Semiconductor Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan

Asia Report #60 | April 18, 2023

Introduction

The resiliency of supply chains in the Indo-Pacific now poses a central challenge for the United States and its partners in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. has entered a new era of industrial policy, backed by the CHIPS Act and the latest round of export controls on China. The story of the chips race will unfold in Asia given that Taiwan, together with South Korea and Japan, account for over 90 percent of the world’s semiconductor production. How well are Taiwan, South Korea and Japan positioned to deal with the ongoing supply chain stresses and what are the economic and security implications to watch for?

To explore this question, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies recently hosted a Roundtable on Semiconductor Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan as part of its Taiwan Roundtable Series. This Asia Report covers the deliberations of the Roundtable comprised of Lotta Danielsson, Vice President of the US-Taiwan Business Council, Daniel Aum, Associate at the Institute for Corean-American Studies, and Jeffrey D. Bean, Program Manager for Technology Policy and Editor at Observer Research Foundation America (ORF America). The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University. Watch the full video of the conference here.

Taiwan’s Central Role in the Semiconductor Industry and its Spinoffs

Lotta Danielsson opened with a brief on how Taiwan evolved to become the epicenter for the global semiconductor supply chain. It was a concerted effort over 40 years, starting with initial government investments and encouragement of private enterprise. Taiwan’s innovations in the sector really hit its stride with the pioneering of the “foundry model” of semiconductor manufacturing. Simply put, it separates the design aspect from the production one, and Taiwan doubled down on semiconductor production. This was only bolstered by the clustering effect around Hsingchu, where thousands of suppliers across the value chain create an ecosystem that turbocharges research and development.

Taiwan’s centrality to the world’s supply chain is remarkably high. Taiwan enjoys around 60-70% of cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing. It is fully cognizant of the geopolitical significance of its industry and has worked hard to cultivate it. It is recognized as a major factor in boosting its global ties, especially with the United States. Danielsson noted that there are many pressures on the semiconductor industry including talent shortages, intellectual property issues, supply risks, demand shocks, and most notably the Chinese security threat. These pressures incentivize Taiwanese companies to look abroad to diversify, however this is tempered by Taiwan’s own desire to remain central to the semiconductor industry, especially at the cutting edge.

Danielsson also considered the impact of the passage of the Chips and Sciences Act (CHIPS) by the U.S. Congress. The United States is having success in drawing investment from foreign companies such as TSMC and Samsung, but Danielsson argues that the $50 billion allocated for semiconductor investment under CHIPS is insufficient. Nearly $400 billion is needed to just replicate the capacity of TSMC alone. Taiwan built its semiconductor industry over several decades and the United States cannot replicate it easily. Danielsson also explored the Chip 4 Alliance with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Politically it is a big opportunity for Taiwan but South Korea and Japan are major competitors as well so this initiative would need to balance political cooperation with private competition.

South Korea in the Semiconductor Supply Chain: Challenges and Opportunities

Daniel Aum began by clarifying what South Korea’s semiconductor portfolio looks like. Although not as dominant as Taiwan in high end chip manufacturing, South Korea’s niche is found in memory chip manufacturing where it dominates nearly two-thirds of global market share. The South Korean economic boom is inexorably linked to the development of its semiconductor industry.

Aum provided historical context for South Korean chip manufacturing. Starting in the 1980s, a combination of government subsidies and conglomerate investment incentivized the hiring of talented engineers who pioneered South Korea’s initial forays into memory and DRAM chips. South Korea took advantage of the U.S.-Japan chip rivalry that restricted the ability of Japanese manufacturers to export to the United States. This allowed South Korean companies to leapfrog their competitors. Additionally, Aum put forth the South Korean “model” of chip manufacturing as a possible reason for success. Samsung, SK Hynix, and other South Korean Chip manufacturers are “end-to-end” service providers, from design to packaging. This allows them to build everything in-house while also servicing foreign clients.

Aum then described the strengths and shortfalls of the current government’s semiconductor initiatives. While South Korea today possesses only 1% of market share of non-memory chips, President Yoon Suk Yeol is targeting 10% by 2030. South Korea’s National Assembly has increased tax cuts by up to 15% for conglomerates, however these efforts fall short of Chinese, Taiwanese, Japanese, and U.S initiatives. The South Korean government has also attracted over $260 billion in private investment, mainly from Samsung, to create a cluster of over 150 firms that cover the entire semiconductor supply chain. To fuel this, the South Korean government has set the goal to train over 150,000 workers over 10 years. However, Aum points out several hurdles this initiative would need to overcome. The South Korean birth rate hampers talent supply, the tax incentives are not competitive, and the U.S.-China rivalry threatens South Korea’s economic ties to China.

Taking up the political implications of semiconductor policy, Aum suggested that to South Korean firms, the CHIPS Act initially seemed like a double-edged sword as subsidies would restrict production expansion in China. However, recent clarifications from the U.S government has allowed South Korean companies some limited expansion rights. South Korea will have to leverage its position as the premier memory provider while balancing the United States and China. Regarding Taiwan, Aum sees South Korean and Taiwanese cooperation as quite healthy. Both governments have a history of cooperation and on a corporate level, even though they compete for each other’s contracts, companies have voluntarily agreed to set up common global standards for chip stacking to increase mutual profits. Aum closed by mentioning that South Korea also faces great opportunity with Japan. President Yoon and PM Kishida have resumed bilateral visits, while Japan has agreed to lift restrictions on semiconductor material exports to South Korea. For its part, South Korea has dropped a World Trade Organization case against Japan. All in all, South Korea stands to gain substantially from cooperation with both Taiwan and Japan.

Getting Back to the Future: Japan’s Chip Challenge

Jeffrey Bean began by describing the downfall of Japanese semiconductor dominance. Decades of government and private investment had led Japan to emerge as a leader in DRAM and memory in the 1980s, but concerns from U.S firms put a stop to that. The United States compelled Japan to sign an agreement that put a price floor on Japanese DRAM in the U.S. and forced Japan to open its market up to foreign suppliers. Japanese firms entered a period of intense adjustment as other nations like South Korea quickly flooded the market. Japanese companies had a tough time adapting to the Taiwanese “fabless foundry model,” but eventually found a niche in specialized supply chain components. Despite Japan’s low market share in the global semiconductor industry, it is not reflective of how integral Japanese specialty products are to the manufacturing of chips.

According to Bean, several characteristics make the Japanese semiconductor industry special. Japanese firms are leaders in design and Japan is a hub for the creation of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and precursor materials. Additionally, Japan’s experience with electronic components, legacy chips, and consumer electronics makes it the premier place for semiconductor expertise. Japan is now actively seeking to grow its position in the supply chain. The Japanese government has subsidized the creation of a 5-nanometer facility in Kumamoto with TSMC and Sony, a 2-nanometer facility in Hokkaido with IBM, and manufacturing equipment plants in Oshu. Japan is seeking to reestablish itself in the industry.

Bean argues that this is largely as a result of Japan pioneering the effort to consider “economic security.” In 2020, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan had conducted research on Japan’s role in a global economy with regards to national security and critical technology. The fruits of this changing focus have been new strategic documents listing China as a strategic competitor, the Economic Security Promotion Act which made national security a factor for investment for firms, and the establishment of a cabinet level position on economic security. Japan has been concerned about this issue longer than most other countries.

Bean summed up by contrasting Japan’s political position with South Korea and Taiwan. Unlike the other two, Japan plays an important role in leading multilateral institutions. Japan is the main driver for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and has looked favorably on Taiwan’s accension, while negatively on China’s. Bean argues that Japan is eager to cooperate in the semiconductor industry, as Japan is part of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Quad. In 2021, Japan and Taiwan also came to an agreement regarding semiconductor supply chain security. Japan has taken a leading role in the conversation on economic security and critical role the semiconductor industry plays in it.

Overall, the prospects for greater cooperation on the critically important global semiconductor supply chain resilience between Taiwan, South Korea and Japan appear bright, in spite of underlying competitive elements. By extension, this is good news for U.S. economic security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

 

By Satvik Pendyala, M.A Candidate in International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs and Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, The George Washington University.

Assessing Taiwan’s New Military Security: Cross Strait, Defense and US-Taiwan Relations

Asia Report #59 | November 21, 2022

A high-tension visit by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in early August 2022 led to the People’s Liberation Army Navy holding exercises near Taiwan and firing live missiles near the island. Chinese military escalation and stern diplomatic warnings to the U.S. came in the midst of final deliberations of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS act) in Washington. A week after Speaker Pelosi’s visit, President Biden signed the measure into law, providing over $50 billion to help develop and produce semiconductors while encouraging U.S. companies to cut China out of their semiconductor supply chains.

To explore these issues and how heightened tensions are likely to affect Taiwan and its economy and security, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a conference on Taiwan’s New Security Challenges: Economic Security and Military Security. The Asia Report from the first panel on economic and high-tech security may be found here. This Asia Report focuses on Taiwan’s changing military security challenges and assesses how cross strait, defense and US-Taiwan relations factor into possible responses. The video of the entire conference may be found here.

The speakers included Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder and Principal of the Marathon Initiative, Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, and Jacob Stokes, Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University.

 

Responses to a Pressing Threat Scenario

Elbridge Colby led off the discussion by noting the graveness and immediacy of the threat to Taiwan’s continued survival posed by an increasingly assertive China. Broad and sustained economic prosperity permitted China to engage in an unprecedented buildup of its conventional military forces over the previous twenty-five years, with major importance being placed on what has been termed the “primary planning scenario,” which calls for a cross strait invasion of Taiwan. As Colby noted, in addition to considerable investment in Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities designed to blunt the United States’ ability to project power into the Western Pacific, Chinese policymakers have placed increased importance on military assets such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and a large space architecture, thus exhibiting global ambitions beyond a favorable resolution of the Taiwan question.

Nevertheless, Colby presented three principal reasons why a cross strait invasion remains the most plausible employment of Chinese military force in the near term. First, the CCP continues to put forth its irredentist claim that Taiwan has historically lain within the Chinese state, and thus should be a constituent part of the People’s Republic. Second, China must subordinate Taiwan in order to achieve its goal of establishing a dominant position in Asia, both because it lies within the First Island Chain and is increasingly seen as being tied to American credibility within the region. Lastly, Chinese attempts to use non-military forms of coercion over the past three decades were not only unsuccessful, but drove the island in the opposite direction with regard to independence.

Shifting to a discussion of the operational aspects of a Taiwan contingency, Colby rejected the prevailing view that a military solution would begin with Chinese actions such as the seizure of offshore islands or cyber-attacks. This “gradual approach,” in his view, fails to account for the fact that China would effectively be telegraphing its goals to the international community, specifically the United States, which would provide both time and reason for American forces to prepare, thus diminishing China’s ability to exercise “higher echelon options.” Rather, an aggressor must possess the ability to deploy and sustain dominant force such that they are able to seize and hold key enemy territories.

Colby then put forth three factors that make such a scenario increasingly likely, though not probable. First, China must employ military force to achieve its objective. Second, it is increasingly clear that the United States and Japan will take part in the conflict, with the latter providing bases for American forces and JSDF support for a defensive effort. Third, China’s willingness to pay the political cost associated with its nuclear buildup suggests that it is expecting a large war with the United States under the nuclear shadow. Moreover, Colby contended that the coming decade presents a uniquely dangerous window for Chinese action against Taiwan. This is due to the dichotomy of disinvestment in defense capabilities on the part of the United States, while China has begun to reap the full benefits of investments begun in the 1990s. Additionally, Xi Jinping has linked the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation with the resolution of the Taiwan question in Beijing’s favor. With this in mind, coupled with the likelihood of little warning prior to an attack, Colby implored the Taiwanese government to raise defense spending to ten percent of GDP in order to prevent a swift and decisive defeat.

 

What Does Heightened Bipartisan US Support for Taiwan Mean?

Robert Sutter sought to explain the unprecedented increase in American support for Taiwan under the Trump and Biden administrations, and the significance of the debate surrounding the military crisis following Speaker Pelosi’s visit.

The main driver, in Sutter’s view, is Congress’ steady, bipartisan and whole of government approach to the challenges presented by China’s increasingly aggressive behavior and rhetoric. He dubbed the unity of purpose across party lines and branches of government, begun in earnest in 2018, as the “Washington Consensus.” Sutter then presented three fundamental challenges being confronted by American policymakers in the deepening strategic competition with China: governance, the security threat, and a high technology competition, with the latter two posing existential threats. More specifically, Beijing’s attempts to alter the status quo through sustained pressure on the government in Taipei since 2016, Taiwan’s outsized importance in the nascent high technology competition, its strategic location, as well as the island’s potential as a useful lever in engaging in both dialogue as well as competition with China, has yielded a sharp increase in American support due to its determination to prevent China from supplanting it as the dominant regional and global power.

