time in the making after Japan had remained a powerful global economy but China’s own economy had taken off by 1989.

Changing US Role

Looking ahead, McGregor points to the tough choices for the US. Previously, the US Navy had free reign in the region. However, today China can track every ship in South China Sea and the Pacific. China has become increasingly more assertive regarding its stance on the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands. There are round the clock patrols around these islands by rings of fisher boats, disguised Chinese Coast Guard ships and the Chinese navy. These patrols are not meant to start an armed conflict but rather to force Japan and the US to negotiate. In an interview with The Economist in 2015, Donald Trump stated that if the US stepped back from the region, Japan would be able to defend itself very well citing that historically it used to beat China in armed conflicts. Two days after the elections in 2016, Prime Minister Abe met with President-elect Trump in New York and presented him with a $3000 Honda golf club. After this meeting, Trump has been more committed to the alliance with Japan. The bottom line is that the US is in Asia by choice, not out of necessity like China. It has remained China’s goal to make this choice more costly for the US, and to allow for a gradual exit.

 

By Dyuti Saunik, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Sigur Center for Asian Studies

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

The Face-Off in Doklam: Interpreting India-China Relations

Asia Report #37 | October 2017

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The recent standoff between India and China on the Doklam plateau was the latest in an increasingly long history of conflict and unease along the nearly 2,500-mile border which has strained relations. Although the latest incursion by Chinese forces occurred in the Doklam region along Bhutan’s border with China, and not the Sino-Indian border, Indian personnel responded in kind to back up their Bhutanese neighbors.

What is the background to this dispute and what does its disposition tell us about the state of India-China relations? Former Indian Foreign Secretary and diplomat Nirupama Rao recently delivered remarks at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies giving her insights on these questions.

Historical Divisions

Ambassador Rao began her remarks explaining in detail the complex and largely unsettled Sino-Indian border region. Historical circumstances have complicated the managing of border disputes as some disagreements arise out of past treaties and conventions. Other standoffs arose out of China’s increasingly aggressive approach in demonstrating sovereignty claims along its periphery.

Following the annexation of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China in 1950, the Chinese government sought to solidify its hold in the southwestern province. In order to gain more access to the remote Tibet region, Chinese personnel entered the disputed Aksai Chin territory in the Western Sector of the Sino-Indian border and constructed a road between Xinjiang province and Tibet. An Indian patrol reconnoitering the construction project was arrested by Chinese personnel. Growing disputes on the border culminated in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The brief but intense war ended in stalemate, and the so called Aksai Chin Highway remains buffered by Chinese PLA forces to the present day. Transgressions by the Chinese have continuously occurred in the Western Sector of the border.

Beyond Aksai Chin, other segments of the Sino-Indian border’s western sector are fraught with discord, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Most recently, segments of Pakistan occupied Kashmir have witnessed renewed strategic importance due to China’s Sino-Pakistan economic corridor which is part of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. India contests that the Sino-Indian border begins near Afghanistan, however today’s line of actual control lies further east. The region continues to be a source of concern for India, as China’s support for Pakistani development threatens to further solidify Pakistan’s control over areas of disputed Kashmir. Lying slightly southeast of Kashmir, the Himachal Pradesh/ Uttarakhand -Tibet border composes the middle sector of the border. Ambassador Rao explained that this segment of border is the least complicated and experiences the fewest instances of disagreement.

Most recently, segments of Pakistan occupied Kashmir have witnessed renewed strategic importance due to China’s Sino- Pakistan economic corridor which is part of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative.

East of Nepal lies the Sikkim sector of the border. Flanked on either side by the sovereign states of Nepal and Bhutan, Ambassador Rao explained that this border has a defined character under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. Signed during the period of British rule over India, the Chinese government accepts this Convention and the border remains relatively quiet. This stretch of border is well suited to act as the “China-India Economic Corridor” with border trade flows of goods. The recent standoff in Doklam occurred just to the east of the Sikkim border.

