Assessing Taiwan’s Security Dynamics in a Competitive International Environment: Strategies for Security

Asia Report #62 | November 11, 2023

Introduction

Recent developments on the global stage point to the exceptional military and economic security challenges facing Taiwan. Continuing supply chain disruptions, moves to de-risk or de-couple from China, heightened geopolitical tension in the Taiwan Strait with rising Chinese pressure, all raise questions for Taiwan’s security and economic stability. From strengthening military and security capabilities to cultivating partnerships around the world, there are many questions on how Taiwan will walk the fine line between defending its integrity and maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait.

These challenges were discussed at the Sigur Center’s Conference on Assessing Taiwan’s Security Dynamics in a Competitive International Environment, with Deputy Representative Johnson Sen Chiang, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S., giving opening remarks followed by two panels of experts. The full video can be found here. This Asia Report is the first of a two-part series from the Conference and focuses on Strategies for Security, to be followed by another on Building Partnerships for Resiliency. The experts on Strategies for Security include Lonnie Henley, Professional Lecturer at the George Washington University, Bonnie S. Glaser, Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, and David Sacks, Asian Studies Fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations. Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, George Washington University moderated the session.

Deputy Representative Johnson Sen Chiang set the stage for the Conference with his opening remarks on the need to foster exchanges between Taiwanese scholars and government officials and institutions such as the Sigur Center for Asian Studies that offer opportunities to engage with top policy experts to help broaden their perspectives on common concerns. He praised the endeavor of Gaston Sigur during his career to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship even during some challenging times. Addressing the topic of the Conference directly, Deputy Representative Johnson cited the expansion and diversification of security dialogues between Taiwan and the U.S. and other like-minded countries beyond the traditional military sector, to new challenges such as gray zone tactics, building resilience in global supply chains and cyber security threats. He highlighted Taiwan’s efforts to bolster its military capabilities to defend its democracy while also exercising self-restraint in order to prevent a conflict that would have a tremendous global impact. Looking ahead to the January 2024 national elections in Taiwan, Deputy Representative Johnson emphasizes how Taiwan works closely with the U.S. to defend common values of democracy and ensure that another free and fair election may be held without interference or intimidation from Beijing.

 

Defending Taiwan and Deterrence Strategy 

Lonnie Henley’s focus is on preventing China from taking military action to forcibly reunify with Taiwan. He recognizes that the main strategies used by the United States involve deterrence by denial, which aims to convince China that an invasion of Taiwan would not be successful, and deterrence by punishment, aimed at convincing China that the cost and damages resulting from an invasion would be too high. Henley also highlights the ongoing discussion that these efforts are weakening and need strengthening. His main thesis is that American military deterrence is strong, but cannot prevent Chinese action on its own.

The idea that deterrence is weakening has led many to believe that the United States must increase its military preparedness and bolster Taiwan’s defenses to prevent an invasion; Henley, however, points out that American deterrence against military action is the highest it has been. If invading Taiwan was easy then China would have done it already. Beijing is very aware that there is a high likelihood of failure should they invade and, even if they were successful, the costs and damages would be enormous. So while the U.S. must continue to maintain these efforts, in his view, American deterrence is effective at this stage.

Henley then goes on to assert that deterrence alone is not enough to prevent military action. For over sixty years Beijing has believed that a military takeover is not necessary and reunification can be achieved through non-violent approaches. However, if China were to believe that peaceful reunification was not possible, then the use of military force may be inevitable despite deterrence. Therefore, according to him, American policy should be focused on keeping Beijing convinced that a non-violent effort will work, whether it is true or not. A relatively effective deterrence strategy is to dissuade China from invasion by maintaining the belief in a peaceful reunification.

 

Alliance Politics and Taiwan 

Bonnie Glaser discusses how both the change in language used in statements and the growing cooperation with Taiwan add to the previous idea of deterrence and are part of the expansion of the role that alliances play in the Taiwan Strait balance. Prior to the Biden administration, the United States has focused on encouraging its allies to support Taiwan’s involvement in the United Nations and especially in the World Health Organization. Recently, there has been a major shift in the way the U.S. and its allies have been referring to Taiwan. The specific rhetoric being used in U.S. statements and joint statements with allies signifies the issue has transformed from a U.S.-China relations issue to an issue that needs to be addressed by the international community as a whole. Another significant shift is the increase of defense and non-defense related support shown by the United States and its allies.

Recently, the specific language and rhetoric used by the United States and its allies created a clear and unified message to China and Taiwan. Joint statements with the U.S. and countries like Japan, Australia, and South Korea as well as intergovernmental organizations like the European Union and G7 all include an emphasis on preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and encouraging a peaceful resolution to the issue. These statements have demonstrated that many countries, not just the United States, have a stake in Taiwan’s security and signals to Beijing that this is an international issue.