Sutter then presented four “brakes” on the hardening of American foreign policy towards China. First, and most broadly, it presents the potential for a rift in Sino-US relations. Second, the United States does not want to harm relations with Japan as well as the vast majority of Southeast Asian nations, who have a vested interest in a healthy US-China relationship. Third, American policymakers do not want to provide governments in Taiwan with the means to provoke Beijing. While all three have been overtaken by events, Sutter argued that China’s military power, and its willingness to employ it, continues to serve as a final brake.

Sutter then went on to note that while the August military exercises heightened tensions considerably, they also served to clarify the contours of the domestic debate. On one side, the vast majority of elected officials and senior members of the Biden administration, embracing the “Washington Consensus,” have made clear that they will not be intimidated into decreasing verbal and material support for Taiwan. On the other side, business and investment professionals, university professors and administrators, and a fair amount of China specialists within the broader foreign policy community, contend that the portrayal of the threat is excessive, economically harmful, and will lead to armed conflict. While the latter camp argued for seeking a stable relationship with China through reassurances regarding American policy towards Taiwan, those in the former prioritized the defense of American interests, pointing to previous attempts at reassurance that gave way to China’s militarization of the South China Sea.

More broadly, Sutter believes that tension in the US-China relationship is inevitable going forward, and America’s task is to place it into perspective while preparing adequately and avoiding unnecessarily “overhyping” it.

 

Figuring Taiwan Into the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Going Forward

Jacob Stokes rounded out the panel through situating Taiwan and cross strait issues in the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy more broadly. As Stokes notes, Taiwan has a direct link to all five pillars of the Biden administration’s approach to the region, which include advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, building connections within and beyond the region, driving regional prosperity, bolstering regional security, and building resistance to twenty-first century transnational threats. Moreover, as tensions in the Taiwan Strait have gradually heightened, U.S. allies’ posture towards China has trended towards a policy of competition and rivalry.

Specifically addressing the potential for a conflict over Taiwan, Stokes made clear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 lent an immediacy to what was previously considered an abstract and long-term challenge by regional and global powers. This is seen most acutely in Japan, as the government in Tokyo undertakes the first comprehensive review of its national security strategy since 2013, and recently announced plans to double defense spending over the next five years. Australia, having inked a trilateral security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom in 2021 known colloquially as AUKUS, sought to acquire capabilities that are tailored to contingencies far from its shores and at the higher end of the combat spectrum. South Korea, ever-mindful of the fragility of peace on the Peninsula, has begun to formally discuss the potential for “simultaneous aggression” from the North in the event of a Taiwan contingency, as well as the likely expectations of their American ally in such a scenario. The Philippines, while also considering the appropriate level of military support to the United States in a conflict over Taiwan, must consider the proximity of the island of Luzon to Taiwan’s south as well as its claims in the South China Sea. India, wary of an increasingly belligerent China following a violent border clash in the summer of 2020 despite a recent thaw in relations, increasingly identifies with Taiwan’s predicament as it relates to Chinese military pressure. Lastly, Europe, while not a significant actor within the Indo-Pacific region, has begun to seriously consider plausible diplomatic and economic countermeasures in the event of a cross strait invasion.

Stokes then put forth three key questions that must govern discussions about the shifting regional order given the rift in cross strait relations. First, what steps are necessary for integrating deterrence across the joint forces of the United States, Taiwan, and their mutual allies and partners? Second, how can a similar spirit of collaboration drive efforts to strengthen economic and technological security amid regional trade integration? Third, to what extent should democratic values serve as a factor in such discussions given the variety of regime types throughout the region?

Stokes then addressed these concerns by presenting four principal recommendations. First, the United States must fully commit itself to implementing a truly asymmetric defense posture, while making clear that Taiwan must shoulder an even greater share of the burden. Second, the economic costs of a cross strait invasion must be made clear not only with regard to sanctions and other direct punishments, but also by mapping the broader regional and global economic fallout. For Stokes, such actions can prove effective in a strategy of deterrence by denial if the United States broadens its understanding of China’s aims to include gaining control over Taiwan without provoking a regime threatening economic crisis. Third, American policymakers must engage in more realistic and detailed contingency planning with a wide range of partners, specifically with regard to gray-zone challenges from Beijing. Lastly, the United States must continue to internationalize the issue of cross strait peace and stability, while simultaneously practicing political steadiness and restraint. More specifically with regard to the latter, Stokes advocated for maintaining both strategic ambiguity as well as the One China Policy. Rather than serving as a concession to Beijing, such an approach, in his view, will ensure that the United States’ commitment to upholding the status quo remains credible with regional partners, thus allowing for a continued focus on China’s destabilizing actions.

 

By Ben Briedman, Rising Powers Initiative Research Affiliate.

Taiwan’s New Economic Security : Supply Chain Resilience, Cybersecurity & US-Taiwan Ties

Asia Report #58 | October 24, 2022

A high-tension visit by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in early August 2022 led to the People’s Liberation Army Navy holding exercises near Taiwan and firing live missiles near the island. Chinese military escalation and stern diplomatic warnings to the U.S. came in the midst of final deliberations of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS act) in Washington. A week after Speaker Pelosi’s visit, President Biden signed the measure into law, providing over $50 billion to help develop and produce semiconductors while encouraging U.S. companies to cut China out of their semiconductor supply chains.

To explore these issues and how heightened tensions are likely to affect Taiwan and its economy and security, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a two panel Taiwan’s New Security Challenges: Economic Security and Military Security. The first panel focused on Economic Security: Supply Chain Resilience, Cybersecurity & US-Taiwan Ties. This Asia Report covers the deliberations on these topics, to be followed by another report on the military equation.  The video of the conference may be found here.

The featured speakers on were Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President of the US-Taiwan Business Council since 2000, Fiona Cunningham, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Faculty Fellow at Perry World House, and Emily Weinstein, Research Fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the National Bureau of Asian Research. The panel was moderated by the Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, Professor Gregg Brazinsky.

 

Supply Chain Resilience

Rupert Hammond-Chambers started the panel by introducing the US-Taiwan Business Council he presides, noting that it represents mostly tech companies, though its defense portfolio often captures the most attention. This was a theme throughout the conference as all speakers pointed out that economic considerations are often eclipsed by the needs of national security. Hammond-Chambers described Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration as a turning point in the US-China supply chain relationship: the Trump administration’s shift from its predecessors’ accommodationist attitude to assessing more realistically how to address the ongoing challenge from China. This position has now become bipartisan as both sides of the aisle view China as a challenge, especially in view of its aggressive reaction to Speaker Pelosi’s visit.

This shift in U.S. policy had a ripple effect in the supply chain. While large multinational companies were initially taken aback, their experience in engaging governments and lobbying enabled them to weigh in on the process of reassessment and readjustment of the China-U.S. economic relationship. However, this was not the case for their Taiwanese supply chain partners, who lack such experience and had more difficulty in assessing the situation.

Less than two years later, COVID rattled the supply chain as demand of certain products spiked while there was a dearth of availability of other products, especially semiconductor chips. This increased pressure on the supply chain as it tried to adjust by attempting to diversify partners rather than relying solely on China. However, considering the way that the global supply chain is structured around China, radical change is unlikely to happen quickly, especially for companies that have invested heavily in production in China and that cannot simply displace entire factories overnight. Long term however, Hammond-Chambers observed a dramatic shift in companies no longer investing capital in China to build production capacity. Instead, he noted a historically high FDI flow to Taiwan as a function of this pressure in the supply chain.

These limitations, conjoined with a general effort to spread out of the supply chain have led to more investments being made in Vietnam, India, Indonesia, and Eastern Europe. Neo-industrialist policies in the U.S. have also contributed to the expansion of manufacturing capabilities within the U.S. Hammond-Chambers mentioned that over the next 10 years the footprint of Taiwanese company Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC) in Arizona will grow, though it will probably only manufacture commodity products and not its most advanced chips. The overall effect of these multiple trends is to push investment away from China, and while Taiwan has several issues working against it as a place for more investment, in addition to a wish to mitigate risks by not having too many economic interests embedded in one part of the world, Taiwan will remain a critical component of the supply chain and is still getting a large share of capital flow for semiconductors.

 

Cybersecurity Challenges and Vulnerabilities

For Fiona Cunningham, Taiwan is a “highly networked, technologically sophisticated open society”, but it is dependent on digital technology, making it vulnerable to malicious cyber activity. As the PRC’s goal is to absorb Taiwan without destroying it, the cyber domain has some novel advantages to enable the PRC to do so. Cunningham summed up the PRC’s strategy of reunification to three main endeavors: exerting leverage, presenting a united front, and persuasion. The PRC’s reunification strategy is more than just a military strategy, and as such, it uses cyber tools in ways other than military as well. Cunningham then highlighted ways that China exerts leverage on Taiwan through the use of cyber tools.

First, by investing in cyber capabilities, the PLA bolstered its capabilities to coerce Taiwan. The PLA originally invested in offensive cyber operations after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Their goal was to make it too risky for the U.S. to intervene in a conflict with Taiwan, which makes Taiwan more vulnerable and thus less likely to take steps towards its independence. Second, the PRC could also attack Taiwan’s critical infrastructure directly using these cyber capabilities it has developed in the last twenty years, giving leverage to the PRC. PLA cyber operators have already targeted Taipei’s city government networks as well as transport and logistics networks, actively reminding of the potential of full-scale offensives. Third, PLA operational plans in the event of a conventional invasion of Taiwan include gaining information dominance, in addition to air and sea superiority. Cyber plays an important role in that effort. While these cyber capabilities are often thought of as being targeted at the U.S. Navy, they can also affect the Taiwanese military, again exerting pressure. Fourth, in addition to these uses of cyber in a conflict, the PRC can execute a strategic blockade campaign, in which information blockades play a role as cyber tools could help seal off Taiwan. Fifth, cyber espionage enhances effectiveness of all military operations as they can lead the PLA to gaining information about Taiwan’s defenses and intentions.

Echoing Hammond-Chamber’s point about military concerns taking over cyber, Cunningham noted that cyber issues are multidimensional. For instance, as a result of its diplomatic isolation, Taiwan is often excluded from the international organizations shaping the rules of cyber governance internationally, removing its ability to shape regulations that affect it.

Cunningham also remarked that the PRC did not use cyber in its demonstration of force following Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Some DDS attacks on Taiwanese government websites were observed, but they may have come from individual netizens or unofficial groups rather than the PLA given their small scale and unimpressive nature. This entails that either China has never conducted cyber operations, unlike most powers with cyber capacity, or it is facing the challenge of figuring out how to use cyber to signal effectively in crises. Outside of crises, Cunningham suggested that Taiwanese semiconductor companies are not at a particular risk from China as sabotage would be counterproductive given China’s reliance on importing Taiwanese chips.

 

U.S.-China Tech Competition and Implications for Taiwan

Emily Weinstein rounded out the panel by focusing on export controls, which are key in the context of decoupling. To support her presentation, Weinstein referred to a historical case study, the Loral-Hughes incident, which occurred in the context of US-China normalization of relations post-1979. Talks about collaboration in space emerged from this normalization, in particular in the context of satellites. Despite the events of Tiananmen and a degradation of U.S.-China relations, collaboration in satellite technology continued until the mid-1990s.

The Loral-Hughes incident led to a U.S. Congressional Committee which commissioned an in-depth study of the issue of tech transfer related to China and drove a unilateral decision from Congress to move satellites from dual-use to be deemed a munition, making the export process of satellite and rocket parts much more difficult. The geographic concentration of satellite makers in the U.S. meant this change of policy affected the sector worldwide. Despite these delaying efforts, China has still emerged as a leading player in space because key components and expertise can come from outside the U.S. Worse, according to Weinstein, this unilateral U.S policy inhibited U.S. progress as it isolated the U.S. satellite industry from partners and markets and reduced the U.S.’ previously dominant share of the market. Indeed, European companies that emerged with the development of the European Space Agency produced ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) free satellites, with no limitations on exports, and those were easier to purchase or incorporate into satellites for non-U.S. based companies. As such, Weinstein sees export controls as a tool that can slow the development of a certain product or technology, but not necessarily stop it.

Weinstein then shifted to discussing these concepts in the context of artificial intelligence (AI), with a focus on data, algorithms, and computing. Her assessment is that when applied to AI, export control is impossible as data is ubiquitous and readily accessible. This is the case because algorithms and software are often developed open source, which makes efforts to control them ineffective. On the hardware side, Weinstein notes that export controls can be used for advanced chips (a specific subset can be controlled), and that will have some effect, but overall, it cannot stop China from innovating.