The final stretch of border between China and India lies in India’s Arunachal Pradesh State. China disputes the legality of the border in this region, yet the area remains mostly peaceful, Ambassador Rao noted. This is due to concerted effort by both India and China to manage disputes through regular meetings of border personnel and confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Renewed Tension in Doklam

Ambassador Rao made note of the strong bilateral relationship between India and neighboring Bhutan, calling it in many ways a “model relationship.” Following China’s adoption of communism and its incorporation of Tibet, Bhutan distanced itself from its northern neighbor. Today, India and Bhutan enjoy strong political, development, economic, and military relations. India encouraged Bhutan’s joining of the UN and the country has also established diplomatic relations with a number of other states. Militarily, without an air force, Bhutan relies on Indian air support. Conversely, Bhutan opts not to maintain official relations with China, although there are ongoing border talks between the two countries. Since 1984, twenty-four rounds of talks have occurred between Bhutan and China over their disputed border with no clear solution generated.

The standoff in Bhutan’s disputed Doklam region this summer occurred near the tri-junction of India, China, and Bhutan, and just east of the Sikkim border. Doklam also lies close to the Indian Siliguri Pass, or “Chicken’s Neck” in the northeast region of the country.This narrow region,flanked on two sides by Bangladesh and Nepal, is the only land access to India’s northeast. Chinese incursions so close to this area provoke a strategic threat to India as well as Bhutan, the Ambassador noted.

The incursion began in mid-June of 2017 when PLA personnel entered the disputed territory and began construction of a road. Bhutanese security forces requested their withdrawal from the disputed land, and India subsequently responded by sending troops to backup Bhutan’s position. Although no loss of life occurred, Ambassador Rao asserted that there could have been a more intense military flare-up. The last loss of life in the Sino-Indian border area occurred during a 1975 Chinese ambush near a border pass in Arunachal Pradesh, she said.

Ambassador Rao explained how Chinese incursions tends to occur gradually as China attempts to slowly change the status quo of the disputed territory. Often grazers are accompanied by Chinese PLA security forces and later semi-permanent structures are left. These incursions serve to push China’s narrative of their interpretation of the border. The latest incursion in Doklam appeared more brazen than other recent actions. Chinese mass media served up fiery rhetoric around the dispute and were dismissive of Indian complaints.

Tensions were partly diffused when disengagement took place towards the end of August and preceding the 9th BRICS summit held in the Chinese city of Xiamen. There was speculation that China removed security forces from the region for fear that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could boycott the summit. Although the situation has cooled since the summer months, Ambassador Rao explained that the India-China border faces constant tension. The seventy-one day engagement is proof of the need for concerted diplomatic communication to prevent such instances.

A Future of Potential but Uncertainty

The insistent border disputes have not dampened Sino-Indian trade relations and other aspects of the bilateral relationship, the Ambassador pointed out. China is India’s largest trade partner in goods. China is also a major investor in Indian energy and telecoms projects. Approximately 13,000 Indian students currently study abroad in Chinese schools and universities, many studying medicine. If India’s border dispute with China were to find a more permanent solution, the region holds great potential in becoming India’s own economic corridor with China. The Ambassador remarked that areas of functional cooperation could be used to find more modus vivendi solutions to border disputes.

Ambassador Rao also expressed the need for India to maintain strong relationships with its neighbors like Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. She argued that by virtue of its being the largest country in South Asia, its strategic, political and economic strength, and through geography, India has the political, economic, and cultural clout to compete with large Chinese investment in these countries. As China continues to expand its land and naval presence, it is also important for India to reinforce the partnership with the United States. Ambassador Rao closed with the need for more mutual understanding between India and China.

The bilateral relationship cannot sustain constant confrontation. It has acquired ballast in many other areas making it much more diversified and evolved.

She hopes more constant contact, and communication, could become the norm in handling border disputes.

Ambassador Nirupama Rao served as India’s Foreign Secretary from 2009 to 2011. She was also India’s Ambassador to the United States, China, and Sri Lanka during her career. She was the second woman to hold the post of Foreign Secretary and the first woman spokesperson for India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Rao delivered remarks at the Sigur Center on September 13, 2017.

By Justin Seledyn, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Sigur Center for Asian Studies

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York for support for its activities.