Many countries have also been increasing their defense and non-defense related cooperation with Taiwan. Some examples of the United States and its allies working towards defense goals include: U.S. and Japan creating a plans to establish temporary military bases along the Nansei island chain in the event of an invasion, Australia’s cooperation with the UK and US to create longer range submarines is partly motivated by the Taiwan Strait tensions, and the U.S. and Canada sailing warships through the strait on a regular basis now. Other non-defense actions include countries like South Korea, Australia, and Germany sending parliamentary delegations or other high level government officials to Taiwan.

Glaser then goes on to explain that the reason many other countries have joined the United States in supporting Taiwan is due to the recognition that an invasion by China would be catastrophic to the economic interests of countries around the world. A report released by the Rhodian group estimated that a blockade of Taiwan would cost 2.5 trillion dollars to the global economy. As for European countries specifically, many have been negatively impacted by the war in Ukraine which has cost far less. While she has noted a significant increase in the cooperation between governments, Glaser points out that the public does not have enough understanding of the issue to support Taiwan. She emphasizes the need to bring the public along if the United States and its allies are to be able to fully support Taiwan and suggests using the lessons learned from Russia’s war in Ukraine to help spread awareness.

 

Strategic Signaling and U.S. Posture 

David Sacks explains his criticisms of the United States’ ambiguity towards Taiwan and instead urges strategic clarity in order for the U.S. to fully cooperate with allies in the defense of the island. The current position of the U.S. on coming to Taiwan’s aid in the event of military action from China is purposely ambiguous in order to simultaneously prevent Chinese aggression and discourage a Taiwanese declaration of independence. Sacks, however, believes that creating a clear policy around defending Taiwan will not add to the independence movement. While public polling has shown a rise in Taiwanese identity, it also reveals that the majority of people in Taiwan would rather maintain the status quo than declaring independence. He argues that the focus should be on preventing an invasion of Taiwan through strategic clarity and bolstering deterrence.

Sacks believes that China has become far more assertive and risk-accepting over the last decade citing examples of the militarization in the South China Sea, border clashes with India, and conflicts with Japan near the Senkaku islands. This combined with concerns about U.S. resolve and commitment as a result of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the debates about giving aid to Ukraine, and a broader sense that the United States is becoming more isolationist could cause allies in the region to doubt Washington’s support. This doubt could lead to countries like Japan and South Korea pursuing their own strategic autonomy or other countries in Southeast Asia to cut deals with China. Strategic clarity would enable better cooperation between the U.S. and its allies because it would remove this doubt. Sacks also goes on to address some criticisms of this tactic. He explains that strategic clarity would not violate the U.S.’s one China policy as it has nothing to do with the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. While some say that this would push China towards invasion, Sacks points out that President Biden has adopted strategic clarity four times without escalation.

In terms of U.S. force posture and bolstering deterrence, Sacks lists the Biden administration’s progress in identifying Taiwan as a major defense challenge, gaining access to bases in the region like Japan and the Philippines, and the submarine program with Australia. Creating bases and placing troops in allied countries while enormously important for bolstering deterrence, almost always creates questions around sovereignty and the role of the United States in the region. Despite these challenges, the Biden administration is making strides towards setting up these bases which in turn signals to Taiwan and other allies in the region that the U.S. is committed to their defense.

Sacks concludes by discussing steps the United States and its allies can take in order to further deter Chinese aggression. These steps include: increasing Taiwan’s defense budget from 2.5% of their total GDP to 4-5%, using Taiwan’s defense budget to invest in both smaller and cheaper items like mines, missiles, and radars as well as larger projects like the indigenous submarine program, furthering U.S.-Japan cooperation, and investing in American assets and force posture. He calls the current conflict in Ukraine a wake up call for the United States as it revealed significant gaps in the defense industrial base and encourages re-energizing the focus to these areas as they are not currently adequate to meet a potential invasion of Taiwan.

 

By Mark Sheehan, B.A.Candidate in International Affairs and Events Assistant, The Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

Asia’s Future at a Crossroads: A Japanese Strategy for Peace and Sustainable Prosperity

U.S.-Japan Relations Associate Professor Mike Mochizuki and Professorial Lecturer Kuniko Ashizawa published a report entitled Asia’s Future at a Crossroads: A Japanese Strategy for Peace and Sustainable Prosperity. It is now available in English and Japanese.

