The US-India Partnership After Modi’s Visit to Washington

Rising Powers Initiative Research Assistant Satvik Pendyala and Senior Research Assistant at Carnegie China Nathan Sher authored an article for 9DASHLINE about Modi’s visit to the United States and India’s position in US-China competition. You can read the full article on the 9DASHLINE website. It is also available below.

The US-India Partnership After Modi’s Visit to Washington

Early in June, the US Indo-Pacific Coordinator, Kurt Campbell, expressed hope that Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Washington DC would “consecrate” India as the United States’ most important partner. Following the visit on 22 June, the two sides agreed to deepen ties across technology, defense, economic, and people-to-people domains. India even received technology-sharing deals traditionally reserved for US allies. As the United States adapts to rising strategic competition with China, it has sought to strengthen ties with New Delhi as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific.

As US-India relations are strengthening, China-India relations are continuing to deteriorate, reaching their lowest point in decades with unresolved border tensions at the forefront of the downturn in relations. Over the last 10 years, India has lost nearly 40 percent of its patrolling posts in Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Recent polling by Tsinghua University reveals that only eight percent of Chinese respondents have a favorable view of India, lower than the percentage of favorable views toward the United States and Japan. To make matters worse, India and China recently expelled nearly all of each other’s journalists, implemented mutual business restrictions, and are continuing to compete for influence in South Asia.

Even as New Delhi and Washington’s interests converge over mutual mistrust of Beijing, many analysts have questioned India’s value as a US security partner. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently argued that Washington should not hold any “delusions of New Delhi becoming a comrade-in-arms during some future crisis with Beijing”. Similarly, a new RAND report suggests that New Delhi displays “no evidence of being willing to volunteer to join a war that does not directly involve” India’s interests.

As the United States adapts to rising strategic competition with China, it has sought to strengthen ties with New Delhi as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific.

Nonetheless, New Delhi may not need to get directly involved in a potential US-China contingency to be pivotal in a time of crisis. There is a range of actions, from logistical support to joint deterrence, that India could take to provide both strategic and tactical benefits to the United States in the event of a Western Pacific contingency. The possibility that India might get involved in a US-China crisis alone would be enough to deflect some of Beijing’s resources and attention from the direct zone of conflict. As the two sides work to continue to deepen their security relationship, Washington should not give up on the prospect of New Delhi’s growing appetite for defense cooperation.

Shared concerns and mutual interests

While many analysts point to the 2020 Galwan border clashes as the inflection point in India-China tensions, bilateral suspicions began rising years before, due to the growing assertiveness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Western Theater Command. Not only did India and China face off at the Depsang Plains in 2013, but three years later several PLA officers involved in those clashes were also promoted to senior positions in the Tibetan Military District and the Western Theater Command.

Tensions then peaked with the May 2020 Galwan clash. While New Delhi claimed that Chinese border violations eroded the “entire basis” of India-China ties, Beijing attempted to put the border issue in an “appropriate place” in the bilateral relationship. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit this April, China portrayed the border situation as “stable”, even though the two sides clashed just months before, in December 2022, at Tawang.

Amid India’s estrangement from China, New Delhi’s underlying motive for strengthening relations with Washington is not solely to oppose Beijing but to cement its role as a rising great power. Therefore, India has joined US-led groupings like the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) along with participating in other coalitions such as BRICS and the SCO. However, India often recoils when the latter organizations try to insert language in support of Chinese initiatives, such as BRI projects, Beijing’s Global Security Initiative, or counter-terrorism efforts that do not target anti-India extremist groups in Pakistan.

During the Cold War, India partnered with the Soviet Union to avoid domination by either the United States or China. Today, the United States and India have discovered that common anxieties regarding China’s potential domination of Asia are bringing them closer together. As India’s threat perception of China continues to grow, India will find greater security cooperation with Washington — short of being a formal ally — ever more palatable.

India in a US-China Confrontation

It is true that India will likely seek to avoid the costs of any conflict that does not directly bear on New Delhi’s interests as much as possible, including in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. India’s emphasis on economic development clashes with any desire to get directly involved in such a hypothetical military contingency. On the other hand, India’s security interests and great power aspirations do not start and stop at the Sino-Indian border. New Delhi recognizes that China’s increasingly destabilizing role in the Indian Ocean and larger Indo-Pacific undermines its own security. A scenario in which the United States loses a kinetic conflict with China and is pushed from East Asia would exacerbate India’s own vulnerability to Chinese domination.

Viewed through an economic lens, India may be reluctant to get involved in a US-China conflict to insulate its own economy. The reality, however, is that a major conflict, even far afield from India’s borders, would severely damage the Indian economy. Deterring and preventing potential Chinese aggression against its neighbors would serve India’s economic interests. In the security domain, India has an abiding interest in preventing Chinese hegemony not only along the Sino-Indian border but throughout the Indo-Pacific. If Beijing were to succeed in “reunifying” with Taiwan, the India-China border would become one of China’s last remaining territorial disputes, and India would be more vulnerable to Chinese pressure.

Even as it faces incursions along the border, India remains committed to improving its maritime capabilities to match the growth of the PLA Navy. New Delhi recently redoubled its military build-up at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands bases in the Bay of Bengal, just northeast of the Malacca Strait. In September 2022, India launched its first domestically built aircraft carrier, and in June 2023 the Indian Navy took part in twin-carrier exercises demonstrating improved interoperability with US and Japanese forces.

India’s naval bases at the mouth of the Malacca Strait give it a unique ability to apply pressure on China by leveraging access to important commercial shipping lanes. New Delhi could grant the United States and its partners access to these islands for logistical, as well as intelligence, support. Even if the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are not operationalized during a Western Pacific contingency, India’s decision to expand its capabilities in advance of any such crisis would enhance joint deterrence, complicating China’s strategic calculations against Taiwan.

Although Taiwan remains a far more important core territorial interest to China when compared with Aksai Chin or Arunachal Pradesh, the PLA still must prepare for the risk of a potential border conflict with India. This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position where it remains vulnerable to Indian pressure on disputed border territories while the bulk of its forces remains focused on preparing for a Taiwan contingency.

Indian geostrategist Brahma Chellaney recently proposed that an Indian escalation on the border in the event of an imminent Taiwan invasion could force China to consider a wider range of threats. Thus, deterrence signaling on the China-India border before a potential Taiwan invasion could be as important as any direct intervention in a US-China contingency. Joint deterrence by India and the United States would necessitate stronger strategic linkages between New Delhi and Washington to coordinate and manage the risks of escalation.