Uncovering Nuclear Thinking in Asia

Asia Report #37 | November 2016

Read the PDF version of “Uncovering Nuclear Thinking in Asia”

The rise in global demand for nuclear energy is heavily concentrated in emerging and aspiring Asian powers. While nuclear power may alleviate energy shortages and climate change concerns, the promotion of nuclear energy compounds Asia’s nuclear weapon proliferation problems alongside nuclear power safety risks. All this is exacerbated by rising geopolitical tensions in Asia with more assertive policies – especially from China – in the region testing regional stability.

Against this perilous setting, Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic Processes – a new book by the Rising Powers Initiative (RPI) at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies – questions the extent to which we can infer nuclear thinking simply from external conditions and instead considers policy thinking on nuclear power and proliferation in Asia to be more complex and variegated than often posited. In this Asia Report, we present analysis offered at a recent RPI book launch event at the Elliott School for International Studies at George Washington University (GWU) with commentary by several of the authors on South Korea, Japan, China, and Taiwan. You can also listen to the event’s audio on the Sigur Center’s website.

Five Important Findings in the Book

The Nuclear Debates in Asia book found several illuminating common features across Asia:

  • First, decision making on nuclear issues is still largely centrally controlled in a process dominated by elites in both democratic and authoritarian states.
  • Second, this stranglehold on nuclear decision making has at times been confronted by grassroots level movements often focused on a specific nuclear question (e.g. protests against nuclear power plants or reprocessing facilities, anti-nuclear weapon groups) especially as pluralism is on the rise in parts of Southeast Asia, Japan, India, and even China.
  • Third, nuclear weapons policy has been remarkably consistent despite tremendous external security challenges (particularly China’s ascendancy) and the rise of so-called “resource nationalism” alongside growing energy demands. Instead, nuclear policy appears to be relatively insulated from the whims of populist Nationalism.
  • Fourth, the overall center of gravity in most of the countries studied shows the dominance of a Realist-Globalist coalition.
  • Finally, Pakistan remains the outlier in this trend with nuclear debates essentially dominated by elites with Nationalist

Book Overview

The book is the product of a two year RPI study (2012-2014) that explored the trajectory of nuclear energy, security, and nonproliferation in several key countries in Asia: China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other states in ASEAN. Arguing against conventional wisdom, the project made the case that rather than simply viewing nuclear debates through the lens of state-level, structural drivers, that the domestic variable is a powerful factor in shaping nuclear decision making.

Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and one of the project’s Principal Investigators, presented the book’s overarching framework of looking at various schools of thought within these domestic nuclear debates: Nuclear Realists, Nuclear Nationalists, and Nuclear Globalists. Realists stress the importance of self-strengthening and self-reliance but are relatively open to forming alliances with other states, especially great and rising powers. In pursuing strength, Realists value tangible military and/or economic assets. Still, they prefer to use this power prudently and worry about overstretching their capabilities. They are therefore willing to exercise self-restraint or be restrained by others if it serves national interests.

Nationalists see the world as hostile and strive for policies, postures, and capabilities similar to Realists. The key difference, however, is Nationalists emphasize these assets as not just a means to achieve national goals but as an end itself. As a result, they view the rise of their nation or attaining nuclear capability as a matter of national pride and sometimes a moral obligation. They are firmly skeptical of international alliances and international regimes that might restrain their options on nuclear matters.

In contrast to the other groups, Globalists tend to favor international political and economic integration over military solutions as means to resolve security and political disputes. They are sensitive to how their country is viewed around the world and many prefer to work with nations that espouse democratic values. They are supportive of international regimes such as the nonproliferation treaty and multilateral nuclear energy cooperation mechanisms.

These schools are thought are not absolute demarcations; individuals may subscribe to one viewpoint on a nuclear energy but hold another on nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, they are useful characterizations to gauge the center of gravity within a country on nuclear debates and assess the future direction of countries in Asia on these issues. With this overview, authors delve into individual cases, focusing here on China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

China

After surveying Chinese debates on nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security, the chapter on China by Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate within the Belfer Center at Harvard University, demonstrates the supremacy of Realist and Globalist views on these issues. Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at GWU, offered his thoughts on the chapter at the book launch.

