China’s first nuclear missile on display at the Military Museum in Beijing (Source:Getty Images)

Dr. Hui Zhang, a participant in the RPI’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project focusing on China and senior scholar at Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom, recently wrote an op-ed for the The Diplomat:

On April 16, the Chinese Ministry of Defense released the eighth edition of China’s bi-annual white paper on defense since 1998. However, unlike the previous editions, this one does not reiterate China’s long-standing doctrine of no-first-use nuclear weapons. The obvious omission has sparked a debate over whether China is changing its nuclear doctrine. If China abandons its no-first-use nuclear pledge, which has guided China’s nuclear strategy since  its first nuclear test in 1964, it would severely undermine the global disarmament process, potentially preventing the U.S. and Russian from further reducing their nuclear arsenals and even encouraging the U.S. to expand its nuclear forces. Is China really changing its nuclear policy?

Colonel Yang Yujun, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Defense, answered this question unambiguously during a briefing on April 25 when he stated:  “China repeatedly reaffirms that China has always pursued no-first-use nuclear weapons policy, upholds its nuclear strategy of self-defense, and never takes part in any form of nuclear arms race with any country. The policy has never been changed. The concern about changes of China’s nuclear policy is unnecessary.”

Colonel Yang also explained that all former White Papers (with the same general title “China’s National Defense”) were comprehensive (zonghe xing), and elaborated on China’s nuclear policy in detail in sections on “national defense policy” and “arms control.” But this latest edition for the first time adopts a “thematic” model (zhuanti xing) and focuses specifically on the employment of China’s armed forces; it does not address nuclear policy in detail.

While the new white paper does not explore generally its no-first-use policy, it emphasizes that the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) is “primarily responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear counterattack.” It also explains clearly how the PLASAF employs its nuclear force during peace and war time:

“[China] keeps an appropriate level of readiness in peacetime… If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the PLASAF will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services.”

It should be noted that the term “nuclear counterattack” in the context of China’s nuclear strategy generally means “nuclear retaliation to a first nuclear strike” or “second nuclear strike.”

Many experts and scholars are suspicious of China’s no-first-use pledge, with the Pentagon’s 2013 annual report on the Chinese military calling it ambiguous.  But China’s nuclear force posture has all the features of a meaningful no-first-use policy. It has a much smaller and simpler arsenal with a much lower alert status than required for a first-use option.

Some security analysts challenge whether China can maintain its no-first-use pledge for some extreme scenarios, such as if an enemy uses conventional weapons to attack China’s nuclear arsenal. These analysts suggest China might consider a conventional attack the equivalent of a first nuclear strike and consequently initiate a retaliatory nuclear strike. However, in practice, since 1980, when it initiated China’s nuclear modernization, the PLASAF has focused on increasing the  survivability of its nuclear force by deploying mobile missiles and moving missiles underground, to ensure that the country’s limited number of land-based strategic missiles can survive a first strike— nuclear or not.

Inside China’s massive tunnel complex.

Since 1985 China has built the tunnels of the underground great wall to protect its smaller nuclear arsenal and assure a reliable second-strike capability. The tunnels are reportedly hundreds of meters underground, deep in mountain areas, and difficult to detect from space. They are designed to withstand nuclear and conventional attacks. If Beijing believes its nuclear arsenal can survive a first nuclear strike, why not a conventional strike?

In fact, the PLASAF has also developed and deployed advanced conventional missiles including DF-21s that can attack aircraft carriers and penetrate regional missile defense systems. These new conventional forces should make Chinese leaders more confident and less reliant on nuclear weapons to deal with conventional attacks.

In fact, there is no evidence that China will change its long-standing no-first-use nuclear doctrine. Since its first nuclear explosion in 1964, China has consistently adhered to a nuclear policy that features a minimum deterrent and a no-first-use pledge, both aimed at avoiding a costly nuclear arms race. This policy has been based on Chinese leaders’ perception of the nature and role of nuclear weapons and has been continuously embraced by top Chinese leaders, from Mao Zedong until today. As Mao stated a few months after China’s first nuclear test: “We don’t wish to have too many atomic bombs ourselves. What would we do with so many? To have a few is just fine.”

China’s nuclear policy has proven to be effective and smart, providing savings that can be used on economic development. As its conventional capabilities grow, Beijing should have more confidence to pursue firmly and unshakably its nuclear policy rather than follow the road of U.S. and Russia’s nuclear development. It is unthinkable that China would change its policy to pursue extremely expensive weapons parity with the superpowers.

In fact, to make substantial progress towards President Obama’s goal of a nuclear-free world,  each nuclear weapon state must change its strategic doctrine from one based on preemption to a purely defensive one based on a no-first-use policy. This will provide a solid base to promote further reductions of nuclear weapons. A no-first-use policy could also be an important measure to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, as no-first-use pledges would discourage other states from seeking nuclear weapons by removing a basic proliferation incentive while deemphasizing the role of such weapons. If the nuclear weapons states truly intend to take steps toward a nuclear-free world, it is time for them to adopt a global agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Hui Zhang, a physicist, is leading a research initiative on China’s nuclear policies for the Managing the Atom Project in Harvard Kennedy School’ s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Read the original article here.

Be sure to follow the Rising Power Initiative’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project on Twitter @westmyer and this blog as events develop for more news and analysis.

INDIA

In the past few weeks, Indian media and politics have seen a deluge of commentary on this border dispute and India’s relationship with China. During the initial confusion when it was reported that Chinese troops had set up camp in Ladakh on April 15, many called for a stern Indian response , while others urged restraint .

With the withdrawal of troops on May 6 and the visit of Indian external affairs minister Salman Khurshid to Beijing on May 9, the stand-off was temporarily relieved. Commentary then focused on explaining China’s motives and assessing the Indian government’s handling of the crisis.

• According to Ananth Krishnan, journalist for The Hindu, Indian analysts have attributed Chinese actions in Ladakh to one of four factors : 1) a general trend of growing Chinese assertiveness; 2) Chinese President Xi Jinping’s need to consolidate support from the military; 3) China’s anxieties over India’s recent build-up of infrastructure at the border; and 4) moves by local PLA commanders.

• Many speculated on what prompted the Chinese to with draw troops. Some analysts, such as Manoj Joshi at the Observer Research Foundation, praised the government’s “patient diplomacy”   and “symmetrical non-threatening military response by Indian forces.”

• Others wondered whether there was a quid pro quo , such as the removal of Indian fortifications along the border. Various papers called for greater transparency. ”Given the trust deficit that plagues the Government’s relationship with the people, there will bespeculation that the UPA regime buckled to unjust demands from the Chinese  in a bid to end a row it could not handle,” wrote The Pioneer, known for its hyper-nationalist editorials.” Aneditorial  in The Indian Express issued a similar call.

Looking ahead to Li Keqiang’s visit, there is much contemplation of future India-China ties, reflecting a wide range of opinion. In the short-term, some commentaries lament the loss of face  and fiercely advocate retaliatory measures, including in areas of trade.  In the longer-term, some are advocating greater caution in dealing with China, strengthened military capabilities, and closer ties with other countries in the region.