A partnership with teeth

While the degree of India’s involvement in a US-China conflict will depend on India’s threat perception of China, there is little to suggest that China and India plan to de-escalate soon. Although narratives in Chinese state media argue that Washington is to blame for rising China-India tensions, Chinese attempts to separate India from the United States have been largely unsuccessful. The confluence of India’s own strategic concerns and great power ambitions have facilitated its alignment with the United States.

Since the United States designated India as a Major Defense Partner in 2016 and elevated New Delhi to the status of Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1 in 2018, the US-India relationship has become broader and deeper. The two countries now exchange vast quantities of military and dual-use technologies, conduct joint military exercises, and engage in intelligence-sharing bilaterally, as well as through the Quad.

Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to Washington solidified new agreements to transfer critical jet technology, cooperate on spaceflight, purchase armed drones, and pursue joint research on semiconductor breakthroughs. In the aftermath of Modi’s state visit, more important than any single deliverable, the tone of the US-India relationship has shifted to one of long-term alignment.

Energy Security in Asia and Eurasia

Many states appear to have strong sentiment on energy security and energy transit vulnerability. Some analysts see the rapidly increasing demand for energy and competition for energy resources leading to nationalistic energy policies. Others argue that global trends with efficient energy markets and growing options on renewables suggest more relaxed energy outlooks.

This book focuses on Asia, where global demand for energy is now concentrated in the aspiring and rising powers of the region: China, India, Japan and South Korea, and also recognises the importance of Russia as a growing energy supplier. Contributions by experts in the field provide detailed and parallel case studies. Shedding light on the ongoing debate in the literature regarding energy outlooks of major Asian states, they analyse whether energy policies are expected to evolve along market oriented cooperative lines or more competitive and even destructive mercantile, nationalist lines. The book argues that states are not unitary actors even in the key energy security arena and there are competing and contrasting viewpoints in Asian states on energy security. It suggests that domestic debates structure thinking on energy security, making energy policy more contingent than assumed by purely market or geopolitical logics.

Providing a strong contribution to comparative energy security studies, the book fills an important gap in the literature on energy and national security and offers a basis for conducting further inter-state, interactive analysis. It will be of interest to researchers on Asian Studies, energy politics and international relations.

Link to purchase.

Editors:

  • Mike M. Mochizuki holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University
  • Deepa M. Ollapally is research professor of international affairs and the associate director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University

Book Chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction: The Energy Security Dissonance, by Deepa M. Ollapally

Chapter 2: Energy Security and Foreign Investment: Asian Resource Nationalism in a Political-Economy Mirror, by Robert Weiner

Chapter 3: Outlooks on Chinese Energy Security Vulnerabilities, by Zha Daojiong and Robert Sutter

Chapter 4: Indian Perspectives on Energy Security: Convergence and Divergence by Deepa M. Ollapally and Sudha Mahalingam

Chapter 5: Japan’s Energy Security: Strategic Discourse and Domestic Politics, by Mike M. Mochizuki and Richard Samuels

Chapter 6: Energy and Transit Security in South Korea, by Scott A. Snyder

Chapter 7: The Energy Factor in Russia’s ‘Asia Pivot’, by Shoichi Itoh and Andrew Kuchins

Chapter 8: Oil, Asia, and U.S. Foreign and Security Policy, by Charles L. Glaser

 

RPI would like to thank the MacArthur Foundation for its support of RPI’s research on maritime and energy security in the Indo-Pacific that contributed to this book.

Understanding Indian Policy Dilemmas in the Indo-Pacific through an India–US–China Maritime Triangle Lens

Policy Commentary October 13, 2016

The author is Dr. Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Rising Powers Initiative.

Between the American rebalance strategy and Chinese Maritime Silk Road initiative, India is increasingly pressed to formulate a maritime strategy that ideally meets Indian economic and strategic objectives. This is generating major policy dilemmas for India stemming from the attraction of economic integration led by China on the one hand, versus the attraction of strategic integration offered by the United States on the other hand. This paper suggests that between these binary options, there are both opportunities and challenges for India, calling for fine-grained policymaking. The notional concept of an India–US–China maritime triangle is useful in sifting through the choices before India to meet its ambitions of development as well as retain and improve its strategic influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

To read the full article, click here (Subscription required).

Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic Processes

This important book analyzes nuclear weapon and energy policies in Asia, a region at risk for high-stakes military competition, conflict, and terrorism. The contributors explore the trajectory of debates over nuclear energy, security, and nonproliferation in key countries—China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Arguing against conventional wisdom, the contributors make a convincing case that domestic variables are far more powerful than external factors in shaping nuclear decision making. The book explores what drives debates and how decisions are framed, the interplay between domestic dynamics and geopolitical calculations in the discourse, where the center of gravity of debates lies in each country, and what this means for regional cooperation or competition and U.S. nuclear energy and nonproliferation policy in Asia.

Book jacket.

Link to purchase.

Link to review in Pacific Affairs.

Editors:

  • Mike M. Mochizuki holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University
  • Deepa M. Ollapally is research professor of international affairs and the associate director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University

Reviews of the Book:

For those of us struggling to understand and anticipate the future of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons programs in Asia, this deeply insightful and timely book reveals the critical role played by domestic forces in the region. Its contributors know well the domestic scene that is driving nuclear outcomes in each of the countries, and they make a persuasive case that these internal forces eclipse external geopolitical forces in shaping Asia’s nuclear future. This essential volume sheds new light on the Asian nuclear landscape. (Bruce Blair, Princeton University)

This must-read book assembles a veritable who’s who of nuclear experts on Asia. The volume skillfully opens the black box of domestic politics across Asian nations with nuclear energy and nuclear weapons programs, tracking the balance of Nationalists, Realists, and Globalists in each and analyzing how domestic political configurations affect the nuclear policies of these Asian nations—states that comprise the most dynamic terrain in the global nuclear landscape. Each chapter should be read by anyone who cares not only about the respective state’s nuclear policies, but how it is in fact domestic politics driving them, a factor whose emphasis in these countries is long overdue. (Vipin Narang, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Warning against relying on state-centric assumptions that seem more a matter of faith than empirical evidence, the volume finds that elusive ‘geopolitical’ factors are not decisive. Domestic politics mediate their actual impact. A welcome corrective for improving our understanding of nuclear futures. (Etel Solingen, University of California Irvine)