Executive Summary

As the strategic competition and confrontation between the United States and China intensifies and the future of the international order in Asia has become uncertain, Japan confronts the task of refashioning its diplomatic and security strategy. In December 2022, the Japanese government adopted a new “National Security Strategy” for the first time in a decade. Although it does not ignore the need for diplomatic dialogue and cooperation, what stands out is the strong emphasis on power politics (including military capabilities) and geopolitics as well as economic security. In response, the new strategy stresses the centrality of Japan’s self-defense capabilities and the U.S.-Japan alliance. However, there exists a significant disparity between the paradigm presented in the new “National Security Strategy” and Japan’s own capabilities. Consequently, the U.S.-Japan alliance is deemed essential to fill this gap; and in that sense, there is an element of logical consistency in the new strategy. Accordingly, strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance ends up being the strategy’s a priori premise and its absolutely indispensable prescription. What underlies the discussion and recommendations in this report is our serious concern that the new paradigm will leave Asia entangled and divided in the future.

Japan’s long-held emphasis on a multifaceted and multilayered approach to Asia policy continues to be a constructive way to address the new regional and international challenges that have emerged. The transnational challenges that have become particularly prominent in recent years have acutely demonstrated the need for an unprecedented level of international cooperation. Nevertheless, recent foreign policy discourse around the world has tended to focus more on great power competition than on interstate cooperation. In this context, Japan should maintain and promote security cooperation with the United States; but at the same time, it should also exercise leadership to help mitigate the competition between the U.S. and China in Asia through constructive diplomacy, thereby reducing the danger of great power war in the region. Without this, there can be no solution to transnational problems and no progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Such efforts and practices are consistent with the concept of “middle power diplomacy,” which aims toward a more autonomous foreign policy that is close to but not solely dependent on the United States.

The US-India Partnership After Modi’s Visit to Washington

Rising Powers Initiative Research Assistant Satvik Pendyala and Senior Research Assistant at Carnegie China Nathan Sher authored an article for 9DASHLINE about Modi’s visit to the United States and India’s position in US-China competition. You can read the full article on the 9DASHLINE website. It is also available below.

The US-India Partnership After Modi’s Visit to Washington

Early in June, the US Indo-Pacific Coordinator, Kurt Campbell, expressed hope that Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Washington DC would “consecrate” India as the United States’ most important partner. Following the visit on 22 June, the two sides agreed to deepen ties across technology, defense, economic, and people-to-people domains. India even received technology-sharing deals traditionally reserved for US allies. As the United States adapts to rising strategic competition with China, it has sought to strengthen ties with New Delhi as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific.

As US-India relations are strengthening, China-India relations are continuing to deteriorate, reaching their lowest point in decades with unresolved border tensions at the forefront of the downturn in relations. Over the last 10 years, India has lost nearly 40 percent of its patrolling posts in Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Recent polling by Tsinghua University reveals that only eight percent of Chinese respondents have a favorable view of India, lower than the percentage of favorable views toward the United States and Japan. To make matters worse, India and China recently expelled nearly all of each other’s journalists, implemented mutual business restrictions, and are continuing to compete for influence in South Asia.

Even as New Delhi and Washington’s interests converge over mutual mistrust of Beijing, many analysts have questioned India’s value as a US security partner. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently argued that Washington should not hold any “delusions of New Delhi becoming a comrade-in-arms during some future crisis with Beijing”. Similarly, a new RAND report suggests that New Delhi displays “no evidence of being willing to volunteer to join a war that does not directly involve” India’s interests.

As the United States adapts to rising strategic competition with China, it has sought to strengthen ties with New Delhi as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific.

Nonetheless, New Delhi may not need to get directly involved in a potential US-China contingency to be pivotal in a time of crisis. There is a range of actions, from logistical support to joint deterrence, that India could take to provide both strategic and tactical benefits to the United States in the event of a Western Pacific contingency. The possibility that India might get involved in a US-China crisis alone would be enough to deflect some of Beijing’s resources and attention from the direct zone of conflict. As the two sides work to continue to deepen their security relationship, Washington should not give up on the prospect of New Delhi’s growing appetite for defense cooperation.

Shared concerns and mutual interests

While many analysts point to the 2020 Galwan border clashes as the inflection point in India-China tensions, bilateral suspicions began rising years before, due to the growing assertiveness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Western Theater Command. Not only did India and China face off at the Depsang Plains in 2013, but three years later several PLA officers involved in those clashes were also promoted to senior positions in the Tibetan Military District and the Western Theater Command.

Tensions then peaked with the May 2020 Galwan clash. While New Delhi claimed that Chinese border violations eroded the “entire basis” of India-China ties, Beijing attempted to put the border issue in an “appropriate place” in the bilateral relationship. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit this April, China portrayed the border situation as “stable”, even though the two sides clashed just months before, in December 2022, at Tawang.