• “A rising China, conscious of the shifting balance of power, has become more assertive in its territorial disputes with all neighbours,” wrote the Indian Express.  ”On the face of it, the prospects for the expansion of economic and political bilateral cooperation look good. But without Chinese flexibility on settling the boundary dispute, Delhi might fall flat on its face , if it tries to construct an ambitious cooperative agenda with Beijing.”

• “The writing is on the wall. The PLA is determined to push its frontiers and intrude into Indian domains,” wrote leading expert Srikanth Kondapalli of Jawaharlal Nehru University on China’s latest defense white paper.  “India needs to tilt the emerging contest in the Indian Ocean in its favour by enhancing conventional and strategic deterrence capabilities .”

• In a series of editorials, the Times of India argued for a final settlement of the border ,  pressing China for a river water sharing treaty , and strengthening of strategic ties with the US, Japan, Vietnam  and other countries concerned about China`s expanding core interests.

CHINA

In contrast to the Indian press, the Chinese media was noticeably more subdued on the border dispute. According to The Hindu, journalists at Chinese media outlets were told to downplay the incident . From the commentaries that were available, initially the Indian media was blamed for hyping the incident.

• “[Indian media's] nonsense will influence mainstream society,” opined a Global Timeseditorial. “Some Indian officials caution that China should pay no heed to the radical voices among some Indian media which sensationalize news. But their malicious impact is so real that it cannot be ignored….Indian media have continuously created trouble for the Sino-Indian relationship .”

As the crisis toned down, the focus turned to touting the importance of China-India ties and extending an olive branch .

• “The grand strategy of China is to avoid troubled relations with its neighbors ,” commented Han Hua of Peiking University.” “Given current rows with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, there is no reason to start another row.”

Moreover, commentaries pointed to the West and Indian domestic politics for exacerbating problems in Sino-Indian relations:

• Western media hype the competition between China and India , trying to provoke the bilateral relationship, argued Mu Yongpeng in the People’s Daily.

• “With the US ‘rebalancing’ toward the Asia-Pacific, the Sino-Indian relationship is seeing subtle changes these days,” wrote Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies in the Global Times. “Within India, the so-called China threat is a trick by Indian political figures to fool their people and Western countries . By making waves about China, Indian politicians can avoid domestic problems, bolster up national morale, and raise votes. And on the international level, India can obtain advanced weaponry and technologies from Western countries.”

1. Policy Alert #45: Asian Powers Comment on French Intervention in Mali (February 2013)
2. Policy Alert #48: Lessons from Cyprus: Rising Powers Comment on the Bank Bailout and Financial Globalization (March 2013)
3. Policy Alert #50: Boston Marathon Bombings Elicit Mixed Reactions from Asian Powers (May 2013)
4. Policy Alert #33: Sentiments from Asia’s Rising Powers on Winning & losing at the Olympics (July 2012)
5. Policy Alert #44: Heightened Tensions in the East China Sea: Reactions from China and Japan (January 2013)

The impact of domestic politics on foreign policy is a subject of long-standing interest for both historians of American foreign relations and political scientists concerned with international relations. A new volume edited by Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia, brings together prominent scholars from across the world to explore the domestic dimension of foreign policy in five important countries. The core argument of this book is that domestic debates powerfully affect foreign policy, sometimes exerting as much influence as external factors. The authors consider the implications of the contesting worldviews not only for each country’s foreign policy, but also for U.S. foreign policy responses. Worldviews of Aspiring Powers therefore offers both a model for future studies of domestic debates in other rising or aspiring powers as well as some thoughtful advice for policymakers.

In order to develop a common vocabulary for discussing and analyzing these debates across the countries under study, Nau’s introductory chapter discusses three aspects of foreign policy under debate everywhere: the scope, means, and goals of policy. By analyzing these three aspects across three broad categories of worldviews–national, regional, and global–he sets up a broad framework of twenty-seven possible worldviews, which the authors of the individual chapter then use as a guide to explore the unique variations of the country under their consideration. Nau makes clear from the outset that reality does not fit the generalized model perfectly, and each country under consideration possesses attributes that make it unique. 

The book’s title makes clear the rationale for selecting these five countries: they are all, in their own ways, “aspiring” to a position in the world they do not yet hold. Not all of them, however, are at comparable stages of development. Japan has risen, though its status as a regional military power is limited; China, India, and Russia are often viewed as rising powers, though each is in some sense “conflicted” about its status; Iran is a potential power, and perhaps the greatest embodiment of the idea of “aspiring.” Though all in a sense “aspiring,” the inclusion of these five governments of “Greater Asia” to the exclusion of others could use further explanation, even if that explanation is simply the limitations of time, travel, and scholarly contacts. That said, the editors themselves acknowledge the need to expand the study, and Deepa M. Ollapally’s conclusion begins to address how to apply their model to Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey.

Each of the five individual country studies consists of a single chapter that combines the research of a U.S.-based specialist with a specialist in the country under consideration. Together, they offer a model for how to think about each country’s foreign policy concerns and debates, as well as explaining where the opinions are coming from and why. International Relations (IR) theorists might find the model itself, as well as the conclusion that in all five countries a realist model dominates, to be the most striking result of the study. For historians interested in the foreign relations and policy choices of the individual countries, the chapters on the internal debates may prove quite useful in unpacking the patterns of debate and schools of thought as they’ve changed over time.

In the opening chapter on China, David Shambaugh and Ren Xiao examine the opinions of scholars of international relations and their publications, as well as public statements from officials and state-sponsored research institutes to reveal a “spectrum” of seven foreign policy worldviews. These range from the insular to the very internationally oriented (p. 49). The contradictions among these views lead the authors to conclude that China is a conflicted power, uncertain in its own identity, and this necessarily makes clear policy prescriptions for the United States difficult to formulate. The authors acknowledge the difficulty of parsing public opinion on foreign policy issues, from the nationalist rhetoric of Chinese “netizens” to the more critical assertions of dissidents, and therefore opt not to include these perspectives in their study.

In India, the main challenge in identifying domestic foreign policy debates is determining whose opinions really matter. Deepa M. Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan focus on the opinions that seem to matter most, those within the government, with two caveats. The first is that personality is unusually important as a determining factor in India. The second caveat is that public opinion, when it matters, acts as a constraint or “veto” on issues of popular importance such as international nonproliferation policy (p. 75). Instead of a spectrum, Ollapally and Rajagopalan identify seven interlocking schools of thought, with a “standard nationalism” rooted in Jawaharlal Nehru and present since India’s founding at the center. This central idea, they suggest, has faced increasing competition from more globally oriented ideas that have gained popularity since the end of the Cold War. Despite the existence of much common ground between these schools of thought, policy toward the United States is, the authors suggest, the major point of dispute; they believe “all other differences in perspective are subsumed under this key issue” (p. 101). This point alone underscores the need for American policymakers to gain a better understanding of the debate in New Delhi.