Book Chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction: Uncovering Nuclear Thinking in Asia, by Deepa M. Ollapally
Chapter 2: China: Evolving Attitudes on Nuclear Affairs, by Hui Zhang
Chapter 3: India: The Nuclear Debate of a Rising Power, by Deepa M. Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan
Chapter 4: Japan: Tremors in the Nuclear Consensus after Fukushima , by Mike Mochizuki
Chapter 5: South Korea: Intense Debates and Global Nuclear Ambitions, by Scott Snyder
Chapter 6: Taiwan: Commitment to a Nuclear-Free Future, by Robert Sutter and Yuan-Ming Alvin Yao
Chapter 7: Vietnam: Nuclear Ambitions and Domestic Dynamics, by Linda J. Yarr and Nguyê~n Thi. Thanh Thu’ y
Chapter 8: Southeast Asia: A Measured Nuclear Policy, by Catharin Dalpino and Timothy Westmyer
Chapter 9: Pakistan: The Nuclear Consensus, by Christopher Clary
Chapter 10: Conclusion: Policy Implications of Changing Domestic Debates, by Mike Mochizuki
Index

 

RPI would like to thank the MacArthur Foundation for its support of the RPI Nuclear Debates in Asia Program.

The Russia-China Gas Deal and the Eurasian Balance of Power

The $400 billion natural gas agreement concluded by Russia and China in May 2014 was hailed by both countries’ leaders as a game-changing development in international affairs. Many Russian and Chinese analysts also seized upon the deal as evidence of an emerging Sino-Russian partnership set to challenge the U.S.-led global order. Is the gas deal part of a broader shift in Russia-China relations and the global balance of power? Are the two countries ready to construct a formidable alliance to challenge the United States and Europe? Or should the agreement be viewed in simpler economic terms?

The gas deal is the latest in a series of political, economic, and military developments between the two countries over more than two decades that illustrates a stronger and more integrated Russia-China relationship. However, the evolution of the Russia-China relationship over the past quarter of a century has been marked by as many policy failures as successes. Economic ties are not as deep as they could be and continue to be dominated by Russian raw materials exports to China. Diplomatic relations are also characterized by a grandiose rhetoric that overstates the progress made between the two countries and undersells underlying cultural and political differences. Complications continue to surround the implementation of the May 2014 gas deal, reflecting these dynamics as well as wider political and economic events that have transformed the global energy landscape since the gas deal was concluded.

This Policy Report finds that the Russia-China gas deal is a significant strategic development but not a game-changer in Russia-China relations or in the global geopolitical environment. A review of modern Russia-China relations, and a detailed assessment of the gas deal, illustrate that economics are still the main driver in relations for both countries. However, the volume of bilateral trade has actually fallen in 2015, a symptom of an economic slowdown in China and a collapse in global energy prices that threatens the long-term viability of energy cooperation and even the gas deal itself. Should the gas deal ever be fully implemented, Russia would continue to export the vast majority of its oil and gas to Europe, while China’s flexible energy policy means that it has developed a range of options across the Asia-Pacific. Rather than a bold strategic transformation in Russia-China ties, the gas deal and its sputtering implementation reflect more closely modern economic and political realities, as well as the delicate and complex nature of modern Russia-China relations.

Read the full Report here.

Perspectives on U.S.-India Relations

Expanding ties between the U.S. and India now span the entire spectrum of foreign policy, inevitably giving rise to convergences and divergences. What are some of the biggest challenges and greatest opportunities in U.S.-India relations? The “Perspectives on U.S.-India Relations” panel, held at the George Washington University on October 5, outlined the contours of the U.S.-India relationship and prospects for its future. The session, sponsored by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and hosted by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, was part of a broader daylong FICCI-GWU Foreign Policy Leadership Workshop introducing a leading group of Indian parliamentarians to U.S. foreign policy on current issues that are of major importance to India. Members of the Indian delegation included:

  • Baijayant “Jay” Panda, Member of Parliament, Biju Janata Dal
  • Gaurav Gogi, Member of Parliament, Indian National Congress
  • Kalvakuntla Kavitha, Member of Parliament, Telangana Rashtra Samithi
  • Jyotiraditya Scindia, Member of Parliament, Indian National Congress
  • Arpita Ghosh, Member of Parliament, All India Trinamool Congress
  • Harshavardhan Neotia, President Elect, FICCI
  • A. Didar Singh, Secretary General, FICCI

Speakers on the panel included:

  • Tanvi Madan, Director, The India Project and Foreign Policy Fellow, Brookings Institution
  • Rick Rossow, Senior Fellow and Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies
  • Dan Twining, Senior Fellow, Asia, German Marshall Fund
  • Baijayant Panda, Member of Parliament, BJD Party, India (Commentator)
  • Jonah Blank, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation (Moderator)

Read the full Report here.

China and America: The Great Divergence? by Robert Sutter in Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2014)

Abstract

While there have been many sources of tension in U.S.-China relations since the Cold War, they have been held in check generally by circumstances that have inclined the governments to cooperate. Yet, the relationship remains multi-faceted and fragile, and various frameworks and forecasts—like the contemporary “Great Divergence” framework, which speaks to the apparent disjunction between economic and security affairs—have proven to be incomplete and incorrect.

Read the full article.

RPI Nuclear Debates in Asia Digest: Cooperation Expands Between Iran and Asian Powers as Nuclear Talks Continue, by Samia Basille

Iran and the P5 + 1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are currently engaging in historic negotiations over Iran’s controversial nuclear program. The Joint Plan of Action (JPA), signed in November 2013 and entered into force in January 2014, gives the parties six months to solve the international dispute with a final deal. This fragile détente followed the election of Hassan Rouhani – considered by some to be a voice for moderation in Iran – as president last June. These developments triggered enthusiastic reactions within Asian powers soon after the interim agreement was signed. Several countries in the region have vested interests in Iranian oil for their energy needs as well as important concerns regarding nuclear nonproliferation and regional security issues.