Conventional wisdom proposes that China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear weapon arsenal and make it more reliable and effective are proof of a more aggressive threat. Zhang, however, pushed back on this interpretation and asserted the modernization push is driven by a Realist preference to maintain a “minimum nuclear deterrent,” a No First Use pledge, and other restraints on China’s nuclear options in order to prevent a costly nuclear arms race with the United States and other nuclear powers. Gains in nuclear weapon capabilities, Realists argue, could be used by Beijing as leverage in future arms control talks with Moscow and Washington. Furthermore, the Globalist school’s contention that China needs to maintain a positive international image on nonproliferation matters as a means to reach its wider economic and development goals appears to be holding strong within the country’s governing elite.

China’s massive push for more domestic nuclear energy aims to: (1) address the country’s air pollution crisis; (2) mitigate climate change and meet international emission reduction targets; and (3) enhance national energy security. Realists in China see nuclear energy as a means to protect the current Chinese growth and development model by offering a solution to the public’s anxieties about air quality and to provide sufficient energy outputs to continue expanding the economy. Globalists favor nuclear power to improve China’s image on the international stage as a prime contributor to climate change solutions. Nationalists promote nuclear power for reasons of self-sufficiency on energy, but that view is overshadowed by Realist and Globalist arguments. These nuclear energy debates are largely controlled by elites in China, but after the nuclear power plant accident at Japan’s Fukushima prefecture in March 2011, local protests against several nuclear energy plants and related projects indicate that this grip has somewhat weakened. Despite an ever more challenging security and energy situation for China, Zhang still foresaw a remarkable consistency in the country’s nuclear policies.

Japan

The chapter on Japan by Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at GWU and the project’s co-Principal Investigator, cuts against the prevailing discourse claiming Japanese security anxieties toward threats from China and North Korea will push Tokyo in favor of developing nuclear weapons or at least encourage Japan to hedge on this choice. By maintaining a large stockpile of separated plutonium from its nuclear power industry, this perspective contends, Japan’s leaders leverage their ability to quickly build a nuclear arsenal to deter its rivals and keep the United States close. While there is some truth to these positions, Mochizuki believes they are quite exaggerated.

The threshold for Japan to make a decision in favor of obtaining its own nuclear weapons is extremely high. Even the threat of a growing nuclear armed North Korea, a rapidly modernized Chinese military, and the possibility of a Donald Trump Administration is not enough for Pro-Nuclear Nationalists to overcome the Japanese public’s strong anti-nuclear bias and the country’s pacifist constitution. After Fukushima, the center of gravity within Japan on nuclear debates shifted toward a coalition of Nuclear Realists and Anti-Nuclear Activists. The Pro-Nuclear Nationalist voice may be loud, but it is very much in the minority.

Mochizuki saw a fundamental bargain develop in 1950s Japan between nuclear energy proponents and anti-nuclear weapon activists: nuclear energy can be a national policy priority only under robust nonproliferation constraints. This norm or allergy against nuclear weapons is resilient and further strengthened by an increasingly popular Globalist position of Nuclear Double Zero: no nuclear weapons and no nuclear energy. The author doubts Japan’s recently restarted nuclear energy plants will ever return to a level of output that once supplied over 30 percent of the country’s electricity or its pre-Fukushima ambition of nearly 70 percent by 2030; a more realistic target is closer to 10 to 15 percent. In recent weeks, Japan has even started to walk away from prior massive investments in reprocessing and fast breeder nuclear reactors. On the other hand, Japan and its U.S. partners are still deeply interested in exporting Japanese nuclear energy technology abroad where Japan is less constrained in its activities than at home.

On the military side, Mochizuki expects the public’s anti-nuclear sentiment to continue reinforcing Japan’s commitment to non-nuclear principles. To address the security challenges posed by North Korea and China, security Realists will focus their attention on upgrading conventional defense capabilities and tightening the alliance with the United States, rather than seriously considering a nuclear weapons option.