The chapters on China and India both note the opaque nature of some foreign policy debates and the subsequent challenges for scholars attempting to dissect them, but Farideh Farhi and Saideh Lotfian had perhaps the most daunting challenge in attempting this analysis in Iran. The authors lack the robust publishing output of IR specialists in China or the media access to government offices in India. Instead, they relied on public speeches, sermons, and a far more limited academic literature in their attempt. These sources helped add nuance to the traditional conception of the Iranian domestic debate as a dichotomy between those emphasizing pragmatic geopolitical interest, and ideology. Farhi and Loftian identify Islamic Idealists, Regional Power Balancers, and Global Power Balancers as core worldviews, and break these groups down further based on their respective policy goals and the means through which they hope to achieve them. The authors highlight the role of a revolutionary Islamic and Iranian nationalism in shaping worldviews at every point along the spectrum, with the debate over how best to achieve security and status as a rising power remaining. The result is a conflicted identity in which advocates at either extreme cannot be completely successful.

In many respects, Japan is the odd man out in this study, with its relative economic prominence and its long-standing alliance with the United States. The internal debate then is less focused on how to balance or confront American actions and more on how to adjust policy strategies to an increasingly multipolar world. Basing their analysis on the work of “scholars, commentators, politicians and bureaucrats,” authors Narushige Michishita and Richard J. Samuels identify four worldviews based on their approach to two issues: the U.S. alliance (a foreign policy goal) and the use of force (a means to achieve it) (p. 151). The resulting perspectives identify broad approaches to Japan’s interaction with the world, which are then subdivided by other factors. They then attempt to remodel the debate, replacing the question of the use of force with Japan’s relationship with China, thereby exploring how Japan’s two most influential bilateral relationships affect its thinking about its foreign policy. The resulting four schools of thought, which range from deep integration to deep isolation, are not equally distributed among the foreign policy elite. The chapter argues that these ideas matter, but it also suggests that Japan’s interactions with other states and changing world events seem to have a greater impact on the Japanese calculus, suggesting the primacy of realist approaches based on hard power.

The final country chapter, which is about Russia, acknowledges the unique history of a once-and-future power enduring the pains of collapse and a changing world. Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor Zevelev look at political parties, experts, and other prominent voices in Russian debates to identify three dominant worldviews: pro-Western liberals, great power balancers, and nationalists (p. 184). Echoing a theme that recurs throughout the volume, namely the way in which national identity and self-perception shape debates, the authors suggest that the Russian sense of itself is greatly influenced by its relationship with the United States, as “old habits of measuring success or failure through a United States-centered prism have endured” (p. 199). The authors cite a smaller range of perspectives than previous chapters, in part because only those who are committed to an expanding role for Russia in the world and who embrace nationalism can be influential in the debate in Moscow.

Across all five chapters, a few general ideas emerge that are worthy of further investigation. The first is that realist worldviews are dominating or rising in each case, suggesting that rhetoric aside, pragmatic approaches are widely favored in translating ideas into actions. A second is that nationalism is vitally important in understanding how these aspiring powers view themselves and their place in the world, though what the term “nationalism” means and how it translates to foreign policy varies widely across both time and borders. A related theme is the extent to which the national mythology, or the self-perception of what the country’s place in the world is or should be, significantly influences foreign policy worldviews in each country: for China, it is the idea of being still a developing country; in India, the legacy of nonalignment and nonviolence learned from Nehru and Gandhi; in Iran, the fear of the “hidden hand” of foreign involvement in its political affairs; in Japan, the importance of the U.S. alliance; and in Russia, the legacy of superpower status and the inevitable comparison of  all progress against that of the United States. All five chapters ground their discussion in recent history to varying degrees, but historians might be interested in adopting this approach to explore earlier debates in order to analyze a longer trajectory of change.

Worldviews of Aspiring Powers concludes that the use of a standard model originating in Western international relations theory applied to five non-Western countries reveals enough similarities in the spectrum of foreign policy thinking for these comparisons to prove useful. The volume is a provocative step in this direction, though the fact that each chapter necessarily uses a different range of sources to uncover the influential worldviews for that country raises questions about the extent to which they can really be comparable. The “Greater Asia” construct loosely ties these five cases together, but the question remains whether analyzing additional countries at comparable stages of development or that hold similar “aspiring power” status could help to establish whether the similarities revealed so far are superficial or more profound.

Another important question is the extent to which these debates really shape changing policies. Throughout the book, the editors and the chapter authors acknowledge the difficulty of linking specific worldviews to concrete policy outcomes, so although the idea that policies are shaped by these domestic debates is compelling, the direct cause-and-effect relationship is not yet visible. There are steps in this direction in some chapters, but more discussion of the process through which these worldviews reach and influence those actually speaking for each country would be necessary to make the full weight of these debates clearer. Far from undermining the volume, however, this fact suggests that further inquiry into this framework is needed to advance the project, something the editors themselves acknowledge.

The opportunities for additional study are nearly endless, but Worldviews is a valuable addition to a growing literature on the connections between domestic politics and foreign policy. This volume should prove useful to scholars from both international relations and history, in no small part because of the accessible way in which it is written; though use of international relations theories and acronyms abounds, none are likely to be unfamiliar to anyone acquainted with foreign policy debates. Moreover, it could open a path toward further crossover studies, in which historians employ the framework offered here to explore domestic debates at critical historical junctures, and political scientists attempt to apply their analysis to past events.

Printable version

Pakistan is on the verge of a historic moment. For the first time in its national existence, a civilian government completed a full term of office in March of this year. A caretaker government is now administering the country until new elections are held this May. Many argue that if all goes well, successful national elections and a smooth power transition would help ensure that democratization is progressing in a country which has hitherto been ruled mostly by its generals.

However, democracy or no democracy, one trend which continues to unnerve the international community is Pakistan’s nuclear program. The country reportedly has the world’s fifth largest nuclear arsenal and it is projected to expand beyond that of France in the next few years. But this vertical proliferation is not only quantitative in nature; it is also qualitative, insofar as Pakistan is slowly but steadily diversifying the fissile base of its nuclear arsenal from uranium to plutonium. Plutonium-based weapons, unlike uranium ones, are more suitable for miniaturization because they require less fissile material. It also allows for both better concealment and swifter movement of nuclear arsenals.

The fact that Pakistan is seeking to increase its stocks of fissile materials—plutonium and uranium—is another disturbing factor. According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, Pakistan currently has enough fissile materials for 100 to 110 nukes over and above the 80-90 weapons in its nuclear arsenal. Also, once two heavy water reactors under construction at the Khusabh complex reach completion, Pakistan will have the additional capacity to produce enough plutonium for 25 warheads annually. China’s assistance in building these reactors underlines its continuing support for perpetuating Pakistan’s nuclear standoff with India.

These destabilizing nuclear projects take place amidst a time of unprecedented internal instability. The government presently confronts, at an institutional level, a tripartite standoff between itself, the judiciary and the military, as all three maneuver to protect their interests and maximize leverage over each other. Furthermore, Pakistan’s civilian government appears unable to control security in large parts of the country provoking social frustration and political opposition. Growing domestic insecurity highlights the dangers in perpetuating the current governance problems where militant groups are free to operate with apparent impunity, especially in attacking minority religious groups. Sustained political attention to stabilize and incorporate restive areas and populations into the national polity is essential for Pakistan’s future prospects as a peaceable, economically growing and cohesive country.