Amid India’s estrangement from China, New Delhi’s underlying motive for strengthening relations with Washington is not solely to oppose Beijing but to cement its role as a rising great power. Therefore, India has joined US-led groupings like the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) along with participating in other coalitions such as BRICS and the SCO. However, India often recoils when the latter organizations try to insert language in support of Chinese initiatives, such as BRI projects, Beijing’s Global Security Initiative, or counter-terrorism efforts that do not target anti-India extremist groups in Pakistan.

During the Cold War, India partnered with the Soviet Union to avoid domination by either the United States or China. Today, the United States and India have discovered that common anxieties regarding China’s potential domination of Asia are bringing them closer together. As India’s threat perception of China continues to grow, India will find greater security cooperation with Washington — short of being a formal ally — ever more palatable.

India in a US-China Confrontation

It is true that India will likely seek to avoid the costs of any conflict that does not directly bear on New Delhi’s interests as much as possible, including in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. India’s emphasis on economic development clashes with any desire to get directly involved in such a hypothetical military contingency. On the other hand, India’s security interests and great power aspirations do not start and stop at the Sino-Indian border. New Delhi recognizes that China’s increasingly destabilizing role in the Indian Ocean and larger Indo-Pacific undermines its own security. A scenario in which the United States loses a kinetic conflict with China and is pushed from East Asia would exacerbate India’s own vulnerability to Chinese domination.

Viewed through an economic lens, India may be reluctant to get involved in a US-China conflict to insulate its own economy. The reality, however, is that a major conflict, even far afield from India’s borders, would severely damage the Indian economy. Deterring and preventing potential Chinese aggression against its neighbors would serve India’s economic interests. In the security domain, India has an abiding interest in preventing Chinese hegemony not only along the Sino-Indian border but throughout the Indo-Pacific. If Beijing were to succeed in “reunifying” with Taiwan, the India-China border would become one of China’s last remaining territorial disputes, and India would be more vulnerable to Chinese pressure.

Even as it faces incursions along the border, India remains committed to improving its maritime capabilities to match the growth of the PLA Navy. New Delhi recently redoubled its military build-up at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands bases in the Bay of Bengal, just northeast of the Malacca Strait. In September 2022, India launched its first domestically built aircraft carrier, and in June 2023 the Indian Navy took part in twin-carrier exercises demonstrating improved interoperability with US and Japanese forces.

India’s naval bases at the mouth of the Malacca Strait give it a unique ability to apply pressure on China by leveraging access to important commercial shipping lanes. New Delhi could grant the United States and its partners access to these islands for logistical, as well as intelligence, support. Even if the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are not operationalized during a Western Pacific contingency, India’s decision to expand its capabilities in advance of any such crisis would enhance joint deterrence, complicating China’s strategic calculations against Taiwan.

Although Taiwan remains a far more important core territorial interest to China when compared with Aksai Chin or Arunachal Pradesh, the PLA still must prepare for the risk of a potential border conflict with India. This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position where it remains vulnerable to Indian pressure on disputed border territories while the bulk of its forces remains focused on preparing for a Taiwan contingency.

Indian geostrategist Brahma Chellaney recently proposed that an Indian escalation on the border in the event of an imminent Taiwan invasion could force China to consider a wider range of threats. Thus, deterrence signaling on the China-India border before a potential Taiwan invasion could be as important as any direct intervention in a US-China contingency. Joint deterrence by India and the United States would necessitate stronger strategic linkages between New Delhi and Washington to coordinate and manage the risks of escalation.

A partnership with teeth

While the degree of India’s involvement in a US-China conflict will depend on India’s threat perception of China, there is little to suggest that China and India plan to de-escalate soon. Although narratives in Chinese state media argue that Washington is to blame for rising China-India tensions, Chinese attempts to separate India from the United States have been largely unsuccessful. The confluence of India’s own strategic concerns and great power ambitions have facilitated its alignment with the United States.

Since the United States designated India as a Major Defense Partner in 2016 and elevated New Delhi to the status of Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1 in 2018, the US-India relationship has become broader and deeper. The two countries now exchange vast quantities of military and dual-use technologies, conduct joint military exercises, and engage in intelligence-sharing bilaterally, as well as through the Quad.

Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to Washington solidified new agreements to transfer critical jet technology, cooperate on spaceflight, purchase armed drones, and pursue joint research on semiconductor breakthroughs. In the aftermath of Modi’s state visit, more important than any single deliverable, the tone of the US-India relationship has shifted to one of long-term alignment.

Xi in Moscow and Kishida in Delhi & Ukraine—a One-Way Alliance vs Delicate Dancing

Last week, from March 20-22, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow for a three-day state visit. Both Putin and Xi published articles in each other’s national media before the visit, which ended with them penning and signing two joint statements “making plans and arrangements for the growth of the bilateral relations.