South Korea

The chapter on the Republic of Korea (ROK) by Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea studies and Director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, identifies three categories of nuclear debates in the country: (1) the drive for energy self-reliance through nuclear power; (2) whether South Korea should rely on nuclear weapons – their own or the U.S. stockpile – to deter North Korea; and (3) the balance between nonproliferation objectives and spent nuclear fuel management. Snyder observes that each of these debates were shaped over past decades by changes in the U.S.-ROK alliance, the country’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and the evolution of ROK technical capabilities.

There is a dominant Realist-Globalist coalition in South Korea today, but it was not always the case. In the 1970s, Seoul had a secret nuclear weapons program advanced by Nationalists unsure of the U.S commitment to South Korea after the Nixon Doctrine, U.S. military escalation in Vietnam, and an ever provocative North Korea. It took an ultimatum by Washington and a promise to reengage the Peninsula for South Korea to abandon these ambitions or else risk a divorce from its Western allies.

As South Korea moved toward a more democratic government, Globalists furthered an export driven economic plan that included the transfer of ROK civilian nuclear power reactor technology abroad. This has resulted in a rift between the U.S. nonproliferation agenda and Korean scientists and politicians who want the freedom to engage in some form of plutonium reprocessing to manage the country’s radioactive waste storage challenge and remain competitive in the global nuclear energy marketplace. The United States insists South Korea’s particular approach to reprocessing – called pyroprocessing – still poses a proliferation risk since this type of technology has applications in producing fuel for both nuclear reactors and nuclear warheads. Globalists have thus far won the argument that collaboration with Washington on nuclear energy and protecting South Korea’s image as a nonproliferation supporter outweighs the benefits of more flexibility. These compromises have allowed the latest and long negotiated U.S.-ROK civilian nuclear cooperation agreement to move forward last year.

North Korean military provocations, especially the second nuclear test in 2009, have tested the Realist-Globalist coalition and South Korea’s non-nuclear weapon status. Frustration with inconsistent U.S. policy on North Korea and a perception that China refuses to reign in its partners in Pyongyang create conditions in Seoul that could see a new Nationalist push toward an indigenous nuclear arsenal. For the time being, however, this viewpoint is in the minority, though Realists express versions of it by advocating for the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea.

Taiwan

In the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwanese elites attempted on two occasions to pursue a nuclear weapons program. These days, Robert Sutter proclaims in a chapter on Taiwan that this line of thinking is mostly discarded. Taiwan’s support for nonproliferation norms and safeguards against the spread of nuclear weapons is strong. The island has instead been intensely deliberating on whether to keep or expand the number of nuclear power plants in the country with the debate centered on reactor safety and energy demands. These debates were heated during the recent national elections with the now ruling Democratic Progressive Party campaigning against the pro-nuclear power position supported by the Kuomintang (KMT).

After the January 2016 presidential election, however, the intensity of the nuclear energy debate diminished with the country moving on to other pressing issues. Sutter argues the United States can rest assured that Taiwan will not resume nuclear weapon ambitions nor backtrack on commitments to being an ideal model for nonproliferation. Still, due to Taipei’s turbulent political dynamics, Washington should not expect a stable and consistent position on nuclear power within Taiwan even as the country aims to be nuclear free by 2025.

Conclusions for U.S. Foreign Policy

The United States has played an important role in shaping the discourse and policies on these nuclear debates in all the Asian countries reviewed by the book. By reaffirming its regional security commitments, Washington has prevented pro-nuclear Nationalist discourse from gaining a foothold in allied states like Japan and South Korea. Moreover, the U.S. ability to regulate access to nuclear technologies has compelled states like South Korea and Taiwan to abandon clandestine nuclear weapon programs or encourage nations like India and Vietnam to accept constraints.

In terms of nuclear energy, the U.S. government and nuclear industry has supported the expansion of civilian nuclear energy programs in Asia and has helped impede the Japanese movement to abandon nuclear power altogether. The United States has an interest in strengthening nuclear safety and nonproliferation throughout Asia and can advance this agenda by moving from an Asian nuclear network dominated by the United States through bilateral relationships to a more multilateral structure that promotes cooperation among Asian countries as well as between Washington and individual Asian capitals.