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there have been conversations about how sanctions and export controls to Russia could work against China. For Weinstein, multilateral export control over Russia could be built into something more durable and be applied to China, but more importantly, they would have to be modernized as current export control agreements were set up for the Cold War to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not technologies. In addition, they are not set up to use export controls for end users, they can only control specific types of technology. Unilateral regimes do have a place, but are often ineffective and sometimes counterproductive, as seen in the satellite example, which is why Weinstein recommends constructing a multilateral regime. To have an impact, such an arrangement must be set up earlier than later, to help as a deterrent, as well as a capacity limiting tool in the event of an invasion.

By Gabriel Savagner, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative and M.A. Candidate, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University.

Shedding Taiwan’s ‘Invisibility Cloak’: Global and Regional Prospects 

Asia Report #57 | January 19, 2022

United Nations Resolution 2758 seating the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the UN passed its 50th anniversary in 2021. Fifty years on, China continues its campaign to influence the diplomatic relations and international recognition of Taiwan. While the PRC’s UN seat is undisputed, the deleterious impact of Taiwan’s exclusion from multilateral organizations and constraints on its global engagement became more than evident in a pandemic hit world. 

The Sigur Center for Asian Studies dedicated its final Roundtable of 2021 to unpack these concerns and discuss the implications. The discussants included keynote speaker, Liang-Yu Wang, Deputy Representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office-U.S., and panelists Pasha L. Hsieh, Associate Professor and Dean at Singapore Management University Yong Pung How School of Law, and Michael Mazza, Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The discussion was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center. 

 

Taiwan’s Pragmatic Approach and Resolution 2758 

Deputy Representative Liang-Yu Wang framed her remarks highlighting the need to overcome Taiwan’s current limited international participation. She pointed out how the unprecedented global health crisis has eclipsed other concerns and triggered an even higher level of global connectivity. Indeed, Taiwan has proven its vital role in supporting other nations and successfully managing the virus itself. She noted that U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken acknowledged Taiwan’s participation in COVID relief was pragmatic, not political and that the G7 foreign ministers support Taiwan’s presence in the World Health Organization (WHO) and World Health Assembly (WHA).

Despite its enviable example of public health management, Wang deplored Taiwan’s continued lack of meaningful participation in the UN and access to UN venues. She cited two methods that China uses to block Taiwan from entering international space. One, that China imposes political pressure on UN member states and other international organizations, and two, that China fabricates a legal basis of exclusion via intentionally misinterpreting Resolution 2758. 

Wang concluded by emphasizing that like-minded nations who share values with Taiwan should work together to end Taiwan’s discrimination from the UN. She criticized China for being a gatekeeper and pointed to the secret Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2005 between the UN and China which mandated that the PRC must approve of any Taiwanese participation in UN activities. Wang closed her remarks by reiterating that Taiwan has demonstrated responsibility and pragmaticism in their diplomatic relations. She complimented the success of the U.S.- launched Taiwan Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) Program, and development of GCTF 2022. 

 

Recognition and Taiwan’s Participation in Economic Agreements

Pasha L. Hsieh opened his comments by making the distinction between the legal and political concepts of recognition. The variable criteria for recognition is its largest obstacle in joining economic agreements. In international law, Chinese representation is only existent through the PRC’s seat in the UN under Resolution 2758. Taiwan also faces a state recognition issue under the provisions of the 1933 Montevideo Convention. As of December 2021, 15 countries recognize Taiwan as a state. The political concept expands on recognition as a gradual process, and recognition can exist within spaces of non-recognition. This complicates the legal binary of total inclusion or exclusion. 

Hsieh went on to detail Taiwan’s Free Trade Agreements (FTA), Bilateral investment agreements (BIA), and relations with the U.S. and European Union (EU). In general, Taiwan holds a sparse number of FTAs, and failed in closing an agreement with Mainland China. It enjoys a greater number of BIAs, especially in Asia and America. At present, Taiwan is blocked from the economically significant Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) since membership require unanimous votes, and the PRC holds membership. Both Taiwan and China have applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific (CPTPP). 

Hsieh closed his presentation by pointing to a hopeful future for Taiwan’s bilateral relations with the EU and U.S. On the former, he noted the juxtaposition of the freeze on the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), and the EU’s prioritization of a potential BIA with Taiwan. On U.S.-Taiwan relations, he saw the possibility of some promising developments within a new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in 2022. 

 

Righting a Wrong: Taiwan, the United Nations, and United States Policy

Michael Mazza elaborated on Wang’s comments regarding China’s misinterpretation of Resolution 2758, and further argued for a recalibration in U.S. policy towards Taiwan’s engagement in the UN. He asserts that U.S. policy makers are not treating the promotion of Taiwan’s participation in the UN system as a negotiation with China as they should be doing. 

To address the core of the issue—the legality of Resolution 2758 itself, Mazza showed that the initial expulsion of Chiang Kai-Shek’s representative was not sound, and the Republic of China (ROC) was not actually expelled when the PRC was seated. Rather, the resolution was made under the impression that China had simply changed its name, and that the PRC now represented total Chinese interest at the UN table. Indeed, according to Mazza China has created a false history of UN-backed Taiwan exclusion. It ignored the fact that the PRC and ROC have distinct international legal personalities. This has been exacerbated by statements from Ban Ki-Moon and Kofi Annan, who perpetuated the artificial narrative of prohibition.

In fact, there is no formal determination on the status of Taiwan. Mazza continues by designating three “baskets” of logic as to why Taiwan should be active in the UN. Firstly, he restated the importance of world connectivity, and commends Taiwan for demonstrating its importance in several sectors and contributions to the world economy. Thus, it would be more beneficial for organization such as the WHO to include Taiwan based on their organizational purpose. Second, he claimed that Taiwan’s participation is consistent with both the Taiwan Relations Act and the U.S.’ One China Policy. Thirdly, that international law should be clarified and upheld by rectifying the continued misinterpretation. Otherwise, there would be no validity to international legal foundations such as the Montevideo Convention.  

Consequently, he stated that the U.S. needs a full-court press campaign for Taiwan’s full membership in the UN.  He explained that the U.S. would need long term commitment to this policy decision, and that its overall goal should be destigmatizing Taiwan in the diplomatic space. 

 

Prospects 

Shedding Taiwan’s “invisibility” cloak would demand a collaborative and sustained effort. Wang called on middle-level officials in IOs to maintain a neutral stance and safeguard the pragmaticism of international affairs. She also places her faith in the continued support of other democratic nations. Mazza advocated for the U.S. to publicize the true legal ramifications of Resolution 2758 and negotiate with Beijing on legal grounds rather than on shakier political terms. Hsieh saw the China-Taiwan issue as a matter of representation, not division. The EU and U.S. should continue to develop closer diplomatic and economic relations to Taiwan through positive outcomes within new economic frameworks. Taiwan and China are distinct, and they both represent a portion of Chinese interest. This nuance should be reflected accordingly in the international space.  

 

By Melynn Oliver, Project Assistant, Taiwan Studies Initiative, Sigur Center for Asian Studies. 

Digital Tech and “Hacking” the Pandemic: Learning from Taiwan’s Crisis Management and Beyond

Asia Report #56 | December 9, 2021

As an unprepared world reeled under the onslaught of the pandemic, Taiwan stood out for its early success in managing the spread of the virus. Taiwan continues to outperform other states in handling Covid-19, and a big reason is the way in which digital technology is being skillfully deployed for public health purposes within a demanding, vibrant democracy. How was Taiwan able to “hack” the pandemic and what does it suggest for the broader international community? 

To take up this question, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies convened a Roundtable featuring Taiwan’s Digital Minister Audrey Tang, and two leading experts, Chelsea Chou, Associate Professor in the Graduate Institute of National Development at National Taiwan University and Lorien Abroms, Professor at the Milken Institute School of Public Health, The George Washington University.  The event was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center. 

 

“Fast, Fair and Fun” Strategy

Audrey Tang, the trailblazing, youngest ever Taiwanese Digital Minister shared her insider account of how Taiwan “hacked” the pandemic. Tang introduced Taiwan’s three pronged Fast, Fair and Fun strategy, that has allowed Taiwan to counter the pandemic without complete and prolonged lockdowns. The first prong and the most important of the three, is a Fast response. Authorities began to screen people entering Taiwan from Wuhan on January 1, 2020, within 24 hours of news of the pandemic. The experience of MERS and SARS has not only fine-tuned Taiwan’s responses to epidemics but also found ways to quickly identify them. Taiwan’s reddit- the PTT, a purely academic forum with no shareholders or advertisers, was extremely useful for early detection according to the Minister.  This type of collective and crowd sourced intelligence is the underpinning of all policies and action by the ministry. Digital social innovation by working with the people rather than just for the people enabled social innovators to see not just the ‘what’ of the policy but also the ‘how’ and the ‘why’. 

The second prong is Fairness of the response, especially in the initial stages of the pandemic when masks were in short supply. Minister Tang explained how social technology and open API- gøv.tw, allowed for real time information. Throughout, privacy remained a salient feature of the responses even in the interest of contact tracing. This transparency encouraged the citizens and different ministries of the Taiwanese government to be more participatory in the whole process. The third and final prong- Fun was the most interesting of all and likely the most immediately adaptable in different countries, noted the discussants. This strategy promoted ‘Humor over Rumor’ and quickly dissipated conspiracy theories and misinformation in Taiwan. The mascot – a Shiba Inu (a once almost extinct dog that now thrives in Taiwan), was particularly effective in relaying messaging on handwashing, mask wearing and social distancing. 

 

What Do Public Surveys Show? 

Chelsea Chou introduced her academic statistical models that identified significance between these strategies of the Taiwanese government in quickly inculcating pandemic specific health habits in the population. She too observed that the government was not only able to control the number of infections in Taiwan, but was also able to maintain democratic principles throughout. She noted that the border controls, use of domestic travel QR codes and SMS to ensure that individuals do not break quarantine rules, significantly helped contain the spread. Moreover, she stressed the fact that the digitization of the Taiwanese National Health Insurance (NHI) database proved to be very useful to first responders. 

In Taiwan every citizen has a health insurance card which stores an individual’s medical history. Additionally, travel history information is now also integrated into this system. During the pandemic, this has served as a foundation for frontline workers to identify, trace and reach those who have Covid. Another important facet of the response as identified by Chou was the frequent press conferences held by the Central Epidemic Command Centre (CECC). Survey data collected by Chou reveals that there was highly significant positive relationship between those who watched the press conferences and those who practiced healthy habits such as regular hand washing, mask wearing and social distancing. 

Her data analysis also pointed to some challenges that the government may face such as maintaining the timelines of planning and evaluation of policies, as well as keeping the rate of infections low when Taiwan reopens its borders. As for the question of whether citizen support for strict Covid Zero policies is sustainable indefinitely, Chou acknowledges it is a potential challenge should there be more cases and Covid restrictions impact daily life in a way they have not so far. 

 

Lessons from Taiwan

Lorien Abroms relayed her takeaways from several years of research on digital communication technologies for health. She identified from her work on preventing diabetes, smoking and cervical cancer that WHO’s “Be Healthy, Be Mobile” initiative was successful because of certain key communication characteristics. She noted that messages must come to the user, communicate the threat, be engaging and consist of a few simple messages repeated often by a variety of trusted sources. She commended the Taiwanese government for adhering to these principles in their communication strategies that ultimately avoided loss of life in Taiwan. She noted in particular that the Shiba Inu campaign, use of influencers and celebrities in messaging, and the 222 campaign (responses within 20 minutes in 200 words with 2 images) were strategies that were highly successful, and possible models for the United States. 

The moderated Roundtable discussion that ensued laid emphasis on questions of privacy and use of health data in Taiwan’s pandemic responses. Minister Tang explained that the NHI has digitalized it’s health care system since 2003 and has a stellar record with respect to maintaining patient privacy. The data is accessed only by health care professionals, who leave a digital footprint when accessing whatever NHI data they access, making the system mutually accountable. These security networks have been vetted so that people do not have to suddenly depend and trust something new during a pandemic.  The Minister noted that similarly, other successful warning systems previously used for flash floods and earthquakes have been repurposed. 

 Abroms pointed out that in the case of the U.S., privacy barriers make it difficult to replicate this model, despite success of some university trials at the University of California of the same. She stressed that the foremost barrier is the absence of a national health system in the U.S. On the engagement strategies and communications front she noted the need for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to build the same trust with the American public as authorities in Taiwan have done. 

 

Prospects

The government of Taiwan has crowd sourced innovation, maintained transparency and has had high success in preventing the spread of Covid-19. By being accessible and in touch with the people’s needs and modifying responses accordingly, it has built a track record of trust. In the process, it also demonstrated the usefulness of technology in promoting democratic values. It remains to be seen now with increasing vaccinations, emerging variants and the opening up of borders, how innovative digital oversight mechanisms will continue to succeed. 