Meanwhile Japanese Prime Minster Kishida’s visit to Ukraine hours after Xi arrived in Moscow, was painted as mirroring Xi’s to Moscow. The Japanese support to Ukraine was seen as the West’s response to China’s support of Russia, and was heavily criticized in Chinese media, which also took issue with Kishida’s visit to India just before Ukraine, adding to India’s difficulties in charting a course through troubled waters.

Russian media saw Xi’s visit as a mark of support from China and attacked critics, but Chinese media and Foreign Ministry statements were far more measured, which was seen as “a likely reflection of the unequal power balance within the alliance.” This contrast  is similar to the discrepancy in analysis between Russian and Chinese national media that was observable after the September 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand. In both cases, Russians went further than their Chinese counterparts in drawing conclusions about how Russia and China were forming a block to oppose the US-led West.  Significantly, Xi’s first words after landing in Moscow were to state that the China-Russia bilateral relationship was built “on the basis of no-alliance, no-confrontation and not targeting any third party”.

Read the full Policy Alert here.

Deadlock in Delhi & After: Rising Powers remain entrenched in their positions post Delhi G20 and Quad meetings

Policy Alert #253

While the G20 Summit in New Delhi is only set to take place in September, it was already in the spotlight as of March, and not in the way that host country India had hoped. The Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on March 1st and 2nd in Delhi succeeded a joint G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG), and a Finance & Central Bank Deputies (FCBD) Meeting in Bengaluru in late February, with an ambitious agenda focused on multilateralism. However, the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting especially showcased divergences among G20 members despite an introductory speech by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi urging unity. Indeed, after one year of fighting in Ukraine, Rising Powers are still entrenched in their positions despite the fluctuations of the war. In fact, there seems to be less consensus as the war has gone on, as Russia’s military setbacks no longer elicit the same reactions from observers than the expected onslaught and initially rapid gains. While in Bali emerging powers seemed to side with the US, in Delhi they seemed to expect more about “seeking peace” rather than “defending Ukraine”.

The end result was that the acrimonious talks over Ukraine and whether the G20 was the appropriate venue to discuss security concerns overshadowed attempts to find consensus on multilateralism and development. Overall, the Foreign Minister’s Meeting appeared as a first major test for India ahead of the Summit in September, with pressure mounting as Russian President Vladimir Putin may attend the Summit in New Delhi. Similar turmoil at the Summit this September would be a disappointment to Modi, and a “chair’s summary will not do” for Indian diplomacy vying for international recognition.

Read the full Policy Alert here.

Japan’s Rising Role as an Indian Ocean Actor: What Do Port Stories Tell Us?

In January 2023, a little-noticed naval exercise took place between the U.S. and Sri Lanka in the strategically located Trincomalee port and Mullikulam base in the Indian Ocean. The annual bilateral CARAT Sri Lanka exercises have been long-standing, but this year, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force joined them for the second time after its initial participation in 2021. This came right on the heels of India sending the INS Delhi to dock at Trincomalee and providing training for the Sri Lankan Navy. These actions come four months after the controversial Chinese docking of a surveillance ship at Hambantota port in the midst of Sri Lanka’s historic economic and political meltdown in 2022.

Japan’s increasing involvement in the Indian Ocean will have a deep impact on the interests of its Quad partners, especially India. While Japan has been a traditional development aid partner in the region, its newest role suggests a leading strategic edge. What does Japan’s strategic edge in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) look like? And to what extent is it characterized by a partnership with India versus a more unilateral approach?

Read full Policy Brief here.

Rising Powers in 2022: a Year Under the “Sign” of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Policy Alert #252 | January 26, 2023

The relationships and power dynamics between China, India, Japan and Russia in 2022 were shaped by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The proximity between the Japanese and American stances towards the invasion was expected, and confirmed during Japanese Prime Minister Kishida’s meeting with U.S. President Biden on January 13. However, the way that India’s government under Prime Minister Modi would react was unknown. As such, his interactions with Russian President Putin were heavily scrutinized and the initial Indian declarations regarding the war carried a lot of weight. On the other side of the spectrum, China was not widely expected to side with the US. Instead, the interrogation resided in the level of support that Chinese President Xi Jinping would show towards Putin.

Another important factor in the quadrilateral balance, in addition to the evolution of each rising power’s relationship with Russia, was the state of the China-India relationship, in the midst of bloody border skirmishes in Ladakh. As such, a worsening relationship between China and India could prevent the two countries from aligning on a common position and presenting a united front. This was reinforced by domestic encouragement in both China and India for aggressive posturing and provocations, such as the invitation of border commander Qi Fabao at the NCPCC to celebrate his involvement in  the June 15, 2020 skirmish in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed. In parallel, Japan announced a strengthening of Japan India military ties, which was seen by China as being encouraged by the U.S. as it tries to isolate Russia and China.