By Timothy Westmyer, Research and Program Associate, Rising Powers Initiative, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University

RPI would like to thank the MacArthur Foundation for supporting our research on nuclear debates in Asia that contributed to this project. 

Taiwan Goes to the Polls: Ramifications of Change at Home and Abroad

Asia Report #36 | December 2015
As Taiwan casts votes for a new government in January 2016, the world is watching closely to see how the election might shake up Taipei’s domestic policies and its relationships with neighbors. Polls indicate the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, has a 2-to-1 lead over the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and its candidate, Eric Chu, as well as the DPP likely securing a majority in the Legislative Yuan. The KMT is perceived by voters as being pro-China, so the shift in domestic politics driving the probable DPP victory may have profound implications for regional security and economic dynamics, not to mention U.S. foreign policy in East Asia.
In this Asia Report, we present the analysis offered at a recent conference – Voting for Change: The Impact of Taiwan’s Upcoming Elections, sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. You can also listen to the event’s audio on the Sigur Center’s website.

Prospects for Expanding Taiwan’s International Role

Asia Report #34 | September 2015

Taiwan faces a host of challenges in its cross strait relations with a rising China. Among these challenges, Taiwan’s sovereignty and status affect Taiwan’s ability to effectively navigate international institutions and organizations. Nonetheless, Taiwan has made some gains in its participation in international institutions, particularly in the fields of global health and disaster relief. What are the implications of these gains for Taiwan, moving forward? These issues came under scrutiny at a Taiwan Roundtable on “Prospects for Expanding Taiwan’s International Role,” held at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. The panel included Wei-chin Lee, Professor of Political Science, Wake Forest University, Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic & International Studies, and Jacques deLisle, Professor of Law and Political Science and Director, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania.

Read the full report for “Prospects for Expanding Taiwan’s International Role”

Remaking India: Modi’s Blueprint to Align Foreign Policy with Domestic Agenda

Asia Report #33 | June 2015

Now that Narendra Modi’s rule has passed the one year mark, there has been no shortage of performance assessments. Most are focused on either the domestic front or the international front. But how are domestic priorities and international ambitions intersecting in Modi’s government? And what does it mean for India’s global standing? These questions were addressed by Ambassador Neelam Deo, Director of Gateway House in Mumbai, at a Sigur Center lecture on “Remaking India: Modi’s Blueprint to Align Foreign Policy with Domestic Agenda.”

Read the full report for “Remaking India: Modi’s Blueprint to Align Foreign Policy with Domestic Agenda” (PDF)

Winners or Losers in the TPP? Taiwan, Its Neighbors, and the United States

Asia Report #30 | May 2015

The Obama Administration has renewed its efforts to get the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) through Congress over the past year. In addition to being the largest trade deal passed by the U.S. in several decades, the TPP may also serve as the economic linchpin of the U.S. “rebalance” to Asia and is of great importance to many of America’s Asian allies. In light of the continuing debate over TPP ratification, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies recently held a Taiwan Roundtable entitled “Winners or Losers in the TPP? Taiwan, its Neighbors, and the United States.” The panel assembled to discuss the different aspects of this proposed trade deal included Mireya Solís, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Shihoko Goto, Senior Northeast Asia Associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program, and Derek Scissors, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

Read the full report for “Winners or Losers in the TPP? Taiwan, Its Neighbors, and the United States” (PDF)

China at the Crossroads? Reform Challenges Ahead

Asia Report #31 | May 2015

China is at a series of junctures in its economic, social, political, environmental, and foreign policy realms. As the ruling party for over 60 years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finds itself at a turning point, faced with numerous challenges on the road ahead. In a lecture entitled “China at the Crossroads? Reform Challenges Ahead,” held at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies in April 2015, David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University, argued that diminishing returns have set in in a number of main areas of reform that China has enjoyed and benefited from over the last 35 years. These diminishing returns set in beginning around 2005 when the CCP started discussing a new wave of reforms. What are the issues the CCP faces in order to retain legitimacy? Ten reform challenges exist in China today, which, if not appropriately addressed, may cause the country to stagnate and lose momentum of growth.

Read the full report for “China at the Crossroads? Reform Challenges Ahead” (PDF)

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