Pakistan also lacks a sustainable fiscal base; a major problem for the government is the extremely narrow tax base within the country. From a population of 180 million, only 768,000 people—less than one percent of the population—paid income tax in 2011. Resolving the weak taxation links between society and the state, as an essential foundation of democratic politics, has to be one of the top reforms for any government. A weak state-society dialectic creates a political vacuum for malignant and destabilizing actors to fill, all too evident in Pakistan. Instead of addressing these issues, the Pakistani polity appears comfortable in moving forward in the expansion of its nuclear arsenal, no matter the cost to society.

Chart detailing growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (Source: Hans M. Kristensen, FAS)

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are no doubt inspired by the logic of deterrence. Pakistani elites believe that they face an existential threat from India, their arch-rival and neighbor. However, the continued build-up of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal cannot be understood from the logic of deterrence alone; Pakistan also coercively utilizes its nuclear arsenal for other means. First, it threatens nuclear retaliation against any Indian attempt to punish Pakistan for its assistance and abetment of terrorism in its territory. By doing so, Pakistan has effectively challenged India’s ability and will to kinetically respond to any state-sponsored acts of terrorism which are planned and supported from inside Pakistan, even though India’s conventional forces are quantitatively and qualitatively superior to those of Pakistan. Secondly, Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal provides it with strategic heft internationally: the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of a state whose authority is rapidly deteriorating poses a significant challenge to the world community and, therefore, creates a special global interest in the country’s overall well-being. Generous donations and grants from the International Monetary Fund and the United States are influenced, in part, by the fear of a nuclear Pakistan disintegrating.

However, beyond strategic considerations, the curious fact is that Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal is also influenced by the internal power struggles between civilian elites and members of the military. The paradox for the international community is that a strong military ensures the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, even when that same force is the biggest obstacle to a lasting democracy. The military understands this dynamic, and leverages its custody of nuclear weapons to interfere in domestic politics. There can be little doubt that as Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal increases, the role of the military will only become more pronounced. This tendency threatens the ultimate potential of Pakistan’s democratization.

It is not without reason that President Barack Obama considers Pakistan to be the single biggest threat to US national security. However, Washington’s ability to force Pakistan to do a course correction is extremely limited. The blowback from the Kerry-Lugar bill, which contained several conditions in return for US aid, encountered in Pakistan is a case in point. Secondly, Islamabad has fundamentally lost faith in the United States after the US-India nuclear deal was signed without a similar agreement being offered to Pakistan. Lastly, the perception of a declining United States and a rising China has taken a strong hold in the Pakistani narrative. The most recent case in point is the commencement of construction on the Iran-Pakistan pipeline.

The champions of democracy in Pakistan should therefore remain extremely wary. As the Arab Spring has revealed, democracy is no miracle cure for long held societal animosities. However, Pakistan’s government must at least prioritize expanding the tax base to reconnect the state to society. Only from this process will the state develop sustainable domestic resources for its existence, which will also inherently raise the comparative costs of nuclear arsenal development as an alternate strategy for state survival. Building the state’s fiscal base would also likely reduce the domestic appeal of nuclear weapons, as public policy became more reflective of social needs rather than primarily those of the military. Washington should emphasize this point to Islamabad, encouraging these state consolidation efforts as essential for Pakistan’s internal and external security.

Yogesh Joshi is a Ph.D Candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University and Frank O’Donnell is a Ph.D Candidate at King’s College London.

Read the original article here.

Be sure to follow the Rising Power Initiative’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project on Twitter @westmyer and this blog as events develop for more news and analysis.

Workers in front of China’s Qinshan No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant (Source: AP)

Dr. Hui Zhang, Nuclear Debates in Asia project author and senior scholar at Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom, and Shangui Zhao recently co-wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:

From 2005 to 2011, China rapidly developed its nuclear power capacity. In 2010 alone, it began operations at two new reactors and broke ground on 10 more, accounting for more than 60 percent of new reactor construction worldwide and making the Chinese nuclear industry by far the fastest-growing in the world. By the end of 2010, China had 14 nuclear reactors in operation with a total capacity of about 11 gigawatts electric, or GWe. That was still a relatively small amount — in contrast, the United States had 104 commercial reactors with a total capacity of about 100 GWe in 2010 — but China was pursuing ambitious plans to rapidly expand.

Then came the tsunami and earthquake that led to Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi meltdown in March 2011, the world’s worst nuclear accident since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. After Fukushima, China changed course dramatically, slowing the pace of nuclear development to focus on safety. The slower pace is reassuring, but to really be a leader on nuclear safety, China should speed up the adoption of new laws on nuclear energy and enhance the independence and authority of nuclear safety regulators.

Putting the Brakes On. According to a government plan issued in 2007, China planned to install a total nuclear capacity of 40 GWe by 2020, which would account for about 3 percent of electricity generation nationwide. Many officials and experts expected that the number would actually increase further, to more than 80 GWe.

In its initial, March 2011 reaction to Fukushima, though, China’s State Council, the nation’s governing body, decided to suspend approval of new nuclear power stations, conduct comprehensive safety inspections of existing plants, and review all nuclear projects including those under construction. In October 2012, after concluding the inspections and reviews, the State Council issued a new plan that represents a serious and cautious reevaluation of safety issues and the pace of development. Called the Medium- and Long-term Nuclear Power Development Plan (2011-2020), its proposals include:

• A return to normal construction at a controlled and orderly pace.
• Permission for a limited number of new nuclear power reactors to be built in coastal sites that have been comprehensively evaluated.
• A ban on new inland nuclear power projects, because the government fears a shortage of cooling water should accidents occur at such plants.
• A requirement that all new projects meet the safety standards of the world’s most advanced nuclear reactors, known as third generation or Gen III reactors. Compared to earlier technology, these new designs incorporate improved fuel technology, superior thermal efficiency, passive rather than active safety systems, and standardized designs aimed at reducing maintenance and capital costs.

Based on the new plan, China will only approve a few new reactor construction projects before 2016. China now expects to grow its total nuclear capacity to 58 GWe by 2020, rather than the more than 80 GWe previously expected.

The government resumed approval of new nuclear power projects in December 2012, just as the new plan was issued. Several inland nuclear power projects where significant preparation work had already begun will be suspended, with some of their equipment likely transferred to coastal sites. While the pace of Chinese nuclear development will slow in the near term, the country’s long-term goals haven’t changed significantly. China continues to emphasize nuclear power as a crucial part of its energy mix. A government white paperissued in October 2012 observed that “as nuclear power is a high-quality, clean, and efficient modern energy resource, its development is of great importance for optimizing the nation’s energy structure and ensuring national energy security.” The white paper put China’s nuclear energy target at 40 GWe by 2015.

Safer Reactors. Although China has every intention of continuing nuclear energy development, in the aftermath of Fukushima it has approved a number of plans to enhance safety standards. All of them emphasize that the pace of growth should be controlled to minimize risk. As Zhang Huazhu, chairman of the China Nuclear Energy Association, said in November 2012, “our nuclear power is shifting from a rapid development to a steady stage with a focus on safety.”