This policy alert will focus on media coverage of international meetings where heads of state met, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, the COP 27, and G20. Coverage of other events, such as the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCPCC), Vostok 2022 military exercises in Russia, or ASEAN forums, also provided information and context to understand internal and external perceptions of each of these rising powers’ current stance towards the war in Ukraine, as well as the fluctuations of their relationships with each other.

Read the full Policy Alert here.

By Gabriel Savagner, M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs at GW. Research Assistant at GW’s Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

Can Regional Architecture for the Global Commons Catch Up in the Indo-Pacific with US and Indian Cooperation?

Introduction

India and the U.S. have become a significant part of the Indo-Pacific’s security framework with their active participation in regional groupings. This makes them indispensable member states in structuring the architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

The Rising Powers Initiative at The George Washington University and Christ (Deemed to be University) in Bangalore recently held a joint Conference on Regional Architecture for Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of US and India in Security and the Commons. The first session sought to explore important aspects of the security dynamics in the region, focusing on how joint contributions may help in upholding a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and promoting a rules-based order. See the Security Policy Brief here. This Policy Brief considers a spectrum of commons issues that the two countries can cooperate on, from climate refugees to the blue economy. Watch the Commons session here.

There is an urgent need for the US and India to go beyond their traditional cooperation in maritime security and address pressing challenges in oceanic ecosystems, international maritime law, and fishing disputes. These are areas which have a direct impact on the lives and livelihood of local and larger populations of the Indo-Pacific. Successful collaboration would thus meet both foreign policy and domestic objectives.

Experts on the commons consisted of Jason Donofrio, External Affairs Officer at The Ocean Foundation, Cornell Overfield, Analyst at CNA Corporation, and Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation’s Maritime Policy Initiative. The session was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University.

 

Read full Policy Brief here.

Assessing Taiwan’s New Military Security: Cross Strait, Defense and US-Taiwan Relations

Asia Report #59 | November 21, 2022

A high-tension visit by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in early August 2022 led to the People’s Liberation Army Navy holding exercises near Taiwan and firing live missiles near the island. Chinese military escalation and stern diplomatic warnings to the U.S. came in the midst of final deliberations of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS act) in Washington. A week after Speaker Pelosi’s visit, President Biden signed the measure into law, providing over $50 billion to help develop and produce semiconductors while encouraging U.S. companies to cut China out of their semiconductor supply chains.

To explore these issues and how heightened tensions are likely to affect Taiwan and its economy and security, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a conference on Taiwan’s New Security Challenges: Economic Security and Military Security. The Asia Report from the first panel on economic and high-tech security may be found here. This Asia Report focuses on Taiwan’s changing military security challenges and assesses how cross strait, defense and US-Taiwan relations factor into possible responses. The video of the entire conference may be found here.

The speakers included Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder and Principal of the Marathon Initiative, Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, and Jacob Stokes, Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University.

Read the full Asia Report here.

Regional Architecture For Security In The Indo-Pacific

November 14, 2022

Introduction

India and the U.S. have become a significant part of Indo-Pacific’s security framework with their active participation in regional groupings. This makes them indispensable member states in structuring the architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

The Rising Powers Initiative at The George Washington University and Christ (Deemed to be University) recently held a joint Conference on Regional Architecture for Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of US and India in Security and the Commons. The first session on Security sought to explore important aspects of the security dynamics in the region, focusing on how joint contribution may help in upholding ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and promoting a rules-based order. This Policy Brief is based on the first session on Security, with a second report forthcoming on the Commons. Watch the first session here.

Primarily to counter Chinese assertiveness, speakers noted that key countries in the region can come together on multiple security dimensions ranging from non-traditional security and intelligence sharing to climate resilience and disaster management. This would help to evolve the existing group frameworks in the region which are currently informal and exclusive in nature. American involvement in the region’s security framework could serve to counter other security concerns including North Korean nuclear proliferation. And in collaboration with India, an emerging regional leader, it could help to foster and solidify more lasting security relations in the Indo-Pacific.

N. Manoharan, Director of the Centre of East Asian Studies, Christ (Deemed To Be University), gave a welcome note, which was followed by a keynote address by Alyssa Ayres, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, moderated the session. The panelists were Jeff Smith, Research Fellow at Asia Studies Center, Heritage Foundation; Lisa Curtis, Senior Fellow & Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at Center for a New American Security; and Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff (India).

Read the rest of the article here:

Policy Alert: Drilling Down into Views in Japan and India on the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Policy Alert #251 | November 10, 2022

The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC) was heavily scrutinized in international media given the symbolic importance Chinese leadership has given it. Newly reelected President Xi Jinping was “long expected to secure a third term,” but the decisiveness of Xi’s victory, the manner in which the NCCPC “cemented Xi Jinping’s iron grip on the party” and the sometimes contentious tone of the event were revealing of a more resolutely assertive stance than anticipated by experts and observers. From former president Hu Jintao being physically removed to the importance Xi dedicated to military modernization, the 20th NCCPC projected an image of a more dominant Xi in China, and a more hawkish China in the world.