 

By Medha Prasanna, M.A. Candidate in International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, and RPI Affiliate. 

 

Democracy’s Digital Future: Lessons from Taiwan

Asia Report #55 | September 30, 2021

Taiwan is a leader in considering how technology can promote democratic principles, a question that democracies around the world are currently grappling with. The pandemic has only intensified the digitization of Taiwan’s democracy. How is Taiwan experimenting with innovative digital oversight mechanisms? What does its civic tech communities and digital ecosystem look like? And importantly, what does Taiwan’s performance tell us about possible pathways to a digitized democratic future for others?

To answer these questions, the Sigur Center’s Taiwan roundtable featured a leading panel of experts, including Puma Shen, Assistant Professor at National Taipei University, Taiwan; Mei-Chun Lee, Postdoc Researcher, Research Institute for the Humanities and Social Science, National Taiwan University & Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan; and Melissa Newcomb, Senior Program Manager for the Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China Illiberal Influence programs at the National Democratic Institute. The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at The George Washington University. 

How to Categorize and Respond to China’s Disinformation Campaigns

Puma Shen opened the conversation by discussing how to categorize and respond to disinformation campaigns by China in Taiwan. In examining the general disinformation campaign, he explained, there are certain points that should be addressed. First, there must be adversaries that operate either intentionally or recklessly. Second, the information must be misleading. Third, we must examine the channels that spread disinformation and fourth, people must truly believe the information, which means the impact is significant. In thinking about how to counter disinformation in Taiwan, Shen has four guidelines to decide which approach to apply. The first is finding the footprint and focusing on the adversaries, especially if it is coming from China—the biggest threat to Taiwan. Second, focusing on the content, he warns, can complicate the process because there are lots of fake posts. Third, governments can focus on specific channels like Facebook and Twitter, which allows them to concentrate on behavior. Lastly, the victim orientation approach can be used to identify which type of people are most vulnerable. 

Originally, Chinese adversaries circulated rumors face-to-face, but YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and a multiplicity of discussion forums online spread information differently than how it spreads offline. The Central Committee of the Communist Party in China organizes disinformation both online and offline to initiate attacks, so current information studies tend to specify the information’s origins. Messages are spread by the Chinese state and circulated by anonymous fan pages. However, we should be vigilant about the type of attack involved, as in the case Shen disclosed, too many similar messages produced by authentic accounts is often the anomaly, instead of the origins of sources themselves. 

There are three types of investment that China makes in disinformation campaigns. First, the foreign actors could directly donate; for example, local newspapers could have connections to foreign actors in China. Second, Chinese actors could invest in domains not related to this information, such as the gaming industry, to spread disinformation. Third, foreign actors pay those on social media to disseminate articles that favor them. After an appropriate investigation, transparency is key to inform the public if information has been compromised. In order to combat those vulnerable to disinformation, such as young people or those who are apolitical, debunking is very important. Resistance to stronger regulations and further disclosure from social platforms give Taiwan and other countries little leverage over China, so exploring more innovative policy options and building cross country policy consensus is necessary for making substantial negotiation between governments and social platforms possible. 

The Taiwanese model does not formally involve cooperation between the government and civil society, but rather a decoupling framework that generates the framework of trust. While Shen advises civil society to keep its distance, Mei-Chun Lee, on the other hand, believes that cooperation between government and civil society should depend on the topic. When fighting COVID-19, collaboration is necessary. But in terms of combatting disinformation, the government acting as the authority of trust is more complicated, which is when civil society can keep adequate distance from the government to balance the dynamic of power. Lee describes civil society as neither collaborative or resistant but “parasitic,” working together when necessary and pushing back against the government when needs are not being met.

How Civic Tech Fights COVID-19 and Infodemic: Taiwan’s Case

Mei-Chun Lee revealed how civic tech is being used to fight COVID-19 and infodemics in Taiwan. The term “civic tech,” which became popular in Taiwan five years ago, is the process of using technology to promote social good. In Taiwan, civic tech is largely led by citizens instead of the government. An example of civic tech in Taiwan is Gov-Zero, one of the largest civic tech communities around the world, comprising thousands of participants including tech people, activists, designers, NGO workers, civil servants, and researchers. Audrey Tang, Digital Minister of Taiwan, was a participant in Gov-Zero before she entered the Taiwanese government. Through Gov-Zero, people participated in monthly “hackathons,” joining task forces to build various tech projects focused on current issues as diverse as supervising the government to environmental protection to gender equality through a grassroots approach to activism. Lee defines “hackers” in this case as people willing to use various technologies to fix societal problems as against our usual characterization of hackers as rogue actors. 

Lee explained how the motto “I am nobody” is a code to action in Taiwan, transforming citizens from bystanders to activists. Civic tech is especially active when crises occur. For instance, during COVID-19, civic tech has forged face mask maps, allowing citizens to check where to buy masks, cofacts, a crowd-sourced rumor reporting and fact-checking platform, and SMS contact tracing. It’s important, Lee noted, to remember that this is not a long-term solution, but a new and creative way to provide quick responses to society’s immediate needs. Trust and community are the main drivers behind civic tech, equipping citizens with new technologies to fight for democracy.

Taiwan and Democracy in a Digital Age

Lastly, Melissa Newcomb discussed the National Democratic Institute (NDI)’s role in promoting democracy in Taiwan in a digital age. In 2020, recognizing that Taiwan’s democracy is a model for other nations, the NDI opened a regional office in Taiwan. With the Open Government Partnership, NDI has worked with the civic tech community in Taiwan to pursue radical transparency in government. Taiwan announced its own Open Government National Action Plan in 2019. What is remarkable about Taiwan’s digital democracy is that it is a whole-of-society approach under the shadow of China: the executive branch, legislative branch, civic tech, civil society, and individuals. Other democracies like the U.S. can learn from Taiwan’s transformation in areas such as improving access to high-speed internet in rural areas, digital and media literacy campaigns, information consensus building, protecting citizens’ personal data, and examining private sector surveillance.   

Taiwan has borne the brunt of China’s disinformation campaigns. As China’s sharp power grows globally and other illiberal actors increasingly resort to disinformation tactics, democracies around the world could look for lessons from Taiwan’s experience and its innovative responses within a strongly democratic digital context. 

By Lily LaMattina, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative

Democracy in Action: Past and Present Movements in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Myanmar

Asia Report #54 | August 5, 2021

The recent reversal of fortunes for democracy movements in Asia, particularly in Hong Kong and Myanmar, stands in contrast to an earlier highly successful campaign for political liberalization in Taiwan. The ongoing democratic crisis in the region warrants a closer comparison of these three movements, and what parallels and differences may be found. The role of young activists and use of media as a tool of mobilization seem to hold across cases but the geopolitical context has dramatically changed with the rise of China and its increasingly assertive behavior. How do democratic prospects look?

To delve into these questions, the Sigur Center’s recent Taiwan Roundtable featured a panel of leading experts including Michael Hsiao, Chairman of the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation, Kharis Templeman, Program Manager of Stanford University’s Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific, Christina Fink, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, and Shirley Lin, Compton Visiting Professor in World Politics at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs.

Michael Hsiao, a close observer of the events, led off the discussion by highlighting the four principal outlets of opposition employed by Taiwan’s democracy movement prior to 1987. First, local elections provided a means of establishing a credible opposition to Kuomintang (KMT) rule through participation in local political processes. Second, a limited number of liberal intellectuals operating within the KMT party apparatus, coupled with vocal opposition from religious organizations, advanced the early democracy movement’s aims through institutional means as well as civil society. Third and critically, “Dangwai Opposition” books and magazines published throughout the 1970s and 1980s provided an outlet for criticism of the KMT regime along with fruitful discussion of Taiwan’s political future. Lastly, three waves of grassroots social reform movements throughout the 80s reflected increased awareness and participation among liberal members of a burgeoning middle class. Moreover, Hsiao stressed the leading role of young activist intellectuals in the authoring of “Dangwai Opposition” publications due in part to a political climate that inhibited participation by those within established academic circles.

Building upon the discussion of Taiwan’s democratic struggle, Kharis Templeman noted that the principal point of contention driving the movement in Hong Kong is the means by which the government is selected. Despite a guarantee under the Basic Law that both the chief executive and the legislature would be selected through free elections in which all citizens were permitted to participate, indirect and illiberal mechanisms such as “functional constituencies” as well as an electoral college sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s priorities were instituted subsequent to 1997. The pendulum swung between reform and repression until Beijing’s unilateral imposition of a national security law subsequent to the 2020 presidential election which provided supposed legal justification for the arrests of protest leaders and political candidates in the democratic camp, along with the targeting of independent media outlets such as Apple Daily. This, for Templeman, represents a body blow to the One Country, Two Systems policy.

While Templeman sees numerous parallels between Hong Kong’s democracy movement and that of Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s, he contends that politically, “the tape is running backwards.” While Hong Kong initially enjoyed greater freedoms similar to the later stages of Taiwan’s movement, Hong Kong now more closely resembles Taiwan’s political systems circa 1975. Templeman sees the reasons for the Taiwanese movement’s success as threefold. First, the KMT regime’s idea of “Free China” was supposed to be “Democratic China.” Second, the KMT regime suffered a progressive loss of legitimacy within the international community. Third, and arguably of greatest importance, was the KMT’s vulnerability to pressure from the United States.

Conversely, Templeman presented five principal factors that have contributed to the foundering of Hong Kong’s democracy movement. First, shifting geopolitical terrain presents far greater challenges than those previously confronted by Taiwan. Second, the significance of mass protests relative to the attitudes of CCP officials in Beijing has decreased dramatically. Third, western influence over Beijing, particularly that of the United States, has waned. Fourth, a hard line Xi Jinping is far less willing to tolerate political action independent of the CCP. Finally, Xi has exhibited a willingness to sacrifice the Party’s credibility and image in order to impose greater control over Hong Kong.

Christina Fink, in addressing the roots of Myanmar’s democracy movement, identified two primary historical struggles that have defined the post-independence period: democracy and federalism. While a brief interlude beginning in 2011 allowed for greater investment in democratic institutions and social services, the period of military rule was marked by both non-violent struggle as well as armed resistance among those residing in Myanmar’s ethnic nationality areas. Thus, Fink notes a widespread sense that the military regime must be stripped of its political power, secured through the February 1, 2021 coup, in order to preserve the gains made during the brief period of liberalization.

Spearheading this effort were members of Gen Z, who sought to ignite a Spring Revolution which would aid in eradicating military influence from political processes. This activism among the nation’s youth was complemented by a civil disobedience movement comprised of government and private sector employees who ceased carrying out their duties to convey their refusal to aid in preserving the regime’s power. Moreover, select members of both the Gen Z and civil disobedience coalitions have joined ethnic armed groups in waging a campaign of violent resistance. This embrace of force as an arrow in the quiver of the democracy movement has been sanctioned by the parallel National Unity government, thus leading to the proliferation of People’s Defense Forces throughout the country.

Fink went on to note the central role played by social media in organizing the largely decentralized movement, as well as exposing individuals who have aided the regime through a controversial practice Gen Z activists term “social punishment.” The military’s response to the various protest movements has come in the form of halting their access to funds, material goods and information, with the latter resulting in the widespread targeting of media outlets.

Shirley Lin framed the discussion with key questions related to sustainability of the movements, generational attitude shifts, the nature of democratic values pursued, and the impact of the external security environment as a permissive or constrictive condition. Pointing to the involvement of young people in all three cases, Lin asked how the views of older generation and Gen Z on democratization stack up, and what the experience from Taiwan foretells about the ability of movements to sustain the democratic momentum. Lin concludes that despite the democratic backsliding and difficult geopolitical context, she remains hopeful thanks to the huge involvement and commitment of youth.

By Ben Briedman, Rising Powers Initiative Research Affiliate, Elliott School of International Affairs.

The Biden Administration’s Approach to Asia and Views on Taiwan

Asia Report #53 | July 26, 2021

The Biden administration’s first few months have laid to rest any claims that its foreign policy agenda will take a backseat to domestic priorities. Important questions regarding the role of Taiwan in a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific as it relates to force posture, economic ties and a broader strategic vision, have also begun to be answered in these early days. What have we learned already about how the Biden team views Taiwan strategically and economically? What are the prospects of cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally? How does Taiwan fit into the administration’s overarching framework within the region?

To address these questions, the Sigur Center’s recent Taiwan Roundtable featured a panel of leading experts including Derek Grossman, senior defense analyst at the Rand Corporation, Barbara Weisel, managing director at Rock Creek Global Advisors, and Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University.