On May 31, 2012, the State Council approved two plans submitted by the National Nuclear Safety Administration. The first, the Comprehensive Safety Inspection Report on Civilian Nuclear Facilities PDF, indicated that most Chinese nuclear power plants meet both domestic safety regulations and the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report did, however, reveal that some nuclear plants lacked adequate guidelines for accident prevention and mitigation, some did not meet new requirements on flood prevention, and some could be damaged in the event of a tsunami. Also, the report found, some research reactors did not meet new earthquake requirements.

The inspection report required civilian nuclear facilities to phase in safety improvements in 16 areas by 2015. By the end of 2012, the facilities were required to finish urgent improvements, including those involving flood prevention, mobile backup emergency power systems, and capacity to respond to earthquakes.

The second plan approved by the State Council, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan and the 2020 Vision of Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Pollution Prevention — the Nuclear Safety Plan PDF, for short — goes farther. It requires that all operating reactors maintain good safety records and avoid accidents. New reactors must put in place prevention and mitigation measures for severe accidents.

The plan also sets regulatory limits, requiring that newly constructed reactors experience accidents that damage their cores less than one time in every 100,000 years of operation; the frequency of accidents that result in large radioactive releases must be less than one event in one million years. For reactors constructed after 2016, the plan calls for efforts to eliminate large radioactive release accidents altogether.

To achieve these goals, the Nuclear Safety Plan requires the government to invest 79.8 billion renminbi, or about $13 billion, in five major projects by 2015: nuclear safety improvement, radioactive pollution control, scientific research and innovation, accident and emergency response, and regulatory capacity building. To implement the Nuclear Safety Plan’s proposals, the National Nuclear Safety Administration is developing a new set of safety requirements, updating the regulatory system, and perfecting nuclear safety supervision procedures.

Rising Costs, Homegrown Innovation. China’s National Energy Administration has also been urging the nation toward greater nuclear safety. In October 2012, an executive meeting of the State Council approved the Nuclear Power Safety Plan (2011-2020) drawn up by the administration. According to a news report (Chinese), the State Council emphasized that nuclear power development must follow the principle of safety first in every phase; that the most advanced proven technology should be used; that safety upgrades to new and existing nuclear power units should be carried out continuously; that safety management of nuclear power should be strengthened and emergency management and response ability should be enhanced; and that public oversight of, and cultivation of public opinion on, nuclear power should be strengthened.

The new safety requirements will have major implications. Capital costs for each nuclear power plant could increase by 10 to 20 percent. Moreover, these plans will likely push Chinese companies to develop homegrown Gen III reactor designs, instead of relying mainly on imported technology. China is constructing four plants with Gen III reactors purchased from the American company Westinghouse, and two with Gen III reactors from France’s Areva. By the end of 2013, though, Beijing is expected to start construction on a Gen III reactor of 1,400 MWe based on a proprietary design developed by Chinese scientists.

The Way Forward. While China has taken important steps towards greater nuclear safety, to make the changes real it must enhance the independence, authority, and effectiveness of its regulators. Since 2008, China has had three major nuclear safety regulators: the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), part of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; the National Energy Administration (NEA), part of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); and the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), part of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). Unfortunately, overlapping and ill-defined responsibilities among these agencies have made for unnecessary duplication and imposed complicated requirements on reactor operators.

China should streamline this system and speed up the adoption of new laws on atomic energy and safety. Beijing has not yet issued a comprehensive law on the use of nuclear energy. A first step would be to quickly pass the draft atomic energy law that was completed in 2011 and is currently circulating among government ministries.

In the wake of Fukushima, China has made it clear that it still considers atomic power an important part of its future energy mix, and it has taken major strides toward improving nuclear safety. Cleaning up the regulatory and legal framework governing nuclear power will make sure China achieves its goals.

Hui Zhang is a physicist and scholar at Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom. Shangui Zhao is chief of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Division at the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center of China in Beijing.

Read the original article here.

Be sure to follow the Rising Power Initiative’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project on Twitter @westmyer and this blog as events develop for more news and analysis.

In this post, we examine the contrasting reactions of Russia, China and India to last week’s bomb attacks on the Boston Marathon. Commentaries from these Asian powers reflect the differences in their attitudes on how to define and respond to problems of terrorism.

RUSSIA

Editorials expressed mixed views on how the Boston bombings may impact US-Russia security relations while also using the incident to criticize US actions and policies against terrorism.

President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed their commitment tostrengthen US- Russia security coordination in a recent telephone conversation. However, others expressed skepticism:

• Though Russia’s Federal Security Service and the FBI have promised to focus on “all aspects of the challenge,” intelligence sharing efforts are “hampered by mistrust, bureaucracy, and self-interest,” said Russian intelligence expert Andrei Soldatov.

• “The Boston terrorist attack may provide for an uptick in the U.S.-Russian security partnership, but we should be careful not to overdramatize its significance for overall U.S.-Russia relations,” wrote George Washington University’s Cory Welt. “The history of post-9/11 relations suggests that a stable and constructive U.S.-Russian relationship cannot be built mainly on a counterterrorism foundation.”

• Duma Deputy Speaker and Liberal Democratic Party member Vlidimir Zhirinovsky predicted that the U.S. faces a grim future of repeated attacks. “There is a clash of civilizations. The United States bombs the Islamic world, and what can they do in return? As long as Islamic countries are being bombed, attacks will occur in London and New York.”

Several editorials criticized the U.S. for holding double standards regarding terrorism:

• The Nezavisimaya Gazeta observed that “Western countries and their partners in the Near East support some terrorists as much as they can, while trying to expose, bring to account, and sentence others to the longest possible sentences, and in some cases, even to use the death penalty against them… Until we stop dividing extremists and terrorists into friends and foes, the war against this evil will be reminiscent of tilting at windmills.”

• “Anyone that the US backs in their war, in the US agenda, they are considered freedom fighters. Anyone who is against the US is seen as terrorists, or fundamentalists,” added theRussia Times.

• “Hopefully, Russia’s own war on terror…may now get at least more understanding, less bias and prejudice in the US and the West as a whole,” wrote journalist Sergei Strokan.

CHINA  

Besides expressing condolences to the victims and condemning the perpetrators of the bombing, Chinese commentary drew attention to differences between China and the US in defining terrorism, particularly with regard to groups in Xinjiang. Similar to the Russian view on this, the Chinese criticized the US for its double standards:

• China and Russia “define terrorism without regard to the reason behind the attacks, while Western countries such as the US and the UK attach importance to the ‘motives’ of any attacks on civilians,” stated a Global Times editorial. This is one aspect illustrating that “world powers are not in a long-term alliance in their anti-terrorism efforts, allowing terrorism to linger on among these powers.”

In the Chinese view, the bombing also underscored a similarity between China and the US: the need to maintain domestic stability:

• “Public security is the basis for social harmony,” argued the Global Times. “Expenditure on domestic social stability is something that both the US and China share.” However, greaterpublic awareness and vigilance are necessary to fight terrorism: “While the [Chinese] government is implementing all kinds of identification and tracking systems, the public almost invariably links them to effects on democracy and freedom, and few think about social security issues.”