On June 9-10, U.S. officials held bilateral meetings with their Iranian counterparts in Geneva on the status of Iran’s nuclear program. Analysts have predicted the talks will be extended an additional six months to resolve outstanding issues, but the JPA formally expires a year after it entered into force. As the July 20, 2014 extension deadline approaches, this Nuclear Debates in Asia Digest highlights the evolution of diplomatic relations over the past months between Iran and countries in the Nuclear Debates in Asia project.

China

China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson remarked last month that the negotiations have moved into the “deep-water zone.” During Rouhani’s first state visit to China in May 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping hoped world powers will reach an agreement with Iran, and he supported Iran’s right to enrichment for peaceful purposes. The Foreign Affairs Ministry noted “China is willing to continue the strengthening of communication and coordination with Iran and its constructive role in promoting the negotiation process.”

Xi also insisted on the benefits of greater economic cooperation between the two countries with Iran’s participation in the construction of the Silk Road economic belt, as well as the necessity of expanded security cooperation to fight terrorism, drug trade, and transnational crime. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif welcomed these exchanges and praised China’s role in the on-going nuclear talks.

India

During a bilateral meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in New Delhi in March 2014, then Indian Minister of External Affairs Salman Khurshid said India would continue to support the interim nuclear deal and praised Iran as an influential country with potential to foster peace and stability in its region. The recent election of Narendra Modi as Indian Prime Minister and his appointment of Sushma Swaraj as the new Minister of External Affairs raises several question on the future of India-Iran relations. Rouhani congratulated Modi on his election, declaring that the vote “indicates the full confidence of the Indian nation in your developmental and prudent policies.”

While Modi comes in to office with a reputation for focusing on economic policy, his critics have accused him of hostility toward Muslims due to his management of violent riots in Gujarat during his term as its Chief Minister. In that leadership position, he maintained close economic ties with Israel, which firmly opposes negotiations with Iran.

As the negotiation deadline nears, the United States has pressured India to bring its imports of Iranian oil down from the early-2014 buying spree. However, since India depends heavily on oil imports from Iran and Saudi Arabia, it has always sought to strike a balance regarding its foreign policy in the Middle East. Some analysts contend, therefore, that Modi’s foreign policy agenda may emphasize continuity rather than change. For example, M.R. Raghu, senior vice president for research at the Kuwait Financial Centre, predicted that while Modi’s “closeness to Israel as an important investment partner in Gujarat may make [Gulf Cooperation Council nations] very cautious to deal with him to start with,” countries in the region “may eventually warm up to India’s burgeoning opportunities. Saudi Arabia may emerge as a key partner to Modi as well as Iran.”

Other commentators held a less optimistic view of the on-going nuclear talks. While the JPA delayed progress in Iranian nuclear program, Dr. Arun Vishwanathan, assistant professor at the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore, argued “one of the most important facts that much of the critique of the agreement reached at Geneva seems to overlook is its interim nature.” He concluded “with or without this agreement, there is nothing that the international community can do to prevent Iran (if it makes a political determination) from developing a break-out capability and go nuclear.”

Japan

Meeting with his Iranian counterpart Mohammed Javad Zarif in Tokyo in March, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said that “Japan welcomes the steady implementation of the Joint Plan of Action.” He “believe[d] that there is a huge potential in bilateral relations” should a final agreement be reached.

According to Nobumasa Akiyama, professor at Hitotsubashi University and an adjunct senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan has a great interest in a final agreement between Iran and world powers. As the country relies heavily on the Middle East for its oil and gas imports, regional stability would help the island nation to diversify its energy supply.

Akiyama also contended the Iran-P5 + 1 talks could set an example for a potential settlement with North Korea as well as encourage further South Korean nuclear fuel cycle development. Therefore, he advised Japan to play a more active role in the Middle East: “There is no free lunch. For engaging Iran, Japan would be required to make a greater commitment to coping with potential geo-political challenges in addition to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.”

Pakistan

Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif met with President Rouhani during a state visit to Tehran in May 2014 and declared he was there “to open a new chapter in the Pakistan-Iran relationship.” Both leaders agreed to continue the gas pipeline project, a topic of contention between the two countries as Pakistan has not yet build the pipeline. They also committed to increase bilateral trade to $5 billion and boost cooperation on regional security and border issues.

This visit followed the seventh round of the annual bilateral political consultations between Iran and Pakistan in April 2014. According to a press release from the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “both sides agreed to focus on enhancing bilateral economic cooperation for the common good of both nations.”

South Korea

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia and Pacific Affairs Ibrahim Rahimpour met with South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Lee Kyung-soo in Seoul in May 2013 to discuss cooperation on political, cultural, and economic issues. These talks followed earlier South Korean expressions of expanded trade with Iran.

Rahimpour also met with South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, who declared: “South Korean companies are pursuing the developments [regarding the international negotiations] and are willing to boost cooperation with Iran on economy and trade.” Yun also expressed optimism regarding the talks over Iran’s nuclear program: “Although there are some disputes on the nuclear case, but the process is positive altogether and we hope that a final agreement between Iran and P5+1 will be signed as soon as possible. The turning point of the talks is that the Western side recognized Iran`s enrichment right.”

Vietnam

Ambassador Nguyen Trung Thank, head of the Vietnamese Delegation to the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, expressed hope that the nuclear negotiations lead to expanded cooperation between Iran and the international community. Speaking at the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR) in March, he emphasized the benefits that this cooperation would bring for security and human rights issues in the region.

During a conference held in Hanoi on June 6, Vietnamese and Iranian officials called for increased bilateral economic cooperation in the future. Le Thai Hoa — Vietnam’s deputy head of Africa, West Asia, and South Asia Market Department under the Ministry of Industry and Trade — pushed further direct trade and investments between the two countries. The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) plans to send a delegation of Vietnamese companies to Tehran to discuss business opportunities later this year.

Looking Ahead

Since the interim agreement was signed in November, diplomatic relations between Iran and Asia have expanded and some governments have shown an interest in improving ties with Tehran. However, the stability of these recent developments depends on the outcome of the current nuclear negotiations. As the negotiation deadline approaches, the Rising Power Initiative’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project will continue to study these developments. Follow the project on Twitter at @Westmyer.

By Samia Basille, Research Intern at the Rising Powers Initiative

RPI Policy Report: Rebooting the U.S. Rebalance to Asia

President Barack Obama’s trip to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines in April 2014 was an important juncture in his administration’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” of U.S. foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific. In a region increasingly tied with U.S. security and prosperity, the president’s trip was a statement of reassurance and resolve by his administration. The president visited key partners – though, significantly, not China – to reinforce the rebalancing policy in the final years of his term.