Defense Strategy

Derek Grossman led off the discussion by highlighting recent developments in the Taiwan Strait. Subsequent to President Tsai ing-wen’s election in 2016, China has escalated military pressure against the island, most notably through a considerable increase in the number of Chinese warplanes entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. The Biden administration’s seemingly staunch commitment to deterrence against Beijing can be seen in immediate steps such as ordering the transiting of the Taiwan Strait by American warships at least four separate times following the President’s inauguration, along with maintaining the Trump administration’s policy of terminating self-imposed limits on contacts with Taiwan, inviting the island’s de facto ambassador to the inauguration and issuing a joint statement with G7 partners calling for Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization as well as the World Health Assembly.

Moreover, having now assessed that Chinese capabilities have become too significant to stave off a cross-strait invasion, Taiwan has developed what it terms the Overall Defense Concept, which prioritizes the conservation of resources, procurement of asymmetric technologies such as anti-ship cruise missiles and sea mines, as well as engaging in combat near littorals and on its beaches if necessary. Of primary concern for the Biden team is determining how best to integrate into this operational concept.

Finally, Grossman contends that the most prudent approach for the new administration is to reinforce the Overall Defense Concept, most notably through arms sales, due to the fact that it takes the island’s geographical position into account and preserves its conventional arms for that point at which they can be most effective.

Economic Ties and the prospect of a Free Trade Agreement

Building upon the discussion of the current security dynamic, Barbara Weisel noted that despite two-way trade between the U.S. and Taiwan totaling $106 billion the previous year, calls for deepening their economic relationship have seen a marked increase as both seek to reduce their dependence on Chinese markets and diversify their respective trading partners. As the single largest manufacturer of sophisticated semiconductors, Taiwan has taken on an especially critical role for U.S. companies.

Moreover, advocates of a free trade agreement in Taiwan have intensified their calls for negotiations in recent years not only due to heightened regional tensions and a renewed emphasis on diversification, but also a fear of collective economic security agreements such as the recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) failing to adequately take the island’s interests into account.

While Weisel sees a plethora of opportunities for heightened cooperation, she notes three principal factors that make the launching of FTA negotiations unlikely. First, the Biden administration has made it abundantly clear that combating the COVID pandemic, climate change and infrastructure will take precedence over trade agreements. Second, in the event that the administration made the decision to dedicate energy and political capital to negotiations, it is unclear whether it would pursue bilateral agreements, sectoral agreements or a broader regional approach. Finally, the looming expiration of trade promotion authority would require a new authorization or Congressional assent to any agreement in its entirety.

With these hurdles in mind, Weisel asserts that policymakers must instead look to additional areas of potential cooperation through three existing work streams: The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement led by USTR which aids in producing policy alignment in APEC as well as the WTO, the U.S. – Taiwan Economic Prosperity Dialogue led by the State Department, which addresses issue areas such as 5G and telecommunications supply chains, and the Commerce Department’s responsibility for establishing standards.

Broader Foreign Policy Strategy and the Future

In spite of heightened polarization within the U.S. domestic political arena, Robert Sutter asserts that the Biden team has largely continued the previous administration’s weakening of the One China policy in favor of increased support for Taiwan. He identifies three key “drivers” that have contributed to this relative continuity. First, China’s heightened military, diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan has prompted a U.S. policy that actively seeks to derail such efforts and preserve the status quo. Second, Taiwan’s strategic geographic position and role within the region, along with its thriving high technology industry, elevates its importance for policymakers seeking to counter China’s increasingly aggressive behavior. Lastly, Taiwan’s liberal political system and economy, along with its support for international norms, are seen by U.S. leaders as powerful tools in their efforts to halt the proliferation of the strain of authoritarianism championed by China.

While this shift in U.S. policy presents the potential for heightened tensions in the diplomatic and security realms, with the latter playing out most clearly in the Taiwan Straits, Sutter presents two principal reasons why the relationship is not likely to deteriorate to the point of armed conflict. First, China has consistently demonstrated a reluctance to confront the United States in ways that would give rise to military force being employed out of a concern for domestic priorities, adverse economic consequences and vulnerabilities along the rim of Asia. Second, China’s ambitions as it relates to internal development require continued economic and high technology interchange with the United States.

Taking these competing factors into account, Sutter argues for continuing to abide by a broad interpretation of the One China policy in order to prevent a potential crisis and allow for a progressive strengthening of the U.S. – Taiwan relationship.

By Ben Briedman, Rising Powers Initiative Research Affiliate, Elliott School of International Affairs.

Indo-Pacific Partnerships and Taiwan

Asia Report #51 | February 2021

Read the PDF version of this report.

The Indo-Pacific is the most critical region today for global prosperity and security. As the region continues in a state of flux, pivotal countries in the region – including India, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand – are recognizing the opportunities Taiwan offers as a partner while being challenged by the difficulty to improve relations with Taipei without angering Beijing. To explore the prospects of Indo-Pacific partnership, the Sigur Center of Asian Studies gathered a panel of leading experts to discuss how cross-strait relations interact with the diplomacy of pivotal Indo-Pacific states.

This Asia Report presents insights on Indo-Pacific partnership from Sana Hashmi, Taiwan Fellow of the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, Jennifer Chang, Research Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute in Washington, and Mike Mochizuki, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at The George Washington University.

Potential Engagement with India

Hashmi suggested that India-Taiwan relationship is underutilized but has much room for improvement under Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. Although Taiwan’s handling of the pandemic and the rising tensions between China and India have elevated Indian domestic discourse in favor of Taiwan, the scale of existing India-Taiwan cooperation remains minimal compared to Taiwan’s relationship with Japan and ASEAN states.

Since the initiation of New Southbound Policy under the President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan started to improve its relations with South Asian states, but interactions between the India and Taiwan are limited. If Taiwan wants to further engage with the stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific, India needs to be at the core of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. President Tsai has stated that the New Southbound Policy is complementary to Washington’s commitment of a free and open Indo-Pacific, thus focusing on cooperation with India would bring Taiwan greater visibility and credibility in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, Hashmi also pointed out that a main challenge to closer India-Taiwan relations is the lack of reciprocity from New Delhi, who remains restricted by its adherence to the One China Policy. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi initiated some symbolic steps – for instance, inviting Taiwan’s top diplomat in India, Tien Chung-kwang, to his swearing-in ceremony in 2014 – but the momentum slowed when China began to oppose the increasing level of official interaction between India and Taiwan, especially the visit of an all-women parliamentary delegation from Taiwan in 2017.

Even though the Galwan Valley clashes along the India-China border in 2020 have led to India’s elevated engagement in the quadrilateral security dialogue with the U.S., Japan and Australia, New Delhi should be cautious in rethinking Indian policy toward China and Taiwan. In particular, Hashmi believed that India and Taiwan should initiate and deepen economic and political interactions while not rushing to establish advanced relations like robust defense ties. For example, the economies of India and Taiwan are complementary and this could be utilized more effectively. The bilateral tensions between Beijing and New Delhi have generated a widening gap in foreign investment, which could be filled by more economic cooperation between India and Taiwan.

Australia and New Zealand under Pressure

Amid recent economic and diplomatic pressures from China, Chang argued that Taiwan’s relations with Australia and New Zealand are significant for uniting regional democracies to deter Chinese expansionism. Both countries have been long time supporters of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization and other international organizations that do not require statehood, but recent tensions between Australia and China have reduced the willingness of both Australia and New Zealand in taking immediate steps to improve relations with Taiwan.

In line with U.S. positions on regional issues, Australia and New Zealand have restricted the installation of Chinese 5G equipment, spoken out against human rights issues in Xinjiang, and voiced support for pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong. Although Beijing has retaliated against both countries, tensions between Australia and China are exceptionally high due to Canberra’s rhetoric on Beijing’s apparent responsibility in causing the pandemic. Over the past year, China has slapped tariffs on $20 billion worth of Australian agricultural exports, which has been a huge blow to Australia’s export economy since China is its largest trade partner. In November 2020, the Chinese Embassy in Australia revealed a list of 14 grievances – including all of the sensitive issue topics from the banning of Chinese 5G technology to Canberra’s statements on the South China Sea – and argued that Australia has to change its policies on the list for bilateral relations to improve.

Given the current level of tensions between Australia and China, Chang believed that it would be difficult for Canberra to make any substantive policy changes regarding relations with Taiwan. Beijing is clearly exerting tremendous pressure to teach Canberra a lesson while sending a message to other U.S. allies and partners in the region that China will utilize various tools and tactics to achieve its objectives. Nevertheless, Taiwan has expressed solidarity by supporting a campaign organized by the Inter-Parliamentarian Alliance on China to purchase Australian wine. Taiwan empathizes with what Australia has to deal with not only because they’re both targets of Chinese pressure, but also because Taipei wants Australian support for its own struggles against China.

Japan’s Diplomatic Success

In contrast to India, Australia, and New Zealand, Mochizuki showed that by pursuing a policy of separating politics and economics, Japan has successfully established closer engagements with Taiwan without tarnishing relations with China. As a backdrop, Mochizuki highlighted four important positive developments between Japan and Taiwan. First, there has been a long-standing trend of positive mutual perceptions between the people of Japan and Taiwan. For instance, a 2018 survey in Taiwan stated that 59% of the respondents prefer Japan as the country they like the most. Similarly, a 2019 survey in Japan showed that 55% of the Japanese have the feeling of greatest affinity towards Taiwan out of all Asian countries. Second, the economic relationship between Japan and Taiwan have become tighter over the years as bilateral trade remain robust. In the last decade, they have signed a number of bilateral economic agreements that cover the areas of investment, e-commerce taxation, customs cooperation, and agricultural products.

In addition to public perception and economic relations, a third type of positive engagement between Japan and Taiwan is the incremental upgrading of diplomatic interactions. Over the last decade, there has been a gradual elevation in official interactions between Japan and Taiwan, the most notable of which include Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Tsai sending each other congratulatory notes after their electoral victories, the visit to Taiwan by Japan’s incumbent Vice Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Jiro Akama, as well as the visit of former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori after former Taiwanese President Li Teng-hui had passed away. Finally, the fourth area of positive interactions is that two sides have managed well potential contentious issues, including territorial disputes over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands, Japan’s claim of exclusive economic zone, and the legacy of sexual slavery during World War II.

Over the years, Tokyo has been able to advance bilateral relations with Taiwan while adhering to the One China policy and avoiding serious diplomatic tensions with Beijing. However, Mochizuki also suggested that security issues in the region, especially the possibility of cross-strait military conflict, is one of the most sensitive diplomatic issues for Japan and a crucial factor determining Japanese policy toward China and Taiwan. While many in Japan would prefer the status quo of cross-strait separation, Tokyo has not made an explicit and formal commitment to Taiwan’s defense and has been ambiguous about whether or not Japan would support the U.S. and Taiwan in a cross-strait military conflict. Although some hardliners in Japan would prefer Tokyo moving away from strategic ambiguity, Mochizuki believed that there is not enough support in Japan to push toward strategic clarity in terms of the defense of Taiwan, given Tokyo’s current interest in stabilizing relations with China.

Prospects of Indo-Pacific Partnership

Considering the future of India-Taiwan partnership, Hashmi concluded that the participation of Taiwan is necessary for the establishment of an open, rule-based, and inclusive order in the Indo-Pacific, especially after seeing its success in handling the pandemic. Taiwan shares the values and interests of the stakeholders of the region, thus not engaging with Taiwan would be a missed opportunity for India and a loss for both. As long as India and Taiwan remain cautious by following the example of Japan, it is possible for the relationship to move forward without impacting their ties with China.

Despite the pressure from Beijing, Chang suggested that closer economic relations could be one promising area of cooperation between Australia and Taiwan. As Canberra looks for alternate markets for Australian exports, it could enhance bilateral trade with Taiwan. However, Chang also noted that there seems to be no desire on Australia’s part to negotiate a free trade agreement with Taiwan because Canberra’s priority at the moment is to prevent further tensions with Beijing. Moreover, Chang saw the possibility of additional pressure to uphold U.S. interests in the region under the Biden administration, which would make Australia’s position between China and the U.S. even more difficult.

Among the pivotal states of the Indo-Pacific, Japan saw the most success in managing relations with China and Taiwan, but it would be difficult for the relationship with Taiwan to advance much further. Mochizuki believed that Japan is currently in an optimal position and Tokyo will be motivated to preserve the benefits from existing policies. Paradoxically, any deepening of regional partnership with Taiwan or any additional international space for Taiwan would require the improvement of U.S.-China and cross-strait relations. However, since the issue of Taiwan is key to the rivalry between the U.S. and China, Mochizuki expected Washington to put more pressure on Japan to play a more prominent role in U.S. military strategies against China as the rivalry intensifies, which would create one of the greatest diplomatic challenges for Japan.