India and Japan, two countries which have had increasingly fraught relations with China in the five last years since the 19th NCCPC, observed with heightened interest, and their respective national media and commentators focused on how specific issues were addressed during the NCCPC, particularly border clashes and Xi’s “complete control” over Chinese foreign policy.

Read the full Policy Alert here.

 

Kowloon Walled City–Unanswered Questions from the Demolition of a Famed and “Notorious” Urban Slum

Urban slums are characterized by overcrowding, lack of access to essential services, substandard housing, and unsanitary conditions. According to the United Nations (2021), more than 1 billion people – every one out of four urban residents – live in slums or informal settlements; the world’s slum dwellers are primarily in three regions: Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and Southern Asia. One of the biggest challenges to city governments in these regions during the urbanization process is dealing with such urban slums and addressing the needs of slum dwellers. One approach adopted by certain city governments is slum clearance. The demolition of Kowloon Walled City in Hong Kong is just such a case.

Kowloon Walled City (KWC) was an ungoverned informal settlement in Hong Kong. In 1898, the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory signed between the Qing Dynasty (the Chinese Government back then) and the United Kingdom signified the lease of the “New Territories” in Hong Kong to the United Kingdom for 99 years rent-free. Notably, the KWC, located within the boundary of the “New Territories,” was exempt from the Convention and thus still under the control of the Qing Dynasty. Nevertheless, while China legally held the sovereignty and administrative power in KWC, China didn’t exercise them in the next few decades after 1898. Meanwhile, Britain claimed that it had administrative power over KWC but never executed it. These made KWC a place that lacked law enforcement.

The population in KWC increased dramatically following WWII, from 2,000 plus inhabitants in 1947 to around 33,000 in 1987 (Ho, 2018). In the late 1980s, KWC was the densest place on earth – a population density of 1.25 million persons per square kilometer. This mega-slum had around 500 buildings of 10-14 stories (see picture below). KWC residents were not required to pay property tax. And business operators and industries inside the KWC were not required to register with the British Hong Kong Government. As a result, people who failed to obtain recognized qualifications, e.g., medical practitioners and unlicensed dentists, those whose work involved illicit industries, and those who couldn’t afford high rent, chose to live in KWC.

Figure 1. Kowloon Walled City Aerial Photo

Kowloon Walled City Aerial Photo
Source: Ian Lambot (1989). An aerial photo of the Kowloon Walled City.

Several times in history, the British Hong Kong Government wanted to eliminate KWC but failed to do so due to the opposition of the KWC residents and political concerns, such as the diplomatic pressure first from Kuomintang and then later from the Chinese communists (the political party in power at different times). Only in the early 1980s, when the bilateral relationship between Britain and China had improved and Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997 had been set on the agenda, did the British Hong Kong Government touch on the thorny issue of KWC and announce its decision to tear down KWC in January 1987. The Hong Kong Housing Authority organized four waves of rehousing efforts from November 1987 to July 1992 (see graph below). After rehousing the dislocated population, KWC was demolished from March 1993 to April 1994. And a historical park was built on-site from May 1994 to Dec. 1995.

Figure 2.  Four Waves of Rehousing Efforts

Figure 2. Four Waves of Rehousing Efforts
Note: This graph was created by the author based on a government report by Hong Kong Housing Authority (2002)

Thirty years after KWC’s demolition, several questions regarding this urban slum clearance action are still pending: whether slum clearance is the best policy option to deal with mega-slums? Whether those rehoused slum dwellers and their offspring have better access to education and job opportunities? Are the overall welfare effects of such slum clearance action in the long run positive? On the one hand, the KWC could be seen as highly disadvantaged compared to other nearby neighborhoods, given the high crime rate and unsanitary conditions. On the other hand, the KWC also served a useful purpose for the city, given that it provided access to medical services and various products at a relatively lower price for the city residents. Scholars from George Washington University are currently analyzing the effects of this slum clearance action on the short-term and long-term socio-economic outcomes in the hope of providing better policy recommendations for developing countries experiencing rapid urbanization.

References:

Girard, Greg and Ian Lambot. 1993. City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City. Watermark Publications (UK) Ltd.

Ho, Pui-yin. 2018. Making Hong Kong: a history of its urban development. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Hong Kong Housing Authority. 2002. Report on the Work of the Special Committee on Clearance of Kowloon Walled City.

United Nations. 2021. “Urban Population Living in Slums or Informal Settlements, 2018.” https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/goal-11/ (Accessed May 9, 2022).