There was also criticism that “respect for life in the media appears to have different grades,” given the disproportionate media coverage of the Boston bombings while other acts of terrorism were also occurring around the world. An editorial in the People’s Daily specifically pointed to recent bombings in Somalia, Iraq and Pakistan as examples.

INDIA

In contrast to the Russian and Chinese criticism of double standards, the Indian press focused mostly on India’s own problems with terrorism and praised America’s official and civilian response to the bombings as a model for India to emulate.

Editorials in papers from across the political spectrum lamented the way that Indian government and society have dealt with terrorism.

• At a basic level of emergency preparedness, “though India is more frequently attacked, each incident catches our system unawares, every lesson has to be learned all over again,” saidThe Indian Express.

• Even more important than the efficiency of response, however, is the level of “civic trust” across sectors in society, argued The Business Standard. The editorial commended US law enforcement for withholding any speculation of the attackers’ identity and motives, and praised the co-operation between the citizenry and police.

• A similar critique emphasized India’s lack of national unity when confronting terrorism. The Hindu praised the US and UK, where “terror is seen as a common threat, a national challenge that requires and demands a unified response.” The Times of India placed the blame on opportunistic politicians, pointing to an Indian congressman’s comment that the April 17 bombing of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s Bangalore office would help the party’s electoral prospects: “Politicization of terror is largely responsible for India’ ineffectiveness in fighting it.”

President Obama during before a speech on U.S.-South Korea issues (Source: AP)

When President Barack Obama and South Korean President Park Geun-hye sit down during a meeting early next month, one item will be missing from the table: a long-term renewed nuclear cooperation agreement.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry aimed to hammer out a final long-term deal before the summit, but South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said today that the two parties agreed to delay expiration of the current deal by two years until 2016. According to South Korea, while there has been “some meaningful progress” on demonstrating their side’s position, negotiators will use this additional time to address “the complexity of details and technologies.”

As this blog has covered in the past, South Korean negotiators would like to secure new rights to enrichment and reprocessing of U.S.-origin material not granted in the expiring 1972 agreement, which sets rules for the export of U.S. nuclear technology and material. The Wall Street Journal writes:

South Korea has argued that it needs to be able to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel to provide a steady supply of nuclear fuel for its fleet of 23 nuclear reactors. It also says it needs the ability to reprocess the spent fuel in order to better store the waste, which it says it is running out of room to store.

The Obama administration and other critics have argued that since these technologies can manufacture fuel for both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons, a revised nuclear cooperation agreement with these new arrangements could set a poor precedent for future nuclear energy trade, provide a future pathway for a South Korean nuclear bomb, and harm the nonproliferation regime.

Reaction in the South Korean media has been negative towards the United States. In a recent editorial, the newspaper JoonAng Ilbo felt that “Washington does not seem to trust South Korea as much as it reiterates blood-tight relations with Korea are as important as a linchpin, since it does not agree to revising the pact.” The editorial doubted that an additional two years would yield a favorable agreement: “It is merely a makeshift move to avoid a dispute.”

In another editorial by the newspaper Chosun Ilbo, U.S. negotiator Robert J. Einhorn was referred to as a “nonproliferation Taliban” for his laser focus on the proliferation risks of reprocessing and enrichment technologies. The editorial contended that the breakdown of talks so close to the U.S.-South Korean alliance’s upcoming 60th anniversary was a slap in the face by the United States to its Korean ally.

Moving forward, the two nations will continue to “hold talks on a regular basis to intensify consultation,” according to a diplomatic source quoted in Chosun Ilbo. Since negotiations began in October 2010, there have been six rounds of talks. Seoul has indicated that another two rounds over the next two years should be sufficient to make their case.

President Park will be in Washington, DC for a summit with President Obama on May 7. She will also address a joint-session of the U.S. Congress on the following day. Be sure to follow the Rising Power Initiative’s “Nuclear Debates in Asia” project on Twitter @Westmyer and this blog as events develop for more news and analysis.

Henry Nau (George Washington University) and Fyodor Lukyanov (Russia in Global Affairs) exchange views at the conference on “Russia as a Global Power” on March 18, 2013.

The collapse of the Soviet Union generated a wide range of contending views in Russia on the nation’s place in the world and its relationship with the West. In more recent years, however, Russian foreign policy can be largely characterized as one shaped by a pragmatic approach to balance of power politics and economic development. This outlook and its policy manifestations, along with dissenting views, were the theme of a recent conference on “Russia as a Global Power,” organized by the Rising Powers Initiative at the Elliot School of International Affairs.

Russian worldviews since 1991 can be categorized into roughly three schools of thought, argue Andrew Kuchins and Igor Zevelev in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers. The “Pro-Western Liberals” stress a European identity and favor closer integration with Europe through collective security and economic liberalization, but they have fallen out of favor since their brief rise in the early 1990s. The “Nationalists” see Russia as a distinct civilization apart from the West, and advocate the use of military power to secure Russia as an independent center of power in Eurasia. In contrast to the regional perspective of the Nationalists, the “Great Power Balancers” believe that Russia should have global aspirations in a multipolar world where international status is attained through both economic and military strength.  The three Russian experts featured at the conference roughly reflected this spectrum of worldviews in their discussions on a wide range of topics including Syria’s ongoing conflict, the creation of a Eurasian Customs Union, and Russian relations with China and India.

Sovereignty and non-intervention in Syria

On the question of Russia’s position on the current civil war in Syria, the general consensus was that Russia has opposed the involvement of foreign powers in Syria due to its firm belief in the principle of non-intervention. This principle is grounded in the “Russian view of how international affairs should be organized at large,” explained Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs and Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. In this light, Russia’s earlier support for intervention in Libya should be seen as an aberration on the part of President Dmitry Medvedev and is unlikely to be repeated, argued Lukyanov.

Andranik Migranyan, who has held several key policy advisory positions in the Russian government and is now the Director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New York, also strongly affirmed Russia’s principle of non-interference in Syria.  “Russia’s principal concept is that so-called democracy promotion and regime change are not an adequate policy in the current world, and it would be better for the United States to reconsider its policy on these issues because this is becoming less and less accepted by many other rising and important actors,” said Migranyan.

Lukyanov further dismissed speculation that Russia’s position on Syria was driven by geopolitical calculations in the Middle East, yet others disagreed that Russian motives were solely the reflection of its belief in nonintervention. Syria lies on the supply route of hydrocarbons from the Middle East to Europe, and thus if a new Syrian government has close relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, oil and gas supplies from the Persian Gulf might undercut Russia’s exports to Europe, argued Vladislav Inozemtsev, Director of the Center for Post-Industrial Studies in Moscow and Chairman of the High Council of the Civilian Force Party, a recently established center-liberal, pro-European party in Russia.

Motives for a Eurasian Customs Union

Just as Russia’s policy on Syria reflects a particular worldview, so does its 2010 initiative to create a customs union comprised of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Experts disagreed on whether this project is motivated by political or economic factors.  Inozemtsev expressed skepticism that Russia will be able to derive any tangible economic benefits from the Eurasian Customs Union because the member economies are too similar in their dependency on exports of oil and raw materials. Thus, argued Inozemtsev, this is a highly political project that is analogous to Boris Yeltsin’s 1996 proposal to unite Belarus with Russia.