By Dennis Yuen Li, Ph.D. Candidate, The George Washington University and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

The 2020 US Election Results and Implications for Taiwan

Asia Report #50 | December 2020

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Just as the transition from President Barack Obama to President Donald Trump marked a significant change in policy towards Taiwan, so too might the transition to President Joe Biden. Against the greater backdrop of China’s rise and great power competition, this relationship is one of strategic importance to both countries. The Sigur Center welcomed a panel of experts to speak on US-Taiwan relations and their predictions for the Biden administration: Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at GWU; Sarah Trister, Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Edward Markey; Hung-jen Wang, Associate Professor at National Cheng Kung University in Tainan; and Lev Nachman, Visiting Scholar at National Taiwan University in Taipei. A recording of the event can be found on YouTube.

Overall, the panelists were cautiously optimistic the new administration will continue to strengthen America’s relationship with Taiwan. However, they warned Biden is likely to take a more conciliatory approach with China. Taiwan maintains strong bipartisan support in Congress which can bolster any favorable actions or counter any unfavorable actions by the new administration. In order to move U.S. interests forward in the Indo-Pacific while concurrently challenging China, the United States should promote multilateralism, democratic values, alliances, and regional cooperation, all of which favor Taiwan’s own position.

Continuity versus Shift in Perspective

Sutter noted how Trump broke from the previous US foreign policy trend of trying to avoid provoking China, and instead turned to an antagonistic China policy predicated on maintaining U.S. might. The Trump administration’s posture towards Taiwan was one of strong friendship and vocal praise, at times seemingly transactional, for example with good-will action towards Taiwan spurred by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s push in the South China Sea. Trump’s continued support also provided Taiwan with greater international political clout to push back against Beijing while bolstering U.S. presence in the region. Sutter suggests Biden will likely break from such a tit for tat geopolitically competitive approach and move to a policy based on pursuing economic security.

Taiwan has established itself as a valuable member of the global community, successfully managing its own affairs despite the overshadowing might of China across the Strait. President Tsai Ing-wen has received kudos for her handling of the pandemic, with less than 800 cases since March. Furthermore, Sutter points out that Taiwan is a vital actor in ensuring supply chain security and promoting democracy in the Indo-Pacific, two overarching goals of the Biden administration. As Nachman notes, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TMSC) became the ninth largest company in the world during 2020, largely in part due to an international move away from China’s Huawei and ZTE under the Trump administration.

To avoid losing Taiwan’s confidence from a perceived lack of importance, Biden should continue to pursue a special relationship with the same zeal as the previous administration. According to Hung-jen Wang, polls showed the general public in Taiwan is fearful of what Biden’s victory might mean for their security in the region. Sutter notes that several key Obama Asian foreign policy experts are returning as veterans for Biden and have thus far signaled a possible continuation of Obama’s policies in which Taiwan was viewed as a separate issue from China and ultimately sidelined during attempts at reconciliation and appeasement of Beijing.

Commitments to Taiwan

Longstanding bipartisan support in Congress will help assuage Taiwan’s concern about potential neglect by the Biden administration. Trister notes that while Biden seems clear-eyed about the threat China poses, he also seems willing to work together to find common ground on issues like nuclear non-proliferation and climate change. This relationship could lead to Taiwan feeling vulnerable, which is why both chambers are committed to lending aid and support to Taiwan whenever possible. Congress passed a Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, one of the first pieces of legislation documenting U.S. commitment and cementing the special relationship between the two countries for the next four decades. Building on that momentum, Congress signed The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (Taipei Act) into law in 2020, which asserts the United States’ commitment to resisting any force oppressing or jeopardizing Taiwan.

The 2018 Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) is another signal of U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific. As Trister explained, the ARIA orients U.S. Asia policy around enhancing its presence in the region and committing to a free, open, and inclusive region predicated on a rules-based international order. Part of the Act details U.S. efforts for environmental conservation, arms control, North Korean sanctions, and dedication to alliances and commitments in the region, in all of which Taiwan is a key component. The ARIA also reaffirmed policy that the United States opposes any effort to change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific apart from a peacefully negotiated agreement, solidifying a continued U.S. presence and deterrent against China for the foreseeable future.

Lastly, China’s increasingly antagonistic actions are only strengthening Congressional and executive support for Taiwan. Sutter and Trister posit that while Biden may continue an Obama-era approach of not letting Chinese cyber thefts and South China Sea activity directly affect the relationship with Taiwan, Congress is adamant that Taiwan remains a priority. China’s meddling in Taiwan’s elections this year as well as military flyovers and increased naval activity in the Strait are strong justifications for drawing the two countries closer together. One outcome is the Taiwan Fellowship Act, introduced in Congress in 2020 and currently up for debate in the House. Similar to the Mansfield Act, this legislation calls on the State Department to create a federal government exchange program with the government in Taiwan, demonstrating commitment while also opening channels for increased communication and awareness-building measures.

A Path Forward: Policy Considerations for the Biden Administration

Nachman argues that a concern for the Biden administration will be framing Taiwan-related actions in a way that does not antagonize Beijing, but instead strengthens Taiwan for its own sake. Taiwan’s Representative to the United States, Hsiao Bi-khim, has already spoken with Antony Blinken, Biden’s nominee for Secretary of State, exemplifying Taiwan’s strategic importance. However, as noted by Wang, the people of Taiwan are nervous about the extent to which the Biden administration will be conciliatory towards China and conversely, whether Taiwan may recede to the background. There was some consensus by the speakers that while Biden’s rhetoric towards China will be different from the sharp and direct criticism of Trump, the new administration’s actions should remain consistent as pro-Taiwan rhetoric for the sake of rhetoric will fall on deaf ears. Instead, Biden needs to make the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan, especially, a cornerstone of his administration’s foreign policy.

Trister argues that the Biden administration’s key goals must include regaining influence in international organizations. The Trump administration withdrew from organizations like the Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization, creating voids that China is able to fill and use to marginalize Taiwan. In Trister’s view, these will be key actions for Biden in his first 100 days; a failure to do so will lead to long battles to regain influence. If the United States is part of norm-setting bodies on trade, intellectual property, the cyber domain, and human rights, this influence can be used to raise Taiwan’s importance in the international community as a strategic partner. Sutter argues the Biden administration should reconsider a free trade agreement with Taiwan, an idea he acknowledged the Biden team has previously rebuffed. Codifying Taiwan’s importance in trade through an agreement will be a confidence-building measure in the US-Taiwan relationship.

Prospects

It is clear that Taiwan will have an increasingly important role to play under the Biden administration as great power competition with China continues to grow. While the Biden administration may take a more conciliatory tone towards China than the Trump presidency, it is important to continue the level of support and recognition offered to Taiwan under Trump. Otherwise, there could be lasting ramifications in the level of trust that Taiwan places in the United States under a Democratic administration. The panelists all agreed that the Biden team should strive to maintain the current trajectory in relations with Taiwan. To that end, the general conclusion was that any forward momentum, even if it means taking actions that antagonize Beijing, is preferable to neglecting Taiwan.

By Emilyn Tuomala, M.A. Candidate, Elliott School of International Affairs.

Cross-Strait Relations in Pandemic Times

Asia Report #49 | November 2020

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During the pandemic, China has been ratcheting up military pressure on Taiwan, leading to more cross-strait tension than ever and raising concerns about Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. Against the unsettled backdrop of COVID, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies held a roundtable of panelists to discuss U.S. security support to Taiwan, cross-strait military balance, Taiwanese attitudes toward China, as well as how these issues are influenced by deteriorating U.S.-China relations and November election results.

In this Asia Report, we present the answers to these questions from leading experts, including Elbridge Colby, co-founder of The Marathon Initiative and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, and Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of Political Science at Davidson College.

Taiwan’s Security and U.S. Policy

Elbridge Colby addressed the security challenges in Taiwan by illustrating the cross-strait military balance and explaining the considerations for U.S. assistance. Since the 2000s, China’s military threat to Taiwan became increasingly elevated as the cross-strait military balance shifted dramatically toward China, changing the ability of the U.S. to confidently defend Taiwan. Colby warned that the growth in both scale and sophistication of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cannot be underestimated and one should not discount the PLA’s capabilities even though they have not taken part in joint combat operations in the last few decades.

At the current level of cross-strait imbalance, China has a number of options to subordinate Taiwan. Colby predicted that economic sanctions and military coercion are less likely due to the perceived ineffectiveness of these strategies. However, military invasion, which is the most dangerous option, has become increasingly probable. In addition to cross-strait unification being a top political priority for Beijing, the growing coalition surrounding China – for instance, the deepening security cooperation of the Quad – would also motivate China to use the invasion of Taiwan as a signal of strength and resolve.

In response to China’s rising threat, the U.S. has elevated its support toward the security of Taiwan under the Trump administration, including the release of 2018 National Defense Strategy and the signaling of U.S. commitment to help Taiwan defend itself. Colby argued that the main security challenge for Taiwan is that its investment in defense has been lagging for years, whereas one goal of U.S. policy should be focusing on preparing Taiwan to defend itself against a Chinese attack; therefore, the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s decision to increase Taiwan’s defense spending is an encouraging policy change. With more resources, Taiwan would be able to procure vital defense systems, including coastal cruise missiles, sea mines, air defense systems, cyber resilience systems, and UAVs, thereby alleviating the cross-strait military imbalance.

In a worst case scenario, if a Chinese invasion were to occur, China will aim for a swift attempt to subordinate Taiwan. The main security goal for the U.S. and Taiwan should be to deny the PLA’s ability to land and its ability to consolidate a hold on Taiwanese territory. However, even if the landing denial was successful, China would still have the option of coercion through economic blockade and military bombardment. Facing such a scenario, Taiwan needs to increase its defense resilience by stockpiling key supplies and diversifying its economic reliance on the mainland. Colby expects that Beijing would recognize the determination of the U.S. coming to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an unprovoked attack, while he also noted that the broad support within the U.S. for defending Taiwan comes with the caveat of Taiwan not declaring its independence.

Politics in Taiwan and Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan’s increasing effort to invest in defensive resilience is closely related to dramatic changes in public attitudes toward China. Shelley Rigger explained how changing domestic politics in Taiwan has been shaping cross-strait relations. In recent years, there was a significant shift in the attitudes of Taiwanese people toward a direction that undermined Beijing’s political preferences but benefited Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and President Tsai Ing-wen.

The percentage of people in Taiwan identifying as Chinese has rapidly dwindled to almost none, whereas people identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese fell from 40% to 30%. Meanwhile, there has been a 10% increase in people identifying as Taiwanese only, representing almost 70% of the population, whereas favorability toward China sank to a new low at about 35%. Although Taiwanese support for immediate independence remains well below majority, the support for status quo now and independence in the future has been rising. Meanwhile, partisan affiliation with DPP increased to about 33% despite Taiwan’s historical tradition of not affiliating with either party. The DPP’s decisive victory in the January 2020 election clearly demonstrated the consequences of recent changes in Taiwanese public attitudes. After her reelection, President Tsai’s COVID response and her handling of cross-strait relations both contributed to her administration’s high level of approval ratings throughout 2020.

Rigger offered two main explanations for the recent changes in Taiwanese public attitudes. First, the positive features of cross-strait relations have been deteriorating. Economic opportunities in mainland China has long been the main counterbalance to the negative aspects of cross-strait relations. However, Beijing’s developmental policy of moving Chinese manufacturing up the value-chain – for example, deploying a vast amount of state resources to establish an indigenous semi-conductor industry – has generated pressure on Taiwanese companies and diminished the value of China’s economic opportunity from the perspective of Taiwanese investors.

Second, the negative features of cross-strait relations have been accumulating in the last two years. Chinese policies that undermined democracy and freedom in Hong Kong, as well as the initial outbreak of COVID in China both confirmed and consolidated Taiwan’s distrust toward mainland China. Moreover, the Taiwanese public sees the increasing level of military pressure from China as a sign of hostility. Compared to ten years ago, these negative and critical sentiments toward China are most prevalent among young people in Taiwan. Rigger concludes that the pressures from Beijing and the negative sentiments in Taiwan generated a negative feedback loop in recent years. Previous administrations in Taiwan were able to accommodate such feedback by seeking win-win opportunities with Beijing, but the acceleration of negative interaction in the last two years has made accommodation increasingly difficult.

Finally, Rigger suggested that the feedback between pressures from Beijing and negative sentiments in Taiwan also affected U.S.-Taiwan relations. Donald Trump’s China policy is the main reason behind his 53% favorability in Taiwan, whereas President Tsai’s lack of response to Secretary Pompeo’s recent quote of quote of “Taiwan has not been a part of China” has led to some criticism within her own party. Rigger commended President Tsai for insisting that Taiwan should not take sides in the U.S. election, but also anticipated that Pompeo’s quote may be an immediate challenge for the incoming Biden administration because both the U.S. and China understand that the dramatic policy shift implied by the quote is unrealistic.