President Obama’s visit was especially significant because it followed a series of U.S. policy setbacks and mistakes – some of which directly affected the momentum of the rebalancing initiative – and because the trip coincided with a period of growing stress in the global geopolitical environment. Notably, tensions in Ukraine have established a schism in Russia’s relations with the United States and Western Europe not seen since the Cold War. Ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa, a U.S. government shutdown in October 2013, and deep cuts in the U.S. defense budget have also consumed Washington’s attention.

Compounding these problems, U.S. policy toward Asia was inconsistent over the last half of 2013 and the first four months of 2014. This was especially notable with respect to the U.S. role in managing maritime and territorial disputes involving China and its neighbors.

President Obama’s trip to Asia was successful, but more must be done. The administration must overcome its recent policy setbacks, avoid policy mistakes in the future, and implement its strategic vision with strong, steadier policies.

Read the full report.

RPI Nuclear Debates in Asia Digest: Asian Powers Wrestle Over Nuclear Security in Asia, by Timothy Westmyer

National Security Summit Logo outlineAs Japan debates restarting its dormant nuclear reactor fleet, leaders in Tokyo are under intense international pressure to address Japan’s large stockpile of plutonium. According to The Japan Timesthe United States asked Japan to return over 300 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium transferred to the island nation for energy research purposes during the Cold War. The consolidation of this nuclear material in Japan, which could be used to produce forty to fifty nuclear weapons, is a major priority of the Obama Administration ahead of the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Netherlands. The impact of Japan’s substantial remaining stock of plutonium on nuclear security and non-proliferation continues to be a source of debate within the country and throughout the region. This latest Nuclear Debates in Asia Digest examines China’s reaction to Japan’s plutonium repatriation, the future of Japan’s plutonium reserve, and the direction of nuclear security in Asia.

Plutonium in Japan Takes the Long Way Home

In a 2009 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama announced a “new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” and called on a summit within the year to jump start actions toward this goal. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC and the 2012 follow up summit hosted by South Korea were opportunities for leaders to coordinate and reassess their nuclear security plans as well as for expert observers to measure progress and identify deficiencies in these countries. The United States backed an international effort to minimize the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), separated plutonium, and radioactive sources in medical and research reactors around the world and return these nuclear materials to their countries of origin where possible.

For decades, Japanese nuclear energy policy aimed to develop a self-sufficient plutonium-based nuclear fuel cycle to support a growing number of reactors throughout the country. Before the 2011 accident at the Fukushima plant, Japan amassed a large stockpile of plutonium that was to be used in fast neutron reactors. As part of this research during the Cold War, the United States and the United Kingdom contributed 300 kg of high quality plutonium to Japan for research into these next generation reactors, which are still under development. As part of President Obama’s goal to consolidate sources of potentially dangerous nuclear material, the United States has been pressuring Japan to return the 300kg of plutonium since the first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010. While Japan hoped to keep the material for its on-going research, the Abe government has reportedly finally agreed to return the material to the United States. This deal will likely be formally announced at the 2014 summit and follows similar arrangements reached at previous Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 to minimize and repatriate HEU and plutonium stocks in other countries.

The 300 kg of plutonium, while enough for several dozen nuclear warheads, would be considered small change relative to Japan’s current stockpile of 44 tons of separated plutonium. To further complicate matters, Japan’s new reprocessing facility at Rokkasho could produce around 8 tons of plutonium each year. According to Dr. Charles Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists and co-chairman of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation’s U.S.-Japan Nuclear Working Group, domestic politics in Japan could drive its nuclear fuel cycle policies and complicate any efforts to halt its plutonium recycling program. Japanese officials hoped to burn reserves of spent fuel and extracted plutonium in its nuclear energy reactors. With Japan’s fleet of nuclear reactors still idle after the 2011 accident at the Fukushima plant, however, officials from the U.S. Departments of State and Energy, former high-level White House staffers, non-proliferation watchdogs, and others have questioned what Japan will do with all that separated plutonium.

China Raises the Alarm on Japan, Still Has Work to Do at Home

Nuclear security and non-proliferation have become another theater in the on-going diplomatic and military row between China and Japan. Media outlets in China issued several reports on Japan’s plutonium debate. Editorials in Global TimesXinhua, and China Daily echoed official Chinese statements and called on how Japan can claim “it sticks by the three non-nuclear principles but at same time hoards far more nuclear materials than it needs.” At a February 17, 2014 press conference, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying expressed concern about Japan’s resistance to return the 300 kg of plutonium. “For a long time, Japan has not returned the stored nuclear materials to the relevant country, which has caused concern in the international community,” said Hua. “China is of course very concerned.”

Delving further into Japan’s domestic nuclear debate, Hua Chunying declared “in recent years, voices in favor of nuclear weapons have kept emerging in Japan without any clarification from the government.” Days after Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida suggested Japan may permit the basing of U.S. nuclear weapons on Japanese territory during a national security crisis, Hua pressed Japan to “adhere to its international obligations and stick to its own Three Non-Nuclear Principles.” First enunciated by the Japanese government in the late 1960s, these principles of no manufacture, possession or deployment of nuclear weapons have been a mainstay of Japanese nuclear policy. These official Chinese statements and news reports indicate Beijing has leveraged the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit to support its overall case against Japan on the international stage.

While it is often hard to distinguish between real policy preferences and mere diplomatic quarrels, studying China’s policies to protect its large stockpiles of military and civilian nuclear material is a major component of the Nuclear Debates in Asia project. In a recent article for Science & Global Security, Dr. Hui Zhang, project scholar and senior research associate at Harvard’s Project on Managing the Atom, detailed China’s attitude toward nuclear security issues and identified where work still needs to be done.