By Jingwen Zhen, Sigur Center Summer Grant for Asian Field Research Awardee.
Any errors in the blog are the author’s.

Policy Alert: Tricky Summitry as Rising Powers Meet at Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Samarkand

Policy Alert #250 | September 21, 2022

 

The 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand, which took place from September 15th to 16th, was much anticipated by international media, as it would provide the opportunity for Russian President Vladimir Putin to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, as well as with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for the first time since the beginning of the Russian war in Ukraine. As such, their encounters were heavily scrutinized, especially to assess the extent to which China and India would support Russia. Both China and India shared circumspection about the war and did not provide unconditional assurances of support. In fact, Prime Minister Modi spoke out in a rare public rebuke of Russia, while President Xi shared his concerns. Both China and India played a balancing act of not endorsing Russian actions while also not outwardly condemning them, with Chinese media criticizing the US for trying to seed dissent within the SCO while some Indian media saw this as a premise to nurturing India’s “growing ties with the US.” Russian media minimized the dissent within the SCO, and President Putin deflected criticism about the war in Ukraine, blaming continued hostilities on Ukrainian intransigeance. The most striking contrast in analysis of the SCO summit was between Russian and Chinese officials. Indeed, while Russian officials and state media argued that the SCO gave its member states tools to resist Western sanctions as a united bloc, and that the Samarkand summit contributed to building a new world architecture, Chinese officials resisted the notion of “China and Russia as a political and military bloc.”

Read the full Policy Alert here.

A Tale of Two Indias? China and India from Hambantota to Vostok

Policy Alert #249 | September 8, 2022

 

On August 16 at 8:20 am local time, the Yuan Wang 5, a Chinese ship, docked in Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. It left after six days on August 22nd, but not without causing an international stir. Its docking had been delayed for a few days by Sri Lankan authorities as the ship came embroiled in controversy. Indeed, the ship arrived in Sri Lanka as India was testing new missiles, raising suspicions that the ship, which has the capacity to track ballistic missile and satellites, had been sent to collect data on Indian missile launches.

This incident comes in the context of the extended standoff between China and India along the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh. Weeks before the Yuan Wang 5 was scheduled to dock, India denounced it as a “dual-use spy ship,” an assessment that was shared by the US Department of Defense. China pushed back against this narrative, asserting that the ship was solely docking for replenishment and was a research ship, conducting marine scientific research, and that its docking was part of “normal exchanges and cooperation between China and Sri Lanka.”

However, the Chinese ship had barely left Sri Lanka before India joined the Vostok 2022 military exercises in Russia held September 1-7. These exercises are hosted by Russia but China is the second largest participant, having sent a 2,000 strong contingent from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As part of these exercises, around 200 Indian troops drilled with contingents from other participant countries, and thus collaborated and trained with the Chinese military even as the controversy over the Yuan Wang 5’s docking near India was still fresh. India seems to be playing a delicate balancing act, drawing concern for different reasons from both the US and China.

What are the opinions in the region on these developments from Hambantota to Vostok?

Read the full Policy Alert.

Maritime Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific: American and Indian Views on Threats and Responses

Policy Brief | June 2, 2022

With the looming presence of an authoritarian China and its deepening footprint in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. and India are aligning on how they equally value the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Challenges in this maritime region come from a variety of sources, and the two democracies have their connects and disconnects while combating them. What are the key traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats facing the Indo-Pacific? How do Indian and American priorities compare, and what are the prospects for working jointly to secure their interests and objectives bilaterally and otherwise?    

To address these questions, the Rising Powers Initiative (RPI) at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University and the Department of International Studies, Political Science, and History, Christ University in Bangalore, invited a panel of leading experts, including Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director, Asia Program and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Director, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)’s Strategy and Policy Analysis Program, with commentator Gurpreet Singh Khurana, missile warfare specialist of the Indian Navy and author, currently a Visiting Professor at Naval War College (NWC), Goa. In addition, there were brief interventions by two other specialists, P.K. Ghosh, a former Senior Fellow at IDSA and Indian Navy veteran, and Subramanyam Raju, Head of the Center for Maritime Studies at Pondicherry University. Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of RPI, moderated the event. This Roundtable is the fourth segment in the project that commenced last year on U.S.-India relations between Christ University and George Washington University. See event recording on YouTube

The first session of the Roundtable covers traditional military maritime security concerns and responses. The second session concentrates on non-traditional security, which does not get as much attention despite its direct impact on Indo-Pacific populations. It covers human security issues or soft security such as climate change and ocean pollution. The purpose of the Roundtable was to draw out the top priorities of the U.S. and India and consider how they intersect, according to U.S. and Indian experts, respectively. 

Read the full policy brief.