Prospects for Taiwan’s Defensive Resilience

Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself is not only about the investment of military hardware, but also the Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight against a potential military attack from the mainland. According to Rigger, there is some uncertainty as to the level of Taiwanese people’s motivation to take military action. She suggested that fatigue from decades of cross-strait tension, coupled with people’s confidence that the consequences for military attack is too high for China, are factors challenging the necessary preparation for Taiwan’s defensive resilience. In response, the Tsai administration has been coordinating a top-down effort to spread awareness among the people, especially on encouraging the younger generation to join the military. Social media has played a key role in this regard. Moreover, Rigger also points out that Taiwanese people are extraordinarily motivated to defend what they perceive as the slightest threat to their democratic system from across the strait.

Colby agreed that President Tsai’s effort has generated positive impact on Taiwan’s preparation for defense resilience and advised that Taiwanese people should have a better understanding of U.S. assistance to Taiwan’s security. For the U.S., defending Taiwan is not a binary decision, in that there is considerable discretion in how the U.S. could assist Taiwan. For instance, if China decides to initiate a blockade and the U.S. perceives that Taiwan is anemic in response, the U.S. will still try to help Taiwan defend itself, but will also be less inclined to put service members at risk for relieving the blockade. Taiwan’s defensive resilience, therefore, not only improves its own capability against a potential military threat, but also affects the willingness of the U.S. to provide assistance.

By Dennis Yuen Li, Ph.D. Candidate, The George Washington University and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

Taiwan’s New Economic Prospects with the U.S. and Beyond

Asia Report #48 | November 2020

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2020 has given Taiwan unexpected opportunities for economic expansion and trade relations. A U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is gaining more momentum than ever. At the same time, the pandemic has exposed the vulnerability of global supply chains concentrated in China, which is expediting manufacturing migration, reshoring, and “decoupling” to various degrees. How is the bilateral FTA expected to progress? And how is Taiwan shaping up to be an important actor in the current shifting global economic climate?

To answer these questions, the Sigur Center’s Taiwan Roundtable featured Her Excellency Bi-khim Hsiao, Taiwan’s Representative to the U.S. at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative’s Office, with a panel of leading experts, including Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President of U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, and Ambassador Kurt Tong, former U.S. Ambassador for APEC and a Partner of The Asia Group, to explore the prospects of the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship and Taiwan’s future role in the global economy.

Progress in Economic Relations

Representative Hsiao led the discussion by highlighting recent developments in economic relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. In addition to being the 9th largest trading partner of the U.S., Taiwan is also the 7th largest importer of U.S. agricultural products. At the same time, bilateral investments have also been on the rise, as TSMC, a Taiwanese company that leads the world in semiconductor manufacturing, announced a 12 Billion dollar investment in Arizona, while Microsoft, Google, and Micron all made significant investments in Taiwan.

Moreover, bilateral economic relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan overcame a long-standing hurdle in August when President Tsai Ing-wen lifted market restrictions on the import of U.S. pork and beef. Despite accounting for a small percentage of bilateral trade, the import restrictions had been a persistent major stumbling block for closer economic relations, and its removal saw positive responses from the members of Congress and from business communities in both countries.

Finally, after the establishment of a new economic dialogue, the U.S. and Taiwan have signed a MOU for infrastructure financing while the two countries are engaging closely on new developments in the digital economy, medicine, and other supply chains. Representative Hsiao believes that Taiwan has a strong strategic imperative in pursuing a bilateral trade agreement for economic and political autonomy, as well as for national security, which are in line with U.S. interests, including the security of the Indo-Pacific region, the protection of technology supply chains, and the attraction of new investments into the American market.

Supply Chain Security and the Benefits of a Trade Agreement

With these shared interests in mind, Representative Hsiao emphasizes three main benefits of a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement: ensuring U.S. supply-chain security, establishing a framework for future agreements, and enhancing the security of Taiwan and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. First, given the current geostrategic context, a bilateral trade agreement will ensure that the supply chain of critical technologies – from information and communication technologies to medical devices – would flow directly between trusted and reliable partners. Second, a high quality comprehensive trade agreement can be seen as a model for future agreements for both countries by emphasizing fairness and reciprocity, as well as the protection of workers’ rights, the environment, and intellectual property. Finally, given Taiwan’s unique security considerations vis-a-vis China, a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement would reduce the country’s high degree of dependence on the Chinese market, thus enhancing the security of the country and the stability of Indo-Pacific region.

Rupert Hammond-Chambers echoes Representative Hsiao’s comments by explaining Taiwan’s crucial role in the global technology supply chain – especially in the production of semiconductors – and the importance of a trade agreement to address the supply chain vulnerabilities. Hammond-Chambers points out that while Taiwan’s security threat from China has made the global technology supply chain vulnerable, China is also highly reliant on the supply of Taiwanese semiconductors. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. ban on technology exports to certain Chinese companies has created a choke point in Huawei’s supply chain because TSMC had stopped doing business with the Chinese company. A U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement would strengthen strategically valuable Taiwanese companies like the TSMC, thus reducing the threat from China and alleviating the vulnerabilities of the technology supply chains. Moreover, the trade agreement could also be the first step in expanding the supply chains toward South or Southeast Asia, which would further mitigate the current global reliance on Chinese manufacturing.

Kurt Tong agrees that Taiwan is a center of value-added in the high technology sector as well as an important source of capital and trade in the Western Pacific. Although a U.S.-Taiwan bilateral trade agreement may not necessarily be a “free trade agreement” due to the potential political problems carried by such narrative, Tong sees the agreement as a comprehensive cross-sectoral agreement that benefits the U.S. from trade, geo-economic, and policy innovation perspectives. First, a trade agreement is likely to increase bilateral investment, thereby increasing productivity and employment in both countries. U.S. investment in Taiwan has room for improvement since currently it is only one seventh of U.S. investment in China. A higher level of bilateral investment with Taiwan will improve efficiency for both countries, which in turn increases economic production and creates new jobs.

Second, a trade agreement with Taiwan will be a major step for the U.S. to reestablish its economic presence in the Western Pacific. In the last few years, the U.S. has undermined its presence in the region by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It is in the interest of the U.S. to tie its economy more tightly to this fast-growing region, which will make the U.S. stronger and more competitive over the long run. The U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement is a feasible measure that would help restore momentum to U.S. trade and investment activities in the Western Pacific, allowing the U.S. to rebuild a greater presence in the region.

Finally, an agreement with Taiwan would also allow the U.S. to explore and experiment with innovations in trade policies. Taiwan has relatively few existing encumbrances, either in terms of domestic law or international obligations, on its trade policy, which means that there are limited rules preventing the country from pursing innovation in trade policy formulation. This creates a possibility of experimentation with new policy tools such as the carbon tariff or other cutting edge approaches in a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement.

Economic Prospects

Policy uncertainties in Washington is likely to generate negative consequences for the potential of a trade agreement with Taiwan. Hammond-Chambers recalls that in recent years, unpredictable trade policies from Washington have negatively impacted Taiwanese companies’ ability to make long-term business commitments. Regardless of who wins the 2020 U.S. election, future trade and technology policies in the U.S. remains uncertain at the moment.

Hammond-Chambers also warns that the size of the Chinese market is likely to influence the investment decisions of major corporations from Taiwan and the U.S., which may limit the potential effect of the U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement on mitigating the existing supply chain vulnerabilities. Addressing supply chain vulnerabilities will be a prolonged process, while the global economy may split into a “red supply chain” in China and a “non-red supply chain” outside China. Corporations from Taiwan and the U.S. are likely to try their best to gain from both, but keeping in mind risks of over-reliance on China.

Besides economic concerns, the attitude of China toward the agreement is also a factor. Tong stresses that the U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement should not be presented as a change in the one China policy. The agreement is not a non-ambiguous security guarantee for Taiwan and does not obligate the U.S. one way or the other on arms sales. Given the importance of Taiwan’s security, it is best kept separate from a trade agreement to maximize the latter’s success.

Looking forward, Tong expects the next step of the negotiation between the U.S. and Taiwan to be detailed exploratory talks to examine the pros and cons as well as the specific terms of a potential agreement. This is likely to be a protracted process, as both parties will be reviewing the positions of each side and evaluating the specific concerns and items.

The difficulties of lifting the market restrictions on U.S. beef and pork is a perfect demonstration of the challenges in the negotiation process, which involves complex legislative processes and domestic political considerations in the U.S. and in Taiwan. Although legislative bodies on both sides have shown strong support toward reaching a bilateral trade agreement, a time-line for the agreement remains uncertain, especially considering the potential changes in the executive branch in Washington.

In the aftermath of the pandemic, Tong foresees that the next administration is likely to put a heavier emphasis on domestic policies, but hopes that the next President will be alert to the opportunities and the challenges in the international arena. While Hammond-Chambers speculates that Taiwan issues and technology policies could be two areas where Beijing would try to exert serious pressures on Washington when a potential Biden administration seeks to re-calibrate U.S.-China relations, Tong takes a different view noting that both Republicans and Democrats are unlikely to be susceptible to any pressure from Beijing.

Optimistic Outlook

Despite these challenges, the recent progress in bilateral economic relations and the agreement’s wide range of benefits provide an optimistic outlook for a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement. The House of Representatives and the Senate have issued joint letters in support of a trade agreement with Taiwan, demonstrating uncharacteristic bipartisanship. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s stable and popular leadership, its strong rule of law, and the size of the Taiwan market will all contribute positively to the prospects of an agreement. While robust political support in both countries have established a solid foundation for future negotiations, policy preferences of the next U.S. administration will be the decisive factor determining the potential progress of the U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement.

By Dennis Yuen Li, Ph.D. student, The George Washington University and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

Multilaterals and Taiwan’s Role: How is Cooperation on Security, Health, and Travel Evolving Amidst a Pandemic?

Asia Report #47 | September 2020

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Taiwan’s success story in the pandemic is bringing it unprecedented international attention. Against the backdrop of the current United Nations General Assembly meetings, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies’ Taiwan Roundtable had an in-depth discussion on how Taiwan’s international role may be played out more broadly in critical areas of international policing, travel, and health – all of which demand multilateral cooperation to be effective. This Asia Report reviews the reasons behind Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations, explains the need of Taiwan’s international participation in functional organizations, and evaluates the strategy of promoting a greater international role for Taiwan.

Political Pressure from China

Ever since countries around the world began establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, international institutions started to exclude Taiwan from their rosters. Dr. Vincent Wang, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Adelphi University points out that the main reason behind Taiwan’s exclusion in international organizations is China’s rising international influence and Beijing’s persisting pressure over the international community. For instance, the Secretary General of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a Chinese aviation official, whereas the Interpol was recently led by China’s Vice Minister of Public Security, perches that allow institutional power.

Wang suggests that China possesses a great deal of influence within a wide range of international organizations because Beijing has been able to generate support from developing countries. Since major decisions in international organizations, including the participation of Taiwan, require consensus from the member states, a large number of developing countries – most of which are under the clout of Beijing’s economic influence – have been consistently following China’s vote. Similarly, Beijing often utilizes market access as an economic leverage to generate political pressure toward western democracies.

Shannon Tiezzi, the editor in chief of The Diplomat, adds that cross-strait tension – which is mostly affected by Beijing’s benchmark of how the administration in Taiwan acknowledge the 92-Consensus – has been a key factor that determines Beijing’s level of effort to exclude Taiwan’s international participation. Under the rule of Xi Jinping, Beijing has been making a push for unification for Taiwan under One-Country-Two-System.

The recent protests in Hong Kong and the subsequent implementation of national security laws in the city have eliminated any prospect for the administration and the people in Taiwan accepting unification and One-Country-Two-System according to Tiezzi. The current level of cross-strait tension means that Beijing is likely to sustain its political pressure to exclude Taiwan from international organizations.

Benefits of Taiwan’s Participation

After the outbreak of COVID19 pandemic and the success story of Taiwan’s COVID response, countries around the world began to question the exclusion of Taiwan and ponder the potential benefit of Taiwan’s international participation in functional organizations. Wang proposes that the exclusion is against the universalist principle of international cooperation. The World Health Organization (WHO) includes 194 state and non-state members, yet Taiwan, which has a population of 24 million, has been shut out.