Here are some of the highlights of his article:

  • -Dr. Zhang concludes “many Chinese experts believe it is implausible (if not impossible) for Chinese nuclear weapons to be stolen because China’s arsenal is relatively small, tightly monitored, and guarded by heavily armed force.” China’s 2000 national defense white paper, for example, asserts “China is extremely cautious and responsible in the management of its nuclear weapons.”
  • -In terms of civilian nuclear material in China, Dr. Zhang writes that “Chinese nuclear experts believe that the probability of terrorist getting access to fissile material inside China and manufacturing a crude bomb is very low.” The “most realistic threat,” according to his interviews with Chinese nuclear experts, “is from a radiological dispersal device or ‘dirty bomb’” from orphaned, spare, or less secure radioactive sources.
  • -He notes a growing sense of “complacency that exists among a significant number of senior nuclear experts and nuclear industries” that may see nuclear security upgrades as “more of an international requirement than as a response to a serious threat,” which add higher capital and operating costs to the nuclear fuel cycle.
  • -Dr. Zhang recommends actions China could take to strengthen its domestic nuclear security culture, legal framework, and enforcement mechanisms: improved physical protection; improved materials control and accountability systems to reduce insider threats; and international assurances through better transparency and cooperation with the IAEA, World Institute for Nuclear Security, and United States.

Nuclear Material Security in Asia

The 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits were attended by several countries in Asia, including all of the Nuclear Debates in Asia project countries (China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam) with the exception of Taiwan due to its unique diplomatic status. The chart below shows several of the metrics used to evaluate progress on bolstering nuclear security. While disputed by some countries for how it ranks nuclear security efforts, the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Material Security Index is included as a comprehensive third-party analysis widely used by non-proliferation advocates and related NGOs.

 

Conclusion

The growing stockpiles of nuclear material and their continued safety and security remain significant challenges throughout Asia. As countries in the region ramp up their nuclear energy plans and turn up the heat in long-standing territorial disputes, these challenges become increasingly more complex and closely interconnected. Be sure to follow the RPI’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project as these issues develop. Stay connected with the project on Twitter at @Westmyer.

By Timothy Westmyer, Research and Program Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

 

Notes:

Nuclear Material Security Score: NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index as of January 2014 report

 

CPPMNM: Acceded to or ratified Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

CPPMNM 2005: Acceded to or ratified amendment of Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

ICSANT: Acceded to or ratified International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

ITBD: Participation in IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database

PSI: Member of U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative

GICNT: Participation in Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

G8GP: Member of G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

Megaports: Participation in U.S. Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative

NSF: Contributor to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund

1 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index: Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action,” Second Edition, January 2014,

2Cann, Michelle, Kelsey Davenport, and Sarah Williams, “The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report,” Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report, July 2013,http://www.armscontrol.org/files/Nuclear_Security_Summit_Report_2013.pdf

3 Ibid

4International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Materials Report 2011: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production,” January 10, 2012, http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr11.pdf

5 Ibid

6 Signed, but not yet acceded to or ratified

7 Signed, but not yet acceded to or ratified

8 In October 2013, Vietnam announced plans to join the PSI. Source:http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/14020/premier-calls-for-secure-regional-architecture-for-east-asia

9 Since 2012, Vietnam operates a local Megaports Initiative in Cai Mep. Source:http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/vietnam-1540-reporting/

10 In July 2013, Vietnam completed the transfer of HEU to Russia to repatriate its HEU research reactor fuel under the auspices of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Programme. Source: http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/vietnamheu.html

RPI Nuclear Debates in Asia Digest: Asian Powers React to Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Deal, by Timothy Westmyer

Negotiators from Iran and the so-called P5+1 powers – the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany –announced on November 24 that they reached a deal to address suspicions over Iran’s nuclear activities. In exchange for Iran freezing key elements of its nuclear program, the P5+1 offered $4.2 billion in foreign exchange and to ease some sanctions on Iranian energy and economic sectors for the next six months. The deal aims to be a sign of good faith between all parties as talks on a broader permanent deal continue.

This announcement sparked a dialogue within countries in Asia with their own varying levels of nuclear capacity. Since Iran’s primary foreign buyers of its oil are China, South Korea, Taiwan, India, and Japan, the agreement provides additional avenues for increased energy trade between Asia and Iran. However, the deal also opens up questions about the intersections of nuclear energy, nonproliferation policies, and regional security in Asia. In this Nuclear Debates in Asia Digest by Timothy Westmyer, research and program assistant at RPI, we explore how countries in our Nuclear Debates in Asia project – China, India, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam – reacted to the Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal and how they are addressing these pressing questions.

CHINA
China, India, South Korea, and Thailand were among countries which recently received a waiver from U.S. sanctions targeting countries that import Iranian crude oil because these countries have reduced their dependence on Iranian supplies over the past several months. They will be allowed to continue to purchase Iranian oil over the next 180 days without penalties.

China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, said the agreement “will help to uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation system [and] safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East.”

  • The Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang said it was a “mutually beneficial agreement which lives up to the broad expectation of the international community” and that “China will continue to play a constructive role and actively promote peace talks.”

Media outlets in China praised the agreement and identified the next several months as critical time period to see what negotiators can finally accomplish:

  • An editorial by China Daily called the agreement “an important step forward,” but the “next six months will be crucial” and a “test of the political wisdom, patience and sincerity of both countries. It is hoped the two sides will continue to shore up pragmatism and pass the test with good grades.”
  • Before the deal was announced, China Daily called on negotiators to seize a “window of opportunity” for a long term deal since there were “credible signs that an agreement can be reached” between the parties. “Ignoring such a hard-earned window of opportunity, which the Iranians say would not be available indefinitely, does no good to any party.”

Chinese media sources highlighted China’s involvement in the negotiations and the deal’s bearing on regional security:

  • In addition to the China Daily, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) underscored China’s “role as a broker” in the “historic deal,” quoting Hua Liming, China’s former ambassador to Iran, who said “when the two parties came across irresolvable problems, they would come to China, which would ‘lubricate’ the negotiation and put things back on track.”
  • Wang Hui, senior writer with China Daily, touted “the breakthrough in the Iranian nuclear issue” as a sign of “how the world order would shift in the future” with less use of “force and imposing sanctions” and more “room for mediating political resolutions to burning regional and global issues.”
  • Xinhua assessed that the nuclear deal with Iran would help resolve the current crisis in Syria. Another Xinhua news analysis suggested that the accord would “open new horizons in Iran’s policies home and abroad.”

INDIA

India’s Foreign Secretary congratulated the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister on the deal and “conveyed India’s expectation that the agreement would renew the prospect for resolving the Iranian nuclear question through dialogue and diplomacy.” Indian refineries – Iran’s second-largest customer – said they were ready to start transferring the $5.3 billion owed to Iran for past purchases of Iranian crude oil.