This view was a marked contrast from that of Migranyan and Lukyanov, who both praised the Eurasian Customs Union as a laudable attempt to strengthen Russia’s economy through further economic integration with its neighbors and eventually the European Union. Lukyanov explained that “Putin’s view on the international economy is that in order to play a role, any role, a big country needs to extend markets and to create a sphere [with] harmonized rules.” For Putin, this process of regional integration is “similar to the initial stage of European integration 60 year ago,” said Lukyanov. Migranyan agreed, rebuking those who harbor suspicions of Russia trying to expand its geopolitical influence through this customs union: “Only loons can think that this is a kind of reestablishment of the Soviet Union or some kind of empire, which we very often read in the Western media.”

Russia’s relations with Asian powers

Even if one sets aside the question of Russia’s relations with the West, debates over Russia’s other external relations remain contentious. Some Russians, while cognizant of economic competition and potential strategic challenges from China, generally hold a positive view toward developing a constructive partnership with China. “China is a natural partner with Russia,” said Migranyan, pointing out that “China is a rising power and is interested also in a multipolar world.” However, others such as Lukyanov and Inozemtsev took note of the imbalanced economic relationship between Russia and China, and expressed worry that Chinese investment in Central Asia portends to replace Russian dominance in the region’s affairs and turn Russia into a junior partner. Similarly, disagreement existed over whether and how relations with India might affect efforts to improve ties with China.

Nevertheless, even with these recent discussions of Russia’s new focus on Asia, substance may still be lacking. After all, Russia’s closest economic and strategic relations are still with the U.S. and Europe, not with Asian countries. Take for example Russia’s 2013 foreign policy white paper, pointed out Lukyanov, and one sees that the Asia Pacific region is merely item #75 on the agenda, far behind Russia’s relations with post-Soviet states and the West. Thus, as Kuchins and Zevelev argue, “the status of the Western democratic market development model as well as the role of the United States and the West more broadly in international relations” remain the center of gravity in Russian debates over foreign policy and identity.

By Amy Hsieh, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, George Washington University, and Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference (Source: Carnegie/Kaveh Sardari)

On April 8-9, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted its biennial Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, DC. The gathering convened government officials, academics, think tank experts, and private citizens to engage in discussions on nuclear energy, nuclear weapon, and nonproliferation issues around the globe. The Rising Powers Initiative’s Nuclear Debates in Asia project was there to see many of the project’s countries and issues prominently discussed at the event, including nuclear debates in China, India, Japan, and South Korea.

In this blog post, we highlight the major exchanges related to the Nuclear Debates in Asia project:

• China’s challenge to pursue ambitious nuclear energy goals alongside regulatory oversight
• How China defends a limited role for nuclear weapons in its defense strategy
• Indian perspectives on the nonproliferation regime and nuclear energy agendas of emerging powers
• India’s expansive nuclear energy plans
• Lessons learned for Japan and India after the accident at Fukushima nuclear plant
• One viewpoint within South Korea on how to respond to its northern neighbor’s recent provocations
• South Korea’s approach to balancing nonproliferation concerns with spent fuel challenges through reprocessing

Changchun nuclear plant (Source: AP)

China: Matching Nuclear Energy Ambitions and Effective Regulatory Oversight

China’s ambitious plans for nuclear power expansion were discussed during a panel on the future of nuclear power around the globe. Mark Hibbs from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pointed out that China’s nuclear regulator is increasingly bottle-necked and overwhelmed as they struggle to keep up with the country’s nuclear energy surge.

• The high number of venders, future plant locations, and growing diversity of reactor designs are stretching China’s regulatory capabilities too thin.
• Since Hibbs did not believe China would give up on nuclear power any time soon, he suggested that the central government move quickly to develop better oversight infrastructure by investing in more experienced and higher quality regulators.

M.V. Ramana, Princeton University, concurred with this assessment and added that China’s fragmented political decision making process and multiple competing interests have thus far resulted in multiple reactor designs being introduced into the country’s nuclear fleet.

• International suppliers see China as a huge potential market for their exports so many venders want to get involved. This means multiple designs and a more complicated nuclear regulatory system.

Panel at 2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference (Source: Carnegie/Kaveh Sardari)

China: Maintaining and Proclaiming the Benefits of a “Small” Nuclear Arsenal

In a panel discussion on deterrence, disarmament, and nonproliferation in President Barack Obama’s second term, General Yao Yunzhu from the Academy of Military Science in China presented China’s views on the subject. Yao argued that because China possessed only a “small nuclear arsenal” and a pledge to not use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, her country should remain outside multilateral arms control talks for the time being.

• When Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals come down to a number closer to China, she insisted that additional issues needed to be included in those possible talks, including missile defense, the role of nonstrategic weapons, and both deployed and non-deployed weapons.
• As has China pledged to not engage in an arms race with the United States and Russia, Yao predicted that her country would not “sprint to parity” as U.S. and Russia reduce size of their arsenal.
• She said that China remained wary of how advancing U.S. missile defense capabilities could harm China’s smaller nuclear arsenal. In the future, Yao reasoned, Beijing may need to recalculate its minimal deterrence strategy to adjust to these new U.S. missile defense systems.
• She thought that China’s primary challenge is learning how to maintain its no-first use pledge and minimal deterrence strategy with the limitations of a small nuclear arsenal. She suggested that China has focused on three key elements: 1) survivability; 2) penetration capability; and 3) fostering uncertainty. China benefits from a “certain level of opaqueness” on the size of its nuclear force. Furthermore, she stressed that Beijing planners remained concerned that U.S. missile defense and advanced conventional weapons threatened China’s penetration capabilities and survivability.
• Though Yao believed that U.S. extended deterrence through its nuclear umbrella for Japan and South Korea may discourage nuclear weapon ambitions for these allies, the nuclear umbrella’s presence in Asia may have encouraged the North Korea to build a nuclear arsenal in the first place. She felt that as long as the U.S. nuclear umbrella exists in the region, it would remain a hindrance to denuclearization.

In response to these claims, Alexi Arbatov, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, expressed his frustration with what he felt was a lack of transparency on the size and purpose of China’s nuclear arsenal.

• Arbatov argued that merely saying that a nuclear arsenal is “small” was not helpful. He He said that China’s talk about force size or minimal deterrence strategies were “just rhetoric” until it can be supported by data.
• He concluded that since China could rapid increase the size of its arsenal and capabilities, Beijing should be more active with current arms control efforts.

Panel at 2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference (Source: Carnegie/Kaveh Sardari)

India: Perspectives on the Nonproliferation Regime and Nuclear Energy

During a panel discussion on the nuclear agenda of “emerging powers” such as Brazil, India, and Turkey, the Indian ambassador to the United States, Nirupama Rao, said that India has long been interested in a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that is global and nondiscriminatory.