Wang also suggests that international organizations are incomplete without the participation of Taiwan. The successful containment of COVID19 in Taiwan despite its proximity to China is an obvious reason to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. Taiwan’s Taoyuan airport is one of the major hubs for air travel in the world, surpassing the capacity of Newark, Houston, and Miami, yet Taiwan has been excluded from the ICAO. In contrast, as the world’s 16th largest trader, Taiwan has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2002.

Jessica Graham, an international security expert and the president of JG Global Advisory adds that the exclusion of Taiwan from Interpol could be a threat to the global effort to prevent cybercrime, counterterrorism, and organized crime. Taiwan could be exploited by terrorist and crime organizations since the exclusion of Taiwan prevents effective cooperation and information sharing between Taiwan and Interpol. Moreover, Taiwan has long been a target of cyberattack from China and is honing counter capabilities. The inclusion of Taiwan in international security organizations like Interpol would allow Taiwan to share its experience in cybersecurity.

Opportunities after the Pandemic

Given the benefit of Taiwan’s participation, and the challenge of China’s political pressure, what is the strategy to promote the inclusion of Taiwan in international organizations? Wang proposes that the COVID crisis has offer a great opportunity to break the institutional inertia of excluding Taiwan. To achieve such goal, however, Taiwan needs to depend on the leadership of the United States and a coordinated support from major democracies. Taiwan’s international participation has seen substantial increase in the level of support from the US and major democracies in this regard. To make progress, it is necessary to further strengthen the relationship between Taiwan and the US, while the US needs to coordinate its effort with other democracies.

Graham agrees that international support for Taiwan’s participation is crucial for achieving any serious change. The rising level of support at the moment could be a good opportunity for Taiwan to obtain an observer status in functional organizations like Interpol or WHO. The ability to attend the meetings would be a meaningful step for Taiwan’s international role, which could ultimately lead to Taiwan’s return as a normal member in these organizations.

Tiezzi suggests that the main obstacle of Taiwan’s international participation is China’s political clout and Beijing’s persistence to generate political pressure through economic influence. One possible way to promote Taiwan’s participation is to side-step the existing international institutions and create new institutions among like-minded democracies around the world. Any potential progress, however, would again be dependent on the leadership of the US, which is currently an uncertain variable due to the upcoming election. Although the Trump administration has made progress by passing legislation to support Taiwan and selling more weapons to enhance Taiwan’s security, how Biden will implement his Taiwan policy remains unclear according to her.

The COVID pandemic has clearly demonstrated the potential benefit of Taiwan’s international participation, while the level of support for Taiwan’s inclusion has grown substantially among like-minded democracies around the world. In an op-ed for The Diplomat, Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, makes a strong case for Taiwan’s considerable contribution to the United Nation’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Taiwan has achieved remarkable sustainable development by reaching zero hunger, reducing the percentage of low-income households to under 2 percent, and improving literacy rate to 98.7 percent. Internationally, Taiwan has promoted sustained development by assisting developing countries via its International Cooperation and Development Fund (Taiwan ICDF) and various programs in the Pacific, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Discussion from the panel of experts shows that the inclusion of Taiwan will greatly benefit the international community. The main challenge to Taiwan’s international participation comes from China’s growing influence in the existing institutions. The pandemic has offered an opportunity to break the existing norm and make progress for Taiwan, but the prospect of Taiwan’s international participation relies on the leadership of the US and the extent of cooperation among global democracies.

Errata: There was a factual error inadvertently attributed to Vincent Wang on Taiwan not being a WTO member. Taiwan has been a member of the WTO since 2002 and the previous statement in original version has been removed.

By Dennis Yuen Li, Ph.D. student, The George Washington University and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

Cross-Strait Relations under Stress: Chinese Pressure and Implications for Taiwan

Asia Report #47 | December 2019

Read the PDF version of “Cross-Strait Relations under Stress: Chinese Pressure and Implications for Taiwan”.

As China increases pressure on governments and corporations around the world to support its political objectives, Taiwan has emerged as a focal point in the region that exemplifies how to withstand or mitigate Chinese challenges. Nevertheless, Chinese military and political belligerence has numerous implications for Taiwanese security and domestic politics ranging from the tightening of Taiwan’s international space to the use of Chinese sharp power to influence the electorate. The Sigur Center for Asian Studies recently hosted a conference featuring  two expert panels to discuss the impacts of Chinese pressure campaigns on Taiwan and other involved nations as well as how cross-strait relations might proceed because of these actions.

Keeping Taiwanese Democracy Secure

The conference began with opening remarks from Christine M. Y. Hsueh, Deputy Representative at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. Deputy Representative Hsueh highlighted Taiwan’s role as a beacon of democracy, which contributes to pressure and attacks from China, such as election interference. With the recent failure of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s threat to use force in reunification with Taiwan, the Taiwanese government is working to ensure that the status quo is not unilaterally altered by Chinese aggression. Although Taiwan faces many challenges in maintaining security and stability, outspoken support from Vice President Mike Pence and other figures in the current US administration have been encouraging signs for Taiwan moving forward.

China’s Rising Militarism and Assertiveness

The first panel offered perspectives on defense and security, and began with June Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, giving an overview of recent developments in Chinese militarism, including the massive show of military power during the 70th Anniversary of the Peoples Republic of China military parade this past October. Dreyer dates the belligerent tone epitomized by this event to 2010 during Hu Jintao’s presidency, which saw the South China Sea become a Chinese “core interest” and increased conflict with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. US countermoves to this aggression included the Department of Defense’s AirSea Battle concept and Hillary Clinton’s 2011 articulation of a “pivot to Asia” in US foreign policy under the Obama administration. Nevertheless, a lack of follow-through on these efforts resulted in few tangible gains.

Dreyer noted a potential option for US policymakers is to avoid confrontation with China in the contested maritime regions while continuing to fly or sail wherever international law allows without being bullied into periodic confrontations with PLAN ships or PLAAF planes. An alternative US approach would be to join with allies and challenge China together; however, past cooperation with partners including India, Australia, and Japan has not taken off due to policy differences across administrations in these countries. A third course of action would be for the US to “meet China halfway” and negotiate.  US concession to Chinese pressure in any way, though, is likely to embolden the Chinese government. While this situation seems to leave Taiwan with few options, Dreyer explained that China has numerous other issues of higher priority than cross-strait relations, which include economic stagnation and pollution on the mainland to simmering tensions in Xinjiang and at the border with India.

Michael Mazza, Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, explored how Chinese pressure campaign have constrained Taiwan’s international space and its ability to engage internationally by restricting Taiwanese participation in international assemblies and encouraging seven of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to sever ties in the last six years. China has also committed to Taiwan’s symbolic erasure by pressuring individual companies to withdraw recognition of Taiwan as an independent government. According to Mazza, Beijing’s interference in Taiwanese internal politics may be difficult to quantify, but it almost certainly boosted Kuomintang (KMT) gains in the 2018 mid-term election. Moreover, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office’s “31 Measures” announced in 2018 expresses China’s aims to encourage pro-China sentiment in Taiwan and precipitate Taiwanese brain drain by luring Taiwanese students and businesspeople to live, work, and study on the Chinese mainland.

Mazza argued that Xi Jinping wants to isolate Taiwan internationally and achieve global acceptance of the One-China narrative. China’s pressure tactics aim to undermine global appreciation of Taiwanese democracy and diminish global concern over cross-strait relations. China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea demonstrate this objective, as Chinese control of these maritime territories could empower it to injure Taiwan’s regional trade. However, Beijing’s pressure has not been very successful, as Taiwan has continued to receive international support and engagement. US-Taiwan relations remain particularly strong, and Taiwan’s relationships with Japan and the European Union have seen similar advances recently. Because Western powers widely view Chinese assertiveness with concern, many have sought to forge informal relations with Taiwan. This has been especially true since the success of President Tsai Ing-wen’s policies to expand Taiwan’s international cultural and economic ties.

US Support for Taiwan

According to Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the George Washington University, Taiwan’s most important ally remains the US and ties between the two have only become stronger in recent years. Sutter describes four earlier periods of American support for Taiwan: in the late 1970s, with the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act; in the mid-1980s under Secretary of State George Shultz; immediately following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre; and in 2001-2002 under the early Bush administration. The current fifth period of support for Taiwan is the strongest yet as the US has reaffirmed the importance of Taiwan’s key strategic location and sought to encourage Taiwan’s political democracy and free-market economy. Although American leaders avoided going so far as to upset Beijing, the negative impact of the current trade war on US-China relations has lessened the incentive for the US to hold back. Recent US support of Taiwan has included the sale of 66 F-16V fighters valued at $8 billion at a reportedly special bargain price.

The US’s other unprecedented steps taken to demonstrate its commitment to Taiwan include expressing public disapproval of countries such as El Salvador for cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan, publicizing transits of US warships through the Taiwan Strait, and brazenly referring to Taiwan as a “country” in the Department of Defense’s June 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy which is valued as a “democratic partner” alongside states like New Zealand and Singapore. Compared to past decades, the Trump administration’s interpretation of the One-China policy is considerably more flexible, but still not designed to provoke Beijing directly. More than anything, current US policy has stabilized support for Taiwan amidst Chinese pressure campaigns and this support is likely to continue and advance.

Mechanisms of Chinese Political Warfare

Mark Stokes, Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute, opened the second panel with a discussion of Chinese sharp power and political warfare. According to Stokes, the Chinese use of propaganda, subversion, and covert operations is deeply based in the Soviet tradition of Marxism-Leninism and the model set by Joseph Goebbels in Nazi-era Germany, which emphasized the use of multiple types of propaganda and established the absolute supremacy of intelligence.

Political warfare, and specifically “liaison work,” has continued to play a major role in Chinese aggression towards Taiwan. The Liaison Bureau’s focus areas include public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. The bureau is often responsible for so-called “gray” and “black” propaganda, which involve varying degrees of disguising the sources of propaganda messages. In terms of organizational structure, Chinese political warfare is instigated by the Liaison Bureau (which includes clandestine intelligence collection), the Investigation and Research Bureau, the External Propaganda Bureau, the Border Defense Bureau, and two province-level bureaus in Shanghai and Guangzhou. In order to combat Chinese sharp power and political warfare, Stokes calls for careful examination and scrutiny of Chinese embassies and organizations in Taiwan, Chinese relationships with international media and educational organizations, and Chinese ties to military and political officials outside of China.

Preserving Taiwan’s International Space and the Outlook for Taiwan

Jacques DeLisle, Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, emphasized the importance of “visible identity” to uphold Taiwan’s international status and security. Taiwan is working to bolster its presence in major international organizations through compliance with major treaties and policies as if it were a formal member and maintain what formal diplomatic ties it has left with other states. In response to the Tsai administration’s efforts, Beijing has waged its own counteroffensive to hamper Taipei’s standing in international organizations and by wooing Taipei’s diplomatic allies to its side. Despite these setbacks, Taiwan is enjoying success in strengthening its informal ties, especially with the US and Japan. The construction of a new American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) office in Taipei serves as a tangible signal in US support for the Taiwanese government.

In the long-term, DeLisle argued that Taiwan should pursue opportunities for international engagement whenever possible. Because of Taiwan’s strong free-market economy, there are increasing odds for Taiwan’s accession to economic organizations rather than political organizations. Pursuing ad-hoc access to organizations and assemblies rather than full membership is more likely to be successful. Finally, as Chinese assertiveness has induced American and international pushback, Taiwan can capitalize on this dynamic to seek greater international space.

 

Bonnie Glaser, Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, further expanded on strategies for advancing Taiwanese international space. Glaser first highlighted the importance of securing international participation, noting specifically access to information and databases, promoting an image of good global citizenship, and increasing global interaction. In the absence of formal international participation, Taiwan has enhanced its international engagement through the Global Cooperation Training Framework conferences in tandem with the US and, recently, Japan. These conferences enhance international understanding of Taiwan and convey Taiwan’s expertise in many fields, such as media literacy.

Taiwan has also pursued international engagement through foreign aid and humanitarianism, and has focused on countries that have maintained diplomatic ties such as Haiti. Moreover, Tsai Ing-wen’s New Southbound Policy has succeeded in enhancing regional relations with South and Southeast Asian countries through export agreements, economic cooperation, and increased study and tourism opportunities for nationals of these countries. Although Chinese pressure presents the foremost challenge to Taiwanese foreign affairs, Glaser argued that increasing international hostility towards China presents many opportunities for global cooperation with Taiwan.

Looking ahead to Taiwan’s future prospects amidst increasing pressure from China, the key consensus among the panelists was that rising Chinese militarism and use of coercive tactics not only toward Taiwan, but also in the neighborhood and beyond, is proving to be counterproductive. China’s actions are alarming a growing number of countries, and this backlash could give Taiwan new options to withstand Chinese pressure.

By Olivia Saunders, Staff Assistant, Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the Rising Powers Initiative