 

Many media outlets and political parties praised the interim agreement as a positive development that could have wider impacts on regional security crises:

  • The Hindu suggested in an editorial the interim deal may have “opened up several issues of the greatest significance to West Asia” where Iran can provide assistance: (1) as a “potentially valuable partner for the United States as Washington prepares to withdraw most of its troops from Afghanistan in 2014″; (2) in resolving the on-going civil war in Syria; and (3) in ending sectarian conflict in Iraq. Another editorial in The Hindu stressed that “New Delhi has real stakes in making sure Iran and the P5+1 succeed – and must exercise all the influence it can, to that end.”
  • C. Raja Mohan, a foreign policy analyst with a regular column in The Indian Express, believed a deal between P5+1 and Iran would ultimately benefit India since continued hostilities between those parties “complicated the conduct of Indian diplomacy in recent years, especially in the pursuit of energy security and other regional interests.”
  • The Economic Times declared the result as “great for India” as it allows New Delhi to pay off its debts to Iran. The paper urged leaders to “seize every chance to engage with Tehran,” including returning to negotiations on a Pakistan-Iran-India natural gas pipeline.
  • The Pioneer agreed that the deal was a “major diplomatic breakthrough,” which “is proof of the West’s official acknowledgement of Iran’s right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in keeping with the latter’s international obligations – a position that India has espoused for decades.”
  • In an editorial for its People’s Democracy, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) declared the Geneva agreement as a “diplomatic breakthrough” which could benefit India. The party argued “India can only rue its shortsighted and craven stance” as New Delhi acted “against India’s own interests when it succumbed to the U.S. pressure and voted against Iran in the IAEA.”

Not everyone, however, was wholly optimistic about the agreement:

  • Portraying the deal as a “clear victory for Iran,” Rajesh Rajagoplan, RPI Nuclear Debates in Asia scholar and professor of International Politics at JNU, felt the “long term consequences of this deal are much more hazy and potentially quite dangerous,” especially if nuclear weapons spread in the Middle East. He predicts the “deal is only likely to encourage further proliferation in the region” as Gulf states “will see this as a sell-out” and seek Pakistan’s help in acquiring a nuclear weapon.
  • While saying the agreement is “good news” for Indian leaders seeking energy supplies and recognition of its claims on uranium enrichment, The Business Standard offered several “important caveats” that could derail the deal, including the lack of an inspections regime and opposition from Israel and Gulf states.

JAPAN

Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomed the deal as the “first significant step toward a comprehensive solution of the nuclear issue” and that the agreement will be “implemented immediately.” Their statement noted “Japan will address the issue based on our own position toward the final solution of the Iranian nuclear issue and its implementation in close cooperation with EU3+3.”

  • According to The Yomiuri Shimbun, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida met with “his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif” to “ensure freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Strait, through which most oil tankers bound for Japan pass.”

Media outlets in Japan cheered the nuclear deal as a first step, but acknowledged future potential roadblocks as negotiations continue:

  • In an editorial, The Japan Times saw the deal as temporary but the “first concrete result of seven years of negotiations.” Since the interim agreement dodges several contentious issues such as Iran’s claim to having an inalienable right to enrichment and the future of its Arak reactor, the editorial determined “it is all the more important that the future treaty include a clear mechanism that will limit Iran’s nuclear program to peaceful purposes and rule out any possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapon.”
  • The Asahi Shimbun characterized the deal as a “landmark accord”, but saw significant trials ahead, including reassuring Israel and preventing what the editors characterized as ineffective and destabilizing military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.
  • An editorial by The Yomiuri Shimbun warned that the “Iranian situation directly affects Japan’s energy security” and advised “Japan should play a proactive role in helping to achieve a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”

PAKISTAN

Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the deal as a “brotherly neighboring country of Iran,” saying “Pakistan has always underscored the importance of finding a peaceful solution” on Iran’s nuclear program. The ministry went on to hope the agreement would “augur well for peace and security in our region and the world at large.”

Several commentators examined how the interim agreement would influence regional security challenges facing Pakistan:

  • In an op-ed in The News International, Asif Ezdi,former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service, remarked that the agreement “has the potential to become a watershed of historic proportions” with a “big impact” on South Asia. Ezdi advised Pakistan to prepare for the possibility that India will continue its “strategic encirclement” of Pakistan through improved economic and political relations with Iran and Afghanistan.
  • Hasan Ehtisham, a freelance columnist in Pakistan, wrote in the Pakistan Observer that the deal complicates Islamabad’s strong diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Ehtisham concluded the nuclear deal improves stability in the Middle East and thus Saudi Arabia – who opposes the agreement – will ultimately be less likely to ask Pakistan for help in acquiring a nuclear arsenal of its own. Ehtisham also advises Iranian leaders they “should not forget that contrary to India, Pakistan had inked its economic cooperation with Iran despite stringent sanctions on Tehran,” and Iran should reciprocate.

Other focused on the impact of the deal on a proposed natural gas pipeline and other economic dealings between Iran and Pakistan:

  • While some observers in Pakistan hoped that the agreement allow the pipeline to move forward without objection, the United States has since indicated that it still opposed the project and sanctions relief would not apply to this economic venture.
  • Asif Ezdi, a former diplomat, predicted that even with U.S. sanctions relief for Iran, “there is no guarantee that Washington will automatically give up its opposition” to the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.
  • Nevertheless, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said Iran and Pakistan would “fast track discussions” on the pipeline “to formulate a road map and a more realistic time schedule.”
  • Afshan Subohi wrote in Dawn, Pakistan’s oldest newspaper, that the Iranian deal could mean increased economic trade between Iran and Pakistan, but officials in Islamabad still lacked a strategy on how to take advantage of this “window of opportunity.”

SOUTH KOREA

South Korea’s Foreign Ministry praised the deal as a “first-step agreement to resolve Iran’s nuclear program” and expected “the agreement to be fully implemented and settle Iran’s nuclear problems in a comprehensive and complete manner.”