• Rao stressed that because India has never engaged in illicit proliferation and has an “impeccable nonproliferation record,” it earned the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver and its current access to the international nuclear fuel market.
• She felt that India has met any reasonable criteria for entry into the NSG and that current discussions with the United States, France, and Russia have been very productive in gaining their acceptance of India’s membership in the group.
• Though India prefers to avoid a collapse of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, Rao pointed out that New Dehli would never join the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State. Whether India could possibly join the treaty as a Nuclear Weapon State in the future was up to existing NPT Member States.

In terms of India’s nuclear energy future, Ambassador Rao said that nuclear energy remained an essential element of the country’s “energy basket” and that they would continue to improve the safety of their reactors.

India: Ambitious Nuclear Expansion Plans

During a panel discussion on the future of nuclear power around the globe, M.V. Ramana outlined India’s ambitious nuclear expansion plans. India has a goal of 450 gigawatts in the next forty years, a substantial increase over its current 4000 megawatt capacity.

• Domestic opposition to India’s nuclear energy plans – especially populations near individual nuclear sites – is strong and based on perceived threats to their livelihoods such as fishing and farming communities. Ramana believed that the government’s current strategy of squashing protests will likely not succeed as the number and diversity of nuclear sites continue to grow.
• Many private sector nuclear plant suppliers have expressed concern that in the event of an accident at a facility they built in India that they could be unfairly punished under existing Indian liability laws. Ramana concluded that these international vendors remained unconvinced that the government’s offer to resolve liability concerns through payment caps and legal reforms would protect the supplier. He argued that venders are quietly worried about possible accidents and that any cap on how much a nuclear company must pay out after an accident will not hold once the public starts putting pressure on their elected official.

Damaged No. 4 unit of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant (Source: Kyodo/AP)

Japan and India: Lessons Learned for Nuclear Energy after Fukushima

During a panel discussion on lessons learned after the Fukushima nuclear accident, Kazuto Suzuki from Hokkaido University and one of the researchers for a major report on the accident found that Japan was simply not prepared.

• He argued that a “myth of absolute safety” was prevalent within the Japanese public, government, and nuclear industry. This myth held that because nuclear power was a “necessary evil” to meet Japan’s growing energy demands, the local public needed to believe that nuclear power was absolutely safe with no risk of accident.
• When stronger regulations clashed with this safety myth, they were not pursued. Rather, government regulators and the nuclear industry focused on investing in “good hardware” as a preventive method.
• Kazuto Suzuki concluded that the driving forces behind nuclear power (e.g. lack of domestic energy resources, rising economic growth) were stronger than the push for increased safety, regulations, and caution.

M.V. Ramana provided the three major lessons he felt India took away from the Fukushima accident.

• First, local opposition within India to nuclear power grew, especially in the south. Those in the public who were sitting on the fence no longer believed official government declarations on safety, preferring to listen more to the emerging anti-nuclear movement. Ramana did not believe that the government’s current pro-nuclear education campaigns will be sufficient to quell local populations on the nuclear power question.
• Second, the Indian government still plans for rapid expansion in nuclear energy capacity by mid-century. India was one of the first nations to certify a new nuclear reactor site after the accident.
• Third, government regulators have concluded that the Fukushima accident is not relevant to India. Through public statements and internal communications, nuclear regulators and government officials continue to believe that an accident with India’s nuclear fleet is a “one in infinity” chance. This attitude, he argued, often leads regulators to develop regulations but not enforce them when push comes to shove.

Finally, during a panel on managing nuclear power post-Fukushima, Tatsujiro Suzuki from Japan’s Atomic Energy Agency reminded the conference that the accident was not over. His government remained focused on getting displaced people back into their homes and on with their lives.

• He felt that the biggest lesson for Japan was its “need to think the unthinkable” when it came to potential future nuclear accidents. Japan and any country using nuclear energy needed to plan for managing contingencies after an accident no matter the probability of occurring.

Assembly Member MJ Chung during 2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference (Source: Carnegie/Kaveh Sardari)

South Korea: One Viewpoint Calls for Expanded Nuclear Mission

During a lively morning keynote session, M.J. Chung, a Member of National Assembly of Republic of Korea, suggested that the threat from North Korea demanded a reconsideration of his country’s current Non-Nuclear Weapon State status. Since he felt that previous efforts to foster better relations with North Korea were massive failures, he provided a number of options that were hotly debated at the conference:

1. Return U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea
2. Nullify past agreements related to nuclear issues that restrict South Korean activities
3. Reposition U.S.- South Korean military divisions to enhance security
4. Consider having South Korea withdraw from the NPT
5. Continue dialogue on nuclear issues with North Korea for now
6. Encourage regime change – with China’s help – in North Korea

Chung felt that the U.S. nuclear umbrella would be insufficient to disarm North Korea. On the other hand, Chung believes that an indigenous South Korean nuclear arsenal may be just enough leverage to accomplish that goal.

• He argued that re-stationing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea could prevent North Korea from starting a war.
• In response to audience criticism that South Korea’s NPT withdrawal could harm the nonproliferation regime, Chung doubted the treaty’s effectiveness if it could not stop the North Korean nuclear program. If the NPT regime did not work then, Chung suggested that there would be little real consequence to South Korea following Pyongyang out of the treaty.
• He predicted that his views on nuclear issues would gain traction in his country as the public continued to feel threatened by the north.
• He concluded that denuclearization of the peninsula is the last step before Korean reunification.

Panel at 2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference (Source: Carnegie/Kaveh Sardari)

South Korea: Balancing Global Nonproliferation Concerns with Domestic Spent Fuel Challenges

During a panel discussion on the proliferation implications of new fuel cycle technologies, South Korea’s attempts to use a reprocessing method called “pyroprocessing” to help manage its spent fuel challenge was closely debated. Pyroprocessing is a spent fuel treatment process that separates plutonium from other more radioactive byproducts after nuclear fuel is burned in a nuclear reactor. Since reprocessing technologies can manufacture fuel for both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons, some critics have argued against Korea using this technology on proliferation grounds.

Soon-Heung Chang from the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology defended pyroprocessing as a necessary tool to minimize the amount of radioactive waste to be left in the environment.

• Chang characterized this need as a duty of government officials to future generations who must live with today’s nuclear fuel cycle decisions.
• He recognized the need to balance spent fuel solutions with global nonproliferation considerations, though Chang argued that pyroprocessing is a proliferation resistant technology because it does not produce pure plutonium that can be more easily used in a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, he said the pyroprocessing would better serve IAEA safeguard efforts through on-site monitoring due to the technology’s unique containment system.

In response to this claim, the panel’s moderator, Jeffrey Lewis from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, maintained that pyroprocessing was too similar to traditional reprocessing techniques.

• The panel cited a 2009 study by the U.S. national laboratories which “concluded that for state-level threats, the differences” in this approach was “not very significant and that a state bent on developing a nuclear weapon could “convert the facility to separate pure plutonium” within a few days to a few weeks.
• Nancy Jo Nicholas from Los Alamos National Laboratory concluded that no fuel cycle technology was completely proliferation resistant and that countries should be cautious when bringing these technologies into operation.

For further information and analysis on these nuclear debates, follow the project on Twitter at @Westmyer or visit the project website and blog.