 

While South Korean officials called upon their nuclear-armed neighbors to the north to follow in Iran’s footsteps, several experts doubted that would be the lesson Kim Jong Un would take away from the deal:

  • Yonhap News Agency quoted a Foreign Ministry source contending “the progress of Iran’s nuclear case carries significance for North Korea, as it would put pressure on the communist country, which continues to pursue the nuclear option.”
  • This idea was explored in The Wall Street Journal’s Korea Real Time blog. However, Chang Yong-seok, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University, thought Pyongyang will be emboldened given that Tehran has maintained its ability to enrich uranium. “North Korea will keep refusing to budge, and this sets a precedent for why it doesn’t have to,” said Chang.
  • Han Yong-sup, vice president at Korea National Defense University in Seoul, put more cold water on this idea by noting North Korea would continue to see its nuclear program as ensuring the regime’s survival and not give up its weapons of mass destruction like the overthrown and deceased Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi.

TAIWAN

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs praised the agreement ”to curb Tehran’s nuclear program and loosen the western countries’ economic sanctions on Iran” and that Taiwan “hopes that the agreement will be fully implemented in a peaceful and pragmatic manner, so as to resolve Tehran’s nuclear issue and promote peace and stability in the region.”

THAILAND

Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that “welcome[d] the successful conclusion of the talks” and that it “is incumbent upon all sides to fulfill their commitments in the months ahead.” The statement noted “Thailand views that this agreement is a very important first step towards resolving the long pending Iran nuclear issue, and will contribute to an atmosphere of regional and international peace and stability.”

VIETNAM

The official newspaper of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nhân Dân, proposed the agreement was a “good compromise” for all parties, especially for the Iranian people who suffered “many years of hard times.” The paper continued that after the dust settles with this interim agreement,” negotiators will have to overcome a path full of thorns” to settle the remaining issues, such as uranium enrichment, international verification, and concerns held by Israel and Gulf states.

MOVING FORWARD

As negotiations on a more permanent and comprehensive deal continue in the months ahead, the Rising Power Initiative’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project will continue to study these developments. Follow the project on Twitter at @Westmyer.

 

By Timothy Westmyer, Research and Program Assistant at the Rising Powers Initiative

RPI Policy Report – Japan as a Global Power: Contending Views from Japan, by Henry R. Nau, Richard J. Samuels, and Timothy Westmyer

The supremacy of the United States in Asia has been a constant in U.S.-Japan relations since the end of WWII. With China’s rise and leadership fatigue in the United States, that may be changing. What will be the consequences for Japan’s foreign policy and for the U.S.-Japan alliance?

Much depends on not just the relative shift in power but how these shifts are interpreted by different schools of thought within Japan and the United States. The Worldviews of Aspiring Powers project1 at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies’ Rising Powers Initiative addressed this question of domestic foreign policy debates in five different countries, initially in a volume published by Oxford University Press in September 2012, and then in followup conferences in Washington, D.C. On June 18, 2013, it held a follow-up conference on Japan – “Japan as a Global Power: Contending Views from Japan,” co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Japan Program and the M.I.T. Center for International Studies.

This Policy Report outlines competing viewpoints expressed at the event as a means to identify likely trajectories of Japan’s foreign policy and behavior in the years ahead.

Read the full report (PDF).

Japan’s Dual Security Identity: A Non-combat Military Role as an Enabler of Coexistence by Isao Miyaoka in International Studies

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s acceptance and institutionalization of a non-combat military role to aid the US has led to its new identity as a US ally and has transformed the content of its ‘peace state’ identity. It is this role that has made these two identities more compatible. This article first attempts to measure the long-term shift in Japan’s two identities by conducting a content analysis of Japan’s Defence White Papers and then seeks to trace the formation process of Japan’s dual security identity through which it accepted and institutionalized a non-combat military role. For this analysis, the process is divided into three stages: the Cold War period when its two identities as a ‘peace state’ and a US ally were considered incompatible, the period of the 1990s when Japan started to accept and institutionalized a non-combat military role, and the period after 11 September 2001 when Japan’s dual security identity gradually got established. In the final section, the article discusses the source of a security identity shift in Japan and draws some implications for the future of its security policy.

Read the full report.

RPI Policy Report- How Russia Sees the World: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates, by Henry R. Nau and Cory Welt

Russia, like other rising powers, faces three broad options in its relations with the world: seek to integrate further with the world economy as China has done (globalist), insist on a great power relationship with the United States that highlights things like arms control negotiations and respect for the internal sovereignty of all nations (great power), or revive Russian nationalism and self-confidence and reassert its hegemonic role in the former Soviet space (nationalist). These options are not exclusive. But they do tilt in different directions. Russia as a stakeholder in the global economy will become more entangled with foreign markets including the U.S. market. Russia as a great power partner will focus on nuclear and military issues and insist on operating through the United Nations Security Council and similar great power forums. And Russia as a revitalized imperial aspirant will inevitably rival and potentially clash with the United States and other Western powers as well as with China and Japan.

Which way is Russia going? The Rising Powers Initiative (RPI) at the Elliott School of International Affairs asked this question, initially in a volume published by Oxford University Press in September 2012, and then at a followup conference on March 18, 2013 sponsored jointly by two projects at the Elliott School, the RPI Project on Worldviews of Aspiring Powers in the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS Eurasia) in the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Which way Russia goes, of course, is up to Russia. In a keynote address to the conference, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987-1991, Jack Matlock, stressed the importance of what goes on inside countries rather than outside them. The Soviet Union ended the Cold War for internal reasons not because the United States forced it to break up. Today, he pointed out, Russia makes too much of Western interference or encirclement. What happens in places like Georgia, Central Asia, or Ukraine will tend to reflect more what Russia does than what the United States does. Thus, as the Worldviews and PONARS Eurasia projects highlight, the debate inside Russia remains key.

The conference brought to Washington three proponents of the different points of view on Russia’s future. While wearing no specific labels, Vladislav Inozemtsev, Director, Centre for Post-Industrial Studies, Andranik Migranyan, Director, Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, and Fyodor Lukyanov, Presidium Chairman, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and Editor-in-Chief, Russia in Global Affairs , laid out globalist, nationalist and realist (great power) perspectives on Russia’s relations with the United States and the world. An American panel then responded to these Russian views. Again, without specific labels, Leon Aron at the American Enterprise Institute, Paul Saunders at Center for the National Interest, Samuel Charap at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and E. Wayne Merry at the American Foreign Policy Council spelled out nationalist, realist and globalist (both liberal and conservative) views on the American side. In this brief report, we set out and elaborate these views on the range of issues Russia confronts as a rising power. Attached to this report are the agenda and full list of speakers at the conference on Russian worldviews.

Read